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I. AN OVERVIEW: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTION TO GIVE
TENANTS A LEGAL RIGHT TO HABITABLE DWELLINGS
As recently as 1965, Burby's well-known hornbook on Real Prop-
erty stated as black-letter law that "[i]n general, the lessor does not
impliedly warrant that the leased land is suitable for a specific pur-
pose," subject to well-recognized exceptions for leases of space in
buildings under construction and for short-term leases of furnished
dwellings,' and "[in the absence of a statute, and in the absence of a
controlling covenant, a lessor is not under a duty to maintain leased
land in a state of repair."2 In 1977, however, the American Law In-
stitute in the Landlord and Tenant Section of its Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Property in substance took the position that, "[e]xcept to the
extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise," every residential
lease contains an implied warranty and covenant by the lessor that
"the leased property . . . is suitable for residential use (both on the
date the lease is made and during the period, if any, between that
date and the date the tenant is entitled to possession)," 3 and the lessor
will "keep the leased property in a condition that meets the require-
ments of governing health, safety, and housing codes [and] keep safe
and in repair the areas remaining under his control that are main-
tained for the use and benefit of his tenants."4
Although the new Restatement's black-letter rules5 do not state
1. W. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 63 (3d ed. 1965).
2. Id.§64.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1 (1977).
4. Id. § 5.5.
5. The Restatement sections cited supra are contained in Chapter 5, entitled "Con-
dition of Leased Property Prevents Contemplated Use." The section headings are as
follows: § 5.1 Condition Unsuitable on Date the Lease is Made-Remedies Before
Entry; § 5.2 Unsuitable Condition Arises After Date of Lease-Remedies Before En-
try; § 5.3 Effect of Entry by Tenant on Remedies Then Available; § 5.4 Unsuitable
Condition Arises After Entry-Remedies Available; § 5.5 Obligation of Landlord to
1979]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
with complete accuracy the case law in a majority of American juris-
dictions, they at least approximate what is by now a "majority rule."
As the introductory Note to chapter five of the Landlord and Tenant
Section of the Restatement observes,
In recent years, the definite judicial trend has been in the di-
rection of increasing the responsibility of the landlord, in the ab-
sence of a valid contrary agreement, to provide the tenant with
[residential] property in a condition suitable for the use contem-
plated by the parties. This judicial trend has been supported by
the statutes that deal with this problem. This judicial and statu-
tory trend reflects a view that no one should be allowed or forced
to live in unsafe and unhealthy housing.6
The new principle that the landlord must provide the residential ten-
ant with a habitable dwelling is now established in at least thirty-one
jurisdictions. In a majority of these jurisdictions, the principle re-
sulted entirely from legislative action. In some of the others it arose
from judicial action, and in the rest its origin was both legislative and
judicial. Although neither the legislative nor the judicial approach
has been uniform, the net result can accurately be characterized as a
"revolution" in American landlord-tenant law.
The tenants' rights legislation of the 1960s and 1970s generally fall
into three types:
1) Statutes that, without expressly creating any new rights, build
on existing housing codes by detailing new tenant-initiated private
remedies for the landlord's failure to provide a habitable dwelling.7
2) Statutes that expressly impose a new duty on landlords to pro-
vide tenants with a habitable dwelling, usually stated in terms of a
Keep Leased Property in Repair, § 5.6 Parties Agree Otherwise as to Landlord's Obli-
gations in Regard to Condition of Leased Property. Chapter 5 is broader in coverage
than the subject matter of this Article, for it states rules applicable to non-residential
as well as residential tenancies. Chapters 10 and 11 deal with tenant remedies in
detail.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5, Introduction at 150 (1977).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-148(f), 19-347k to 347v, 19-371 & 19-400 (1977); 1968
Md. Laws ch. 459; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 127C-127N & ch. 239, § 8A
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1978); MicH. COMp. LAWS § 125.530 (MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 5.2891(10) (Callaghan 1976)); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 441.500-441.640
(Vernon Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-85 to 42-95 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y.
MuLT. DWELL. LAW §§ 302(1)(b), 302(a) (Consol. 1974); N.Y. MULT. REsID. LAW
§ 305-a (Consol. Supp. 1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW ACTS §§ 755, 769-782 (Consol.
1974 & Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 45-(24.2)-1I (SuPp. 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-5501 to 53-5507
(1977).
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"warranty" or "covenant" of habitability, but without describing any
duty or remedy in detail.'
3) Statutes that detail both the landlord's duty to provide a habit-
able dwelling and the tenants' remedies for breach. All but one of
these statutes are embodied in comprehensive new codes of landlord-
tenant law,9 and most of them are similar-though not identi-
cal-because based on either the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act (URLTA)' ° or the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code.'
Several states have statutes of more than one type. 2 Most of the
statutes falling into all three categories include or are coupled with
provisions that protect tenants against retaliatory action by landlords
in cases where tenants assert statutory rights. 3
The highest courts in at least eleven jurisdictions have recognized
the tenants' new right to a habitable dwelling by holding that all or
most residential leases contain an "implied" warranty or covenant of
8. See IDAHO CODE §§ 6-320, 6-322 & 6-323 (Supp. 1977). See also MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 554.139 (MicH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1109 (Callaghan 1976)); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 504.18 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (Consol. Supp. 1978); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-(18)-(16) (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West Supp. 1978).
Maine creates an implied warranty and covenant of habitability, but also details the
tenant's remedies for breach. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 6021 (Supp. 1978). The Wis-
consin statute creates a duty on the landlord's part without using the term "warranty"
or "covenant," and also contains a brief tenant's remedy provision. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 704.07 (West Supp. 1978).
9. The exception is MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (Supp. 1977).
10. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.010 to 34.03.380 (1977); ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1301
to 33-1381 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47a-1 to 47a-20 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 83.40 to 83.63 (West Supp. 1978); 1978 Iowa Legis. Serv., pp. 449-511 (House file
2244); KAN. STAT. §§ 58-2540 to 58-2573 (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 383.505-
383.715 (Baldwin 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 42-401 to 42-442 (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76.1401 to 76-1449 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-7-1 to 70-7-5
(Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.01-5321.19 (Page Supp. 1977); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 91.700-91.900 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-2801 to 64-2864 (1976); VA.
CODE §§ 55-248.2 to 55.248.40 (Supp. 1978); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.010-
59.18.900 (Supp. 1977).
11. DEL. CODE tit. 25, §§ 5101-5112 (1974); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 521-1 to 521-77
(1977), Hawaii is listed in 7a UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 499 (West 1978) as having
adopted the URLTA, but in fact the Hawaii legislation more closely resembles the
Model Code.
12. See notes 7, 8 and 10 supra.
13. This will be separately considered later in this Article. See notes 547-621 ac-
companying text infra.
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habitability. 4 In five other states lower courts have taken the same
view.'5 In several implied warranty jurisdictions-Massachusetts,
Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York-judicially im-
plied warranties of habitability have been superimposed upon Type I
statutes.' 6 In Washington, the court retroactively implied a warranty
of habitability into a lease that antedated new legislation adopting a
comprehensive residential landlord-tenant code based on the UL-
TRA and the Model Code. 7 A California court adopted the new
implied warranty theory' 8 shortly after the legislature enacted
amendments detailing the landlord's long-established statutory duty
to provide his tenant with a habitable dwelling.' 9 In New York, how-
ever, the process was just the opposite: a legislative warranty of hab-
itability followed judicial recognition of the warranty.2" Similarly, in
Iowa, Hawaii and Kansas, enactment of comprehensive landlord-ten-
ant codes based on the Model Code and the URLTA, respectively,
followed court recognition.2' In the District of Columbia, the local
legislative body enacted an ordinance substantially codifying the ju-
dicially recognized implied warranty of habitability.2 Wisconsin en-
acted a Type 2 statute 3 a decade after the famous Pines decision that
14. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974); Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Lemle v.
Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351,
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer,
214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184,
293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito v.
Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d
526 (1970); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 166 (1973); Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). It is arguable, however, that Pines v. Perssion
was overruled sub silentio by Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528
(1970). See note 25 infra.
15. Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, - Ind. App. -, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ct. App.
1976); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Tonetti v. Penati, 48 App.
Div. 2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d
919 (1972); Pugh v. Holmes, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978).
16. See note 7 supra.
17. Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
18. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974).
19. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941.1, 1941.2, 1942, 1942.1 & 1942.5 (Deering 1972).
20. See note 8 supra.
21. See notes 10 and I1 supra.
22. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATIONS § 2902.2 (1970).
23. See note 8 supra.
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established an implied warranty of habitability.24 The Wisconsin
statute was enacted before, but took effect after, a decision that ar-
guably overruled Pines."
The District of Columbia and Missouri courts have allowed ten-
ants to assert new rights based on the theory that a lease is illegal if
entered into when substantial housing code violations exist on the
leased premises.26 This argument is an alternative to rights based on
the implied warranty of habitability theory. In the District of Colum-
bia, a local municipal ordinance later codified the illegal contract the-
ory.
2 7
Although both legislative and judicial development of the principle
that landlords must provide residential tenants with habitable rental
housing started before 1965, the trend accelerated tremendously be-
tween 1965 and 1979. While the reason for this acceleration is not
entirely clear, a number of factors seem to have been operative:
higher concentrations of low-income tenants in central cities, an in-
creasingly serious shortage of affordable housing, the inadequacy of
traditional modes of housing code enforcement, the civil rights move-
ment of the 1960's, the riots in the urban ghettos, and the Johnson
administration's Great Society program, which provided motivation,
dedicated manpower, and financial support for the effort to alter
traditional legal relationships between landlords and tenants in ur-
24. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
25. Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970). In Posnanski, the
tenant alleged that certain defective conditions in his housing violated the Milwaukee
Housing Code, which obviated any obligation of the tenant to pay rent while these
code violations existed. Although all alleged violations arose after the beginning of
the tenancy, the tenant clearly relied on the theory that these violations of the housing
code made the lease an illegal contract, and hence unenforceable. The court held
inadmissible all evidence intended to prove code violations, after stating that the issue
was "whether the legislature and common council of the city of Milwaukee intended
that the housing code be an implied covenant mutually dependent with a tenant's
covenant to pay rent, and thereby utilize rent withholding as means of enforcing the
housing code." Id. at 178, 174 N.W.2d at 531. The Posnanski opinion is puzzling
because the court's statement of the issue is inconsistent with the tenant's asserted
"illegal contract" defense, Pines v. Perssion is not even cited, much less distinguished,
and the stated rationale of Posnanski- that the legislature and city council did not
intend to give the tenant a private remedy for housing code violations-is directly
contrary to the rationale in Pines.
26. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968); King v.
Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973).
27. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATIONS § 2902.1 (1970).
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ban areas.28
II. TENANTS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION: THE HOUSING CODE
APPROACH
As indicated above, one major recent statutory approach builds on
existing housing codes. While not expressly creating new rights,
these statutes provide detailed new tenant-initiated private remedies
for the landlord's failure to provide a habitable dwelling. But, the
modem housing code upon which these statutes are based, has a his-
tory that stretches back more than a century.
A. From the 19th Century Tenement House Law to the Modern
Housing Code
29
The New York Tenement House Law of 1867, the direct ancestor
28. See Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integra-
tion, 56 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Abbott].
Abbott suggests that the new landlord-tenant law concerning the condition of
leased premises did not develop until recently because in earlier days, despite a com-
mon law rule and express lease covenants placing the burden of repairs on tenants,
landlords defacto assumed the burden of repairs. He further suggests that landlords
will cease to assume this burden "when neighborhood change, declining demand, ra-
cial confrontations or increased operating costs threaten the landlord with a loss." Id.
at 29. By implication, Abbott believes that these factors led to widespread abandon-
ment by landlords to maintain low- and moderate-housing in urban areas during the
1950's and 1960's. However, the data adduced by Abbott are not persuasive on the
question of landlords' defacto assumption of the maintenance burden. The notion
that most urban landlords actually assumed that burden until fairly recently is incon-
sistent with the evidence of widespread failure of landlords to comply with local hous-
ing codes. Also, Abbott's implicit conclusion that the recent revolution in tenants'
rights resulted from "neighborhood change, declining demand, racial confrontations,
or increased operating costs" in the central cities raises more questions than it an-
swers. All these factors were present, from time to time, in many American cities
during the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th Centuries. Urbaniza-
tion is not a late 20th-century phenomenon in the United States. Rather, it already
was well advanced by the end of the 19th Century. Nor is the immigration of large
numbers of poor people to the older central cities a late 20th-century phenomenon. A
high percentage of the European immigrants who settled in American cities during
the period from 1890 to 1920 were poor, as were the successive waives of black immi-
grants from the rural South who moved to northern cities during and after World
War I. As Abbott points out, many of the cases that expanded tenants' rights were
brought by legal services attorneys. Many of these attorneys also served as advocates
for tenant interests before legislative committees. Id. at 5 n.9.
29. This section of text is based primarily on L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND
SLUM HOUSING 25-55 (1968) [hereinafter cited as L. FRIEDMAN]; Abbott, supra note
28, at 41-44; F. Grad, Legal Remedies for Housing Code Violations 1-6 (1968) (Nat'l
Comm'n on Urban Prob., Research Rep. No. 14) [hereinafter cited as F. Grad].
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of all modem housing codes, applied only to lodging houses and mul-
tiple dwellings that housed three or more families within a building
or two or more families on the same floor. ° The 1867 statute, appli-
cable only to New York City, contained nineteen sections mandating
inter alia that "tenements" should have watertight roofs, adequate
chimneys, fire escapes, ventilators, refuse containers, and "good and
sufficient water closets or privies."'" That the principal purpose of
the statute was to safeguard public health is evidenced by the
designation of the Metropolitan Board of Health as the enforcement
agency." In 1868, Massachusetts enacted a statute, applicable only
to Boston, patterned on the New York formulation.3 3 In New York,
the need for a comprehensive housing law was forcefully demon-
strated by Riis, DeForest, and Veiller,34 whose efforts led to a new
Tenement House Law, applicable to New York City and Buffalo, en-
acted in 1901. 3' The 1901 statute increased the number of sections
setting out minimum standards from nineteen to one hundred, and
provided for a system of tenement house registration and occupancy
36permits.
The pioneering New York and Massachusetts tenement house
laws, by detailing minimum health and safety standards, stood as
prototypes for the modern housing code. Today's codes, however,
are much more comprehensive:
A housing code deals with the owner's and occupant's duty to
keep existing housing in decent condition-to see to it that it is
not occupied by more persons than are legally permitted for
housing accommodations of that size; to keep it in proper repair;
to maintain it in a sanitary condition; to see that it remains prop-
erly ventilated and lighted; to make sure that it has the required
facilities for fire safety; that required machinery-elevators, boil-
ers and heating plants, etc.,-are kept in working order; and that
required services-heat, hot and cold water-are provided in ac-
30. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 26-27.
31. 1867 N.Y. Laws, ch. 908, §§ 1-19.
32. Id See 1866 N.Y. Laws, ch. 74, §§ 1-33.
33. 1868 Mass. Acts, ch. 281, §§ 1-18.
34. See, e.g., THE TENEMENT HOUSE PROBLEM (R. DeForest & L. Veiller eds.
1903); Riis, The Clearing of Mulberry Bend, 12 REv. OF REVIEWS 172 (1895); Veiller,
The Tenement House Exhibition of1899, 10 CHARITIES REV. 19 (1900).
35. 1901 Laws of N.Y., ch. 334, §§ 1-149.
36. Id. § 121. For a discussion of the historical development of housing codes, see
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 25-39 & 44-55; Abbott, supra note 29, at 41-44.
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cordance with minimal requirements of law.37
A housing code generally provides minimum standards in regard
to four different features of the housing it regulates: structural ele-
ments such as walls, roofs, ceilings, floors, windows, and staircases;
facilities such as toilets, sinks, bathtubs, radiators or other heating
fixtures, stoves, electrical outlets, window screens, and door and win-
dow locks; services such as heat, hot and cold water, sanitary sewage
disposal, electricity, elevator service, central air conditioning, and re-
pair and maintenance services for each dwelling unit; and occupancy
standards setting limits on the number of occupants per dwelling or
per bedroom. 38
Minimum code standards may be either qualitative or quantitative.
A qualitative standard, for example, prescribes that the dwelling unit
must be "clean" or "in good repair," or that a facility must be "in
good condition," or that a service must be "adequate." A quantita-
tive standard prescribes specific requirements, such as a mandate that
sufficient heat must be supplied from October 1 through May 30 to
keep a dwelling unit at seventy degrees during the day and sixty-five
degrees at night, that window areas must equal ten percent of the
37. F. Grad, supra note 29, at 2. As Grad has pointed out, the term "housing
code" really means more than a particular municipal ordinance: "Realistically, it
includes the entire body of state and local law that prescribes housing standards and
that may be relied upon to provide the source of power or authority for enforcement
sanctions and remedies." Id. at 8.
In this Article, the term "housing code" will be used to describe any state law or
local ordinances dealing with the matters referred to in the quotation above. In some
municipalities, housing code elements are lumped together with elements of building
codes, plumbing codes, electrical codes, and the like. Thus, a provision for a mini-
mum number of windows in a dwelling might be contained either in a "housing code"
or a "building code," and minimum plumbing standards might be included in either
of them or in a separate "plumbing code." But, for present purposes, the "housing
code" should be clearly distinguished from other types of regulations. Building codes,
plumbing codes, and electrical codes specify structural standards, materials and re-
quirements for plumbing, electrical and heating installations in new or substantially
remodeled buildings of all types, but they impose no continuing requirements as to
maintenance or provision of services to tenants. Housing codes, in the sense in which
the term is here used, apply only to dwelling units-primarily rental units-and im-
pose only ongoing requirements as to maintenance and provision of services. When a
housing code is enacted or amended, the new regulations generally apply to existing
housing. When a building code, plumbing code, or electrical code is adopted or
amended, the new regulations generally apply only to buildings constructed or sub-
stantially remodeled after adoption.
38. Abbott, supra note 28, at 40. For a more extended discussion of the contents
of housing codes, see GRAD, HACK & McAvoy, HOUSING CODES AND THEIR EN-
FORCEMENT 195-216 (1966).
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floor space, that there must be 150 square feet of space for each addi-
tional occupant, or that each room in the unit must have one electri-
cal outlet and one electric light fixture. Qualitative standards, since
obviously highly subjective, leave wide discretion to the public
agency responsible for inspecting housing subject to the housing
code.39
Broad similarities exist in the current housing codes, most of which
are based on one of four or five model housing codes. The model
codes themselves are quite similar. Beyond the many municipal
housing codes, several state housing codes have been enacted. The
substantive content of these state codes is substantially identical to
that of the model codes and their municipal derivatives. Some of the
state housing codes apply statewide. Others are applicable only to
certain cities or to municipalities falling within certain population
classifications. Some are "mandatory" but allow municipalities to
adopt more stringent requirements. Others are "optional," ie., mu-
nicipalities may, but need not, adopt them as local ordinances.4"
Housing codes were still not very common by 1954, as only fifty-six
codes were then in force in the United States.4 ' But the Workable
Program requirement of the 1954 Housing Act42 gave impetus to the
spread of housing codes. Ten years later several amendments re-
quired the Federal Housing Administration to refuse certification or
recertification of local Workable Programs unless the localities in
question had housing codes in effect for at least six months and were
39. See Abbott, supra note 28, at 45-46; Mood, The Development, Objectives, and
Adequacy of Current Housing Code Standards, in Housing Code Standards: Three
Critical Studies (1969) (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research Rep. No. 19)
[hereinafter cited as Mood] (surveying the requirements of four model housing codes,
nine state housing codes, and sixteen city or county housing codes).
Housing legislation usually implies the existence of criteria of acceptability. It
suggests that data are available which separate with precision unfit, unsanitary,
unsafe, and inadequate housing from that which is decent, clean, safe and sani-
tary. Unfortunately, such a bank of data does not exist. . . The state of the art
today is such that currently there is no single comprehensive evaluation proce-
dure available that will clearly and concisely delineate the presence or absence of
a relationship even between the quality of housing and health.
Id. at 13, 18.
40. See Mood, note 39 supra.
41. URBAN RENEWAL ADMINISTRATION, HOUSING & HOME FINANCE AGENCY,
URBAN RENEWAL BULL. No. 3, PROVISIONS OF HOUSING CODES IN VARIOUS AMERI-
CAN CITIES (1968).
42. Housing Act of 1954, § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 145 1(c) (Supp. III 1954) (amended
1970).
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implementing codes through enforcement programs.43 By 1968,
under the stimulus of this legislation, at least 4,904 communities had
local housing codes and at least six states had state-wide housing
codes in force."
Until very recently, violation of a housing code provision was not
considered a breach of any duty owed by the landlord, and these
tenants had no direct remedies when code violations occurred. En-
forcement of early tenement house laws was delegated to local ad-
ministrative agencies, who were charged with the duty to inspect
buildings covered by such laws both on a regular periodic basis and
in response to tenant complaints. This continues to be the normal
mode of enforcement today.45 If the issuance of a violation notice
and one or more informal or formal administrative hearings do not
force remedial action, the enforcement agency has traditionally been
authorized to obtain a court order for vacation of the building, fol-
lowed by an order for demolition if the owner does not correct the
violation within a designated time,46 and to bring a criminal action
against the building owner.47 In some states additional modes of en-
forcement include a mandatory injunction requiring the building
owner to bring his building into compliance with the housing code,48
suits to impose a civil penalty on the building owner,49 direct agency
action to correct code violations by making repairs and improve-
ments,5 ° and suits for appointment of a receiver to apply building
43. Housing Act of 1964, § 301(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1964) (amended 1970).
44. NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R.
Doc. No. 34, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 276-77 (1968).
45. When a housing inspector discovers and reports code violations, the code en-
forcement agency usually sends a violation notice to the owner of the building with a
request that the violations be corrected. If the violation notice does not produce cor-
rective action, the owner may be invited to discuss the reported code violations infor-
mally at the agency's office. The agency may also issue a formal show cause order
demanding that the owner show cause why the agency should not initiate an enforce-
ment action against him because of the reported code violations. Formal administra-
tive hearings before a hearing officer may initially determine whether the reported
conditions actually constitute code violations. More often, however, the reporting of
a violation by the inspector is itself an administrative determination that a violation
exists, and the administrative hearing is in substance an appeal from the inspector's
determination. F. Grad, supra note 29, at 14-19.
46. Id. at 56-61.
47. Id. at 22-33.
48. Id. at 42-49.
49. Id. at 34-39.
50. Id. at 62-69.
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rents toward correcting code violations.5
B. The Failure of Traditional Modes of Housing Code Enforcement
Substantial success in applying traditional modes of housing code
enforcement would probably have rendered the "revolution" in land-
lord-tenant law unnecessary. But all observers agree that local gov-
ernments have been notably ineffective in code enforcement.52 In
part, this lack of success stems from the limitations of institutions
charged with enforcement. Most code enforcement agencies are un-
derstaffed and underfunded, primarily because of a low level of pub-
lic awareness of code enforcement problems and only lukewarm
support of local elected officials. 3 Inspections are rarely carried out
on any regular schedule and public prosecutors are largely indifferent
to code enforcement. 4 Since housing inspectors are not very well
51. Id. at 42-55.
52. See, e.g., COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, CODE ENFORCE-
MENT FOR MULTIPLE DWELLINGS IN NEW YORK CITY (PART II): ENFORCEMENT
THROUGH CRIMINAL COURT ACTION (1965); B. LIEBERMAN, LOCAL ADMINISTRA-
TION AND ENFORCEMENT OF HOUSING CODES: A SURVEY OF 39 CITIES (1969); PHIL-
ADELPHIA HOUSING ASS'N, IMPEDIMENTS TO HOUSING CODE COMPLIANCE (1963);
M. TEITZ & S. ROSENTHAL, HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY
(1971); Abbott, supra note 28, at 49-56; Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement
Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1966); Castrataro, Housing Code
Enforcement: 4 Centurr of Failure in New York City, 14 N.Y.L. FORUM 60 (1968);
Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1965); Com-
ment, Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conservation of Chicago's Housing Sup-
po,, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 180 (1963); F. Grad, note 29 supra; Grad, Weiss & Hack,
Legal Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement in New York City (1965) (Legislative
Drafting Research Fund, Columbia University); J. Slavet & M. Levin, New Ap-
proaches to Housing Code Administration (1969) (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban
Problems, Research Rep. No. 17).
53. Abbott, supra 28, at 54-55.
54. . . . Few housing code enforcement agencies have legal staffs of their own,
and even the ones that do must usually bring prosecutions through the munici-
pality's regular legal department; ie., through the city attorney or corporation
counsel, or through the city or county prosecutor. In the usual course, the munic-
ipal law officer or his deputies have little experience or knowledge of housing
matters and tend to regard housing prosecutions as a very minor, troublesome,
and unexciting area for the application of their legal expertise. Even in large
cities, where hundreds and thousands of housing cases may be brought each year,
they represent a low-prestige area of activity, for a young lawyer in the city's
legal department gains neither friends nor glory by successfully prosecuting
housing cases.
F. Grad, supra note 29, at 25. See also PHILADELPHIA Hous. AsS'N, IMPEDIMENTS TO
HOUSING CODE COMPLIANCE iv (1963); Abbott, supra note 28, at 53-54.
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paid, code enforcement is often hindered by corruption. 5 Even hon-
est housing inspectors grow discouraged and apathetic because of the
ease with which landlords can obtain variances.56
Most modes of enforcement-criminal prosecutions, civil actions,
suits for mandatory injunction, and suits for receivership-share at
least one common problem: the difficulty of obtaining personal juris-
diction over the owner of a noncomplying building. This often re-
suits from the common practice of placing title to low-income multi-
family dwellings in corporations whose officers and offices cannot be
located and whose agents cannot identify their principals.57 Each of
these methods of enforcement is also subject to its own peculiar
problems, discussed below.
1. Order to Vacate and Demolish.58  This remedy is generally too
drastic to be used except in cases of immediate hazard of collapse or
fire, although it may be utilized during periods of high vacancy in the
community's standard housing stock. As Grad points out, "No hous-
ing code enforcement agency is likely to issue vacate orders, however
attractive the remedy, when such an order would deprive tenants of a
place to live; for even an inadequate dwelling is better than no dwell-
ing at all." 59 The vacate order can be a powerful enforcement tool in
periods when there is a high vacancy rate because it cuts off the land-
lord's rental revenue. Yet it must be a credible threat to induce hous-
ing code compliance. Since World War II, an overall shortage of
55. See J. Slavet & M. Levin, New Approaches to Housing Code Administration
179 (1969) (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research Rep. No. 17).
56. Lieberman reported that most code enforcement personnel believed that vari-
ance boards act on the basis of political considerations or emotion. "The results are
disrespect for the inspector and his superiors; ineffective systematic code compliance
programs; and disrespect for local regulatory measures." B. LIEBERMAN, LOCAL AD-
MINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF HOUSING CODES: A SURVEY OF 39 CITIES at
23 (1969).
57. Abbott, supra note 28, at 50. For a more detailed discussion of the problem,
see F. Grad, supra note 29, at ch. IX (The Phantom Landlord: Finding the Absentee
Landlord). Grad emphasizes that this problem is a serious one only in some of the
larger cities and that it is a more serious problem when criminal prosecution is sought
than when some form of civil action is used. Both Abbott and Grad point out that
some jurisdictions require registration of owners and the authorization of service of
process on a natural person living within the jurisdiction.
58. The discussion of this enforcement method is based on Abbott, supra note 28,
at 49-50; F. Grad, supra note 29, at ch. VI; Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforce-
ment. Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1261 (1966).
59. F. Grad, supra note 29, at 57.
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low- and middle-income housing in most urban areas has prevented
the threat from being credible.6" Moreover, ". . . a vacate order can
play into the hands of a recalcitrant landlord who wishes to rid him-
self of troublesome tenants without resort to the eviction prices. By
allowing his building to become seriously substandard, the landlord
can trigger an order to vacate that would allow him to remodel or
tear down the vacant structure.'
2. Criminal Prosecution.62  Although clearly the most common en-
forcement strategy utilized in the United States, criminal prosecution
of the building owner has proved to be remarkably ineffective. The
difficulty in securing personal jurisdiction over the owner of the
building63 is more pronounced in criminal cases because the individ-
ual owner must be physically present in court.' The enforcement
process is likely to be characterized by interminable delays, both
before and after a criminal prosecution begins.65 And there is an
even more fundamental difficulty:
60. A vacancy rate of more than 25% in standard housing is necessary before
substantial use of vacate orders is feasible. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforce-
ment: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1261 n.29 (1966). Vacate
orders were used effectively in New York City during the early 1900's, and again in
the 1930's, when there were high vacancy rates. F. Grad, supra note 29, at 57.
61. Abbott, supra note 28, at 50.
62. The text of this enforcement method is based on Abbott, supra note 29, at 50-
51. and F. Grad, supra note 29, at ch. III.
63. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
64. F. Grad, supra note 29, at 23. "In the case of a corporate owner, all that is
necessary is that the corporation be represented in court by an attorney." Id. at 35.
Registration requirements for landlords have not proven useful in locating "phantom
landlords" because normally the failure to register is itself only punishable as a crimi-
nal offense-and it is necessary to catch a building owner before he can be punished
for failure to register. Id. at 32.
65. "Criminal prosecution [in New York City] is slow and its impact is negligible.
In 1968-69, the average time between placement of a violation and first court appear-
ance was over 18 months." M. TEITz & S. ROSENTHAL, HOUSING CODE ENFORCE-
MENT IN NEW YORK CITY xi (1971). The great majority of cases are adjourned at
least once. Grad, Weiss & Hack, Legal Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement in
New York City 40-41 (1965) (Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia Univer-
sity). See also Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801,
819, 820 & 824 (1965). Where housing courts have been established, manned by
judges who are specialists in housing problems (and who may even have investigative
staffs of housing specialists), speedier disposition of cases is possible. But in metro-
politan areas relatively few housing cases are actually tried: the overwhelmingly
larger number are disposed of, without trial, by a guilty plea. This leaves the court
with little else to do but to impose sentence. Although a housing court may result in
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The underlying notion is that the threat of the penalty will
cause owners to make proper repairs, and that the imposition of
the penalty will not only deter the person punished from permit-
ting further violations, but also set an example for the deterrence
and warning of other code violators. Since jail sentences are
hardly ever imposed (even where authorized), and since, with
few exceptions, fines imposed are very low, the practical deter-
rence value of criminal penalties is very minimal for housing vi-
olations. Criminal penalties, moreover, are not really designed
to lead to repairs-the criminal court's power does not extend to
ordering the making of repairs, but merely to the punishment of
the owner. On the contrary, the manner in which the system of
criminal law operates actually encourages the postponement of
repairs. An owner who fails to correct violations for many
months until his case gets to trial, and who, in token of his "co-
operativeness" repairs the faults just before sentencing, will not
be treated significantly more harshly than the owner who does
not make use of available legal delays. Since the cost of making
the repairs may be-and usually is-substantially higher than
the fine imposed, the occasional payment of fines may be viewed
as part of the cost of the business of renting dwelling
space. 66
more consistent sentences, it may not in fact result in substantially speedier disposi-
tion of housing cases.
66. F. Grad, supra note 29, at 29.
Most housing laws and housing codes authorize both fines and jail terms ...
Although in some jurisdictions jail terms up to six months may be authorized,
most commonly 30 days is the maximum jail sentence that may be imposed for a
housing violation. But, whatever the length of time authorized, the actual impo-
sition of jail sentences is so unusual and infrequent as to play a relatively insig-
nificant part in code enforcement. In the main, the situation is not too different
with respect to the imposition of fines. Although fines ranging up to $500 or even
$1,000 per violation may be authorized, only very minor fines are imposed in
most jurisdictions.
Id. at 26.
All too often, however, where compliance occurs just before sentencing, courts
will impose very minimal fines, even though the violation may have been out-
standing, and may have caused actual harm to the comfort and health of the
occupants, for months, if not years, before the case was prosecuted and was
finally brought to the sentencing stage.
Id. at 24.
For those cases adjudicated in 1968-69 [in New York City], the average fine
imposed by the court was $12.62, or $1 to $3 per violation. Criminal prosec-
tuions have little effect on violation removal. Of 329 cases studied in 1968-69,
only 53 percent of the violations brought to court had been removed one year
(Vol. 16.3
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3. Civil Penalty.6 7  Generally, the civil penalty is a lump-sum
amount recoverable by the municipality in a civil action, with the
number of code violations determining the total penalty amount.
Some statutes provide that unpaid civil penalties shall become a lien
on the property in question. The rationale of these statutory and lo-
cal code provisions is that unlawful economic advantages, such as
failure to maintain rental property in compliance with code stand-
ards, should be penalized by measures that reduce the illegal profits
of the owner. Although civil penalties were used with some fre-
quency at the turn of the century in New York and elsewhere, they
have fallen into disuse in cities where they remain on the books. 8 A
primary reason for disuse of civil actions is that municipal attorneys
find it easier to bring routine criminal prosecutions that involve little
paper work rather than civil actions that require detailed pleadings
and produce relatively small money judgments. The civil penalties
presently authorized are generally not sufficiently varied to reflect the
length of time a code violation has existed. Hence, as with criminal
penalties, the landlord is likely to treat the periodic payment of civil
penalties simply as a cost of doing business instead of being induced
to correct the violations on his property.
4. Mandatory Injunction.69  In theory this is an unusually effective
mode of enforcement because, instead of punishing the owner of a
later; more than half of these had been removed before the case reached the
Criminal Court.
M. TIETz & S. ROSENTHAL, HousING CODE ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY xi
(173).
The reluctance of the courts to treat housing offenses as 'crimes' is reflected not
only in the low penalties that are imposed, but also in attempts to place such
violations in some category that is intermediate between a 'criminal' and 'civil'
violation. Although invariably subject to the basic requirements of criminal pro-
cedures, housing violations have been designated as 'quasi-criminal' or as 'quasi-
civil' in some jurisdictions, and in New York City, which probably accounts for
most of the court prosecutions of housing cases in the Nation, the housing code
treats such violations as 'offenses,' defined as non-criminal violations of the law.
F. Grad, supra note 29, at 31.
67. The text discussion of this mode of code enforcement is based on F. Grad,
supra note 29, at ch. IV.
68. For a history of the extensive use of civil remedies in the early days of housing
code enforcement in New York City, starting in 1903, see Grad, Weiss and Hack,
Legal Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement in New York City 60-65 (1965) (Leg-
islative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia University).
69. The text discussion of this mode of code enforcement is based on F. Grad,
supra note 29, at 40-42.
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noncomplying building for past code violations, the injunction orders
him to bring his building into compliance and only later punishes for
contempt if he fails to do so. Moreover, a preliminary injunction
may often be quickly obtained in emergency situations. And, since
the injunctive remedy is flexible, the court can tailor its order to the
specific circumstances of each case. This remedy, while indirectly au-
thorized by the New York Tenement House Law of 1901, fell into
disuse after the pioneering decision of Tenement House Department v.
Moeschen.7° Mandatory injunctions have been rarely used in the
majority of states despite legislative authorization. In recent years,
injunctions have been used, to some extent, in California7t and Phila-
delphia7 2 to enforce housing codes, but the most extensive use of the
injunctive remedy for this purpose has occurred in Chicago.73
5. Direct Agency Action to Effect Repairs.74  This mode of en-
70. 179 N.Y. 325, 72 N.E. 231 (1904), at'd, 203 U.S. 583 (1906). The decision
sustained the Tenement House Act in its entirety against constitutional attack. The
failure of New York City to utilize the mandatory injunction after Moeschen is hard
to explain. The New York code enforcement agency had authority to "institute any
appropriate action ... to prevent such unlawful construction, alteration, conversion
or maintenance, to restrain, correct or abate such violation or nuisance, to prevent the
occupation of said dwelling or structure or any part thereof, or to prevent any illegal
act, conduct or business in or about such dwelling, structure or lot." N.Y. MULT.
DWELL. LAW § 306 (McKinney), as enacted by 1929 N.Y. Laws, ch. 713.
71. The California statutory formulation, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17981
(Deering 1976), has led to several sweeping mandatory injunctions, including an or-
der requiring extensive repairs and reconstruction or the reconversion of dwellings to
conditions prior to the illegal alterations. See, eg., San Francisco v. Meyer, 208 Cal.
App. 2d 125, 25 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1962); Knapp v. City of Newport Beach, 186 Cal. App.
2d 669, 9 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1960); People v. Morehouse, 74 Cal. App. 2d 870, 169 P.2d
983 (1946).
72. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 827
(1965).
73. In 1963 the Chicago Department of Buildings obtained 178 mandatory in-
junctions against housing violations; in 1964, it obtained 223. The total number
of injunctions secured is especially striking, since the Chicago courts have not
merely issued perfunctory orders in the words of the statute, but have sought to
shape effective decrees suited to end special problems. The Chicago effort is
noteworthy, too, because the courts have insisted in housing injunction cases not
only on the joinder of all interested parties, but also on the retention of jurisdic-
tion for as long as necessary for a "complete determination of the controversy."
Injunctions have apparently become so well established an enforcement device in
Chicago that few challenges to their use have been attempted-and where at-
tempted, they were quickly disposed of.
F. Grad, supra note 29, at 41.
74. This part of the text is based on F. Grad, supra note 29, at ch. VII.
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forcement, authorized in a number of states, is based on the tradi-
tional power of local governments to abate public nuisances and
health hazards. Under some statutes it is tied to the local govern-
ment's power to order noncomplying buildings vacated for repair or
demolition, but the authority has actually been used in only a few
jurisdictions. New York City has been the only major city using di-
rect agency action to a substantial extent. Potential constitutional im-
pediments to the creation of an effective lien to secure the
enforcement agency's right to reimbursement were largely eliminated
by Matter of Department of Buildings of City of New York, 75 leaving
the New York Department of Health to begin a direct repair program
in 1965. The New York City experience is summarized by Grad as
follows:
New York started out with a revolving repair fund. . . .It has
given up on the revolving repair fund idea simply because the $1
million in the fund refused to revolve. What happened was that
the owners wouldn't pay for the repairs. Then you would have
to impose a lien on the building for the repair costs, the lien just
sat there since it was too much trouble to foreclose on it. Now
New York does something much better. It not only has a lien on
the property-it also has a lien on the rents. When emergency
repairs have been made, the City instructs the tenants to pay the
rents directly to the city, and in that fashion a major part of the
repair costs are recouped ... .
6. Receivership.77  Although several states now have legislation
authorizing appointment of a receiver empowered to take possession
of rental property, collect rents, and correct housing code violations,
substantial use of receiverships has occurred only in New York City
and Chicago. The New York receivership statute was adopted in
1962 to meet the problem of financing repairs and improvements of
greater magnitude than the "emergency" repairs dealt with under the
direct repair program. The statute was enacted "under the shadow of
the Central Savings Bank case, and the legislation that finally passed
75. 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964) (court held that the
1962 amendments to N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW § 309, providing for a lien with prior-
ity over existing mortgages, did not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of mort-
gagees' contracts nor deny them procedural due process).
76. Grad, New Sanctions and Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URn.
LAW. 577, 584 (1971). Cf. discussion of New York's direct repair program in F. Grad,
supra note 29, at 65-67.
77. This section of text is based on F. Grad, supra note 29, at 42-55.
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was the result of major efforts to avoid at least all of the procedural
due process issues on which the prior [New York] lien law had
floundered in Central Savings."7 The 1962 statute withstood consti-
tutional attack in the 1964 New York Court of Appeals decision of
Matter of Department of Buildings of City of New York.79 Although
observers generally agreed that the 1962 statute was a very effective
tool for correcting major housing code violations, New York City
substantially abandoned use of the receivership in 1965, "quite sim-
ply because it [receivership] is so expensive."' Receiverships con-
tinue to be extensively utilized only in Chicago."' That city's
program differs substantially from the New York City program in
three respects: The court may appoint as receivers persons and
groups other than government agencies-e.g., the Community Re-
newal Foundation, a non-profit subsidiary of the Public Housing Au-
thority; the Chicago receivership program generally has involved
only relatively small buildings, often with fewer than ten dwelling
units; and the problem of raising capital to repair a structure whose
value has already been fully encumbered was solved by authorizing
the receiver to issue interest-bearing certificates that constitute a lien
having priority over all existing liens except those for taxes.8 2 The
overriding priority of the receiver's certificate has been sustained
against constitutional attack, 3 and the available evidence suggests
78. Id. at 44. Central Savings Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 18
N.E.2d 151 (1938), motion to amend remittiturgranted, 280 N.Y. 9, 19 N.E.2d 659, cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939) (invalidated the Murray Prior Lien Law, 1937 N.Y. Laws,
ch. 353).
79. 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964).
80. Grad, New Sanctions and Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URB.
LAW. 577, 582 (1971).
81. Under a 1953 amendment of what was then the Illinois Cities and Villages
Act, a municipality was authorized to "make application to any court of competent
jurisdiction for an injunction requiring compliance [with city ordinances] or for such
other order as the court may deem necessary or appropriate to secure such compli-
ance." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 23-70.3 (1955). The courts adopted the theory that
appointment of a receiver was an appropriate way of securing compliance, and sev-
eral receiverships were granted either upon application of the City of Chicago or of
tenants in the buildings in need of repair. In 1965, the statute was amended to specifi-
cally authorize the appointment of receivers. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
82. The authorization for issuing receiver's certificates was added by 1965 Inl.
Laws, p. 2612. The language of the current statute reflects this provision. See ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
83. Community Renewal Foundation, Inc. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 44 InI. 2d
284, 255 N.E.2d 908 (1970).
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that the Chicago program has been relatively effective.84 However,
receivership is clearly no panacea.85
C. The New Legislative Approach.- Tenant-Initiated "Private"
Remedies
1. An Historical Overview
All of the statutes enacted during the 1960's and 1970's creating
private remedies for tenants upon the failure of landlords to provide
habitable dwellings share two basic characteristics: first, the with-
holding of rent from the landlord is the principal new remedy pro-
vided; and second, the right to withhold rent, or to obtain a court
order for rent withholding, depends in most cases on proof of a seri-
ous violation of the applicable housing code.
Rent withholding as a private remedy for housing code violations
was not an entirely new idea in the 1960's. Connecticut, Iowa and
New York had rent withholding legislation long before 1960. The
Connecticut86 and Iowa87 statutes provided that failure to obtain a
certificate of compliance with the state housing law should bar any
action by the landlord to recover rent or to evict for nonpayment of
rent. A literal construction of the Connecticut statute barred a land-
lord's action if no certificate of compliance had been issued, even if
the building actually complied with the substantive code require-
ments.88 As so construed, the statute was held to be constitutional.8 9
The Iowa statute received similar treatment by courts,9" but neither
of these statutes has ever seen much use. Connecticut enacted new
legislation in 1969 to provide a more effective rent withholding rem-
edy for serious housing code violations.9
When the New York Multiple Dwelling Law (MDL) was enacted
84. See F. Grad, supra note 29, at 50-51. For a brief discussion of receivership
programs in other states, see F. Grad, supra note 29, at 52-55.
85. Abbott, supra note 28, at 52.
86. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-371, 19-400 (West Supp. 1977). Originally en-
acted in 1905, in its present form this statute applies to all multi-family dwellings
except public housing.
87. IowA CODE § 413.106 (1976) (originally enacted in 1919).
88. Dreamy Hollow Apts. Corp. v. Lewis, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 355, 232 A.2d 346
(1967), cert. denied, 288 A.2d 559 (1967).
89. Id. at 361, 228 A.2d at 350.
90. Burlington & Summit Apts. v. Manalato, 233 Iowa 15, 7 N.W.2d 26 (1942).
91. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-347 to 19-347v (1977 & Supp. 1978).
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in 1929 to replace the 1901 Tenement House Law,92 section 302 of
the MDL was quite similar to the Connecticut and Iowa rent with-
holding statutes. Although the New York statutory provision requir-
ing vacation of any building not covered by a certificate of
compliance would have, if literally construed, drastically limited use
of the statute as a basis for rent withholding, section 302 was con-
strued as giving the code enforcement agency discretion not to order
vacation of the building so that the tenant could retain possession,
withhold rent, and have a valid defense against any action by the
landlord to recover rent or evict the tenant for nonpayment of rent. 93
This statute has been little used since New York adopted more effec-
tive rent withholding statutes in the 1960's.
A 1939 New York rent withholding statute,94 provided for a stay of
any action to recover rent or evict for nonpayment of rent where
housing code violations constructively evicted the tenant from a por-
tion of the premises occupied by him, on condition that the tenant
should deposit with the clerk of the court all rent due when the stay
was issued. This statute, held constitutional in 1957,9' was used in
1966 as the initial basis for widespread tenant rent strikes. In most of
the early 1968 cases where the statute was invoked the courts held for
the tenants, but "shortly thereafter, cases in which the factors did not
differ significantly from the ones in which judgment for the tenants
had been granted earlier began to be decided in favor of landlords in
an apparent shift in the courts' attitude toward tenant rent strike pro-
92. The Tenement House Law of 1901, 1901 Laws of N.Y. ch. 334, §§ 1-149,
while finally repealed in 1952, continued to apply to the city of Buffalo until 1950,
when Buffalo chose to come within the terms and provisions of the Multiple Dwell-
ings Law. Section 3 of the current statute expressly provides that it "shall apply to all
cities with a population of four hundred thousand or more," which makes it applica-
ble only to New York City and the City of Buffalo. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 3(1)
(Consol. 1977). New York City enacted a Housing Maintenance Code to supplement
the Multiple Dwellings Law and the provisions of the Building Code that apply to
multiple dwellings. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 56 (1967).
93. Broadway-Sheridan Arms v. City of New York, 195 Misc. 491, 89 N.Y.S.2d
623 (Sup. Ct. 1949). The New York courts have issued mandamus orders enabling
tenants to remain in possession, despite unlawful occupancy under the statute, where
the code enforcement agency decided not to require vacation of the premises. See,
e.g., 1350 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. Department of Hous. & Buildings, 197 Misc. 982, 96
N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
94. 1939 N.Y. Laws ch. 661, codified as amended at N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW
§ 755 (Consol. 1977).
95. Emray Realty Corp. v. DeStefano, 5 Misc. 2d 352, 160 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct.
1957).
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visions."96
Beginning in the 1960's many states enacted legislation that pro-
vided tenants with new private remedies for serious housing code vio-
lations.97 The principal new remedy provided by this legislation
involved an authorization to withhold rent during the existence of
code violations. While some of the statutes will be detailed later, sev-
eral general statements may serve to identify the rent withholding
process.
Most of the new statutes leave for judicial determination the ques-
tion whether a particular code violation or combination of violations
is, in fact, serious enough to justify the withholding of rent. Most of
the new statutes also require the tenant show, as the basis for rent
withholding, that an official inspection of his dwelling was made and
that the inspecting officer reported one or more code violations to the
enforcement agency.
Most of the statutes now under consideration require payment of
withheld rents, either into court or to some other agency, to be held in
escrow. Some of the statutes require the tenant to bring suit and ob-
tain a court order for rent withholding; others do not require the ten-
ant to bring suit but allow him to set up the landlord's violations of
the housing code as a defense in any action by the landlord to recover
unpaid rent or to evict for nonpayment of rent. Some of the statutes
allow a court or some other agency to apply the withheld rents to
96. F. Grad, supra note 29, at 126. Grad also observed that "[r]elying on the
'constructive eviction' concept referred to in Section 755, the tenants were able to
achieve significant results, probably going well beyond the initial intent of the law."
Id.
97. See note 7 supra. For more detailed discussion of the statutes of particular
states, see F. Grad, supra note 29, at 125-36. See also Angevin & Taube, Enforcement
of Public Health Laws-Some New Techniques, 52 MASS. L.Q. 206 (1967); Clough,
Pennsylvania's Rent Withholding Law, 73 DICK. L. REV. 583 (1969); Krumholz, Rent
Withholding as an Aid to Housing Code Enforcement, 25 J. HOUsING 242 (1968);
Quinn & Phillips, Landlord-Tenant Law: .4 Critical Evaluation of/he Past with Guide-
lines for the Future, 38 FORD. L. REV. 225 (1969); Simmons, Passion and Prudence:
Rent Withholding Under New York's SpiegelLaw, 15 BUFF. L. REV. 573 (1966); Com-
ment, Rent Strike Legislation-New York's Solution to Landlord-Tenant Conflicts, 40
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 253 (1966); Comment, Plight of the Indigent Tenant in Massachu-
setts: .4n .4ttempt by the Law to Provide Relief, 8 SUFF. L. REV. 106, 108-111 (1973);
Comment, Abatement of Rent in New York, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 490 (1966); Note,
Rent Withholdingfor Welfare Recipients: An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statute, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 798 (1970); Comment, Rent Withholding in Pennsylvania, 30 U. PItr.
L. REV. 148 (1968); Comment, The Pennsylvania Project-4 Practical Analysis ofthe
Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act, 17 VILL. L. REv. 821 (1972).
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correct the code violations that justify the withholding of rent, and
some do not. Some of the statutes provide for rent abatement as well
as rent withholding, and some do not. Some of the statutes authorize
remedies in addition to rent withholding, such as recovery of dam-
ages, injunctive relief, or even the appointment of a receiver to collect
rents and correct code violations. Many of the statutes include or are
coupled with provisions designed to protect the tenant from retalia-
tory action by the landlord when the tenant asserts his statutory
rights. Most of the statutes expressly bar any waiver of the remedial
rights conferred on the tenant by statute.
In several states the new tenants' rights acts cover all rental hous-
ing. In other states only multi-family dwellings-most often defined
as buildings with three or more dwelling units-are covered. In a few
states, coverage is even more limited. Most of the statutes have state-
wide application.
While it is impossible to detail each rent withholding statute, an
examination of the more significant formulations follows.
2. The New York Statutes
New York has a greater variety of rent withholding statutes than
any other state. In the 1960's, adding to the two statutes mentioned
above,9" New York adopted two new rent withholding statutes and
substantially strengthened one of the older statutes.99
98. See notes 92-96 and accompanying text supra.
99. One addition, a provision applicable to New York City and Buffalo, allowed
rent abatement for multiple dwellings that posed a serious threat to health or safety.
1965 N.Y. Laws, ch. 911 (currently codified at N.Y. MULT. DWELL. Law § 302-a
(Consol. 1977)). A virtually identical provision was made applicable to all other New
York municipalities. 1966 N.Y. Laws, ch. 291 (currently codified at N.Y. MULT.
REsID. LAW § 305a Consol. 1977)). In addition, an entirely new article provided a
method for tenants to use in remedying dangerous conditions. 1965 N.Y. Laws, ch.
909 (currently codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW Art. 7A, §§ 769-782 (Consol.
Supp. 1977)). Article 7A applies only to New York City and to Nassau, Suffolk,
Rockland and Westchester counties. Id. at § 769(1) (as amended by 1974 N.Y. Laws,
ch. 861-62). N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 755 (Consol. 1976), which allowed te-
nants to obtain a stay in proceeding to evict for non-payment of rent, was significantly
amended. 1969 N.Y. Laws, ch. 820 (currently codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. Acrs.
LAW § 755 (Consol. Supp. 1977). In addition to making § 755 applicable to all New
York municipalities, rather than just New York City, several substantive changes
were also made. See notes 119-24 and accompanying text infra. Except for Article
7A, which applies only to buildings with six or more dwelling units, all of the statutes
apply to buildings having at least three units. See N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW, Art.
7A, § 782 (Consol. Supp. 1977); N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW § 4(7) (Consol. 1977); N.Y.
MULT. REsID. LAW § 4(33) (Consol. 1977).
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a. Section 302-a
Under New York Multiple Dwelling Law section 302-a, if the code
enforcement agency notes in its official records that a rent-impairing
violation, designated as such by the agency,'0° exists within a multi-
ple dwelling structure, the building's owner has notice of the condi-
tion, and the official violation notation is not cancelled within six
months, "then for the period that such violation remains uncorrected
after the expiration of said six months, no rent shall be recovered [for
any premises] in which the condition constituting such rent impairing
violation exists."101 To avail himself of the protection of section 302-
a, the tenant must deposit with the clerk of the court in which the
landlord sues to recover rent or to evict for nonpayment of rent, "the
amount of rent sought to be recovered. . . or upon which the pro-
ceeding to recover possession is based."'0 z
Perhaps the most striking feature of section 302-a is that none of
the rent accruing after the end of the six-month period and prior to
100. The section requires the code enforcement agency to promulgate a list of
conditions constituting violations of the Multiple Dwelling Law and also to designate
"those violations which it proposes to classify as rent impairing." N.Y. MULT.
DWELL. LAW § 302-a (Consol. 1977). The statute generally defines a "rent impairing"
violation as "a condition in a multiple dwelling which, in the opinion of... [the code
enforcement agency], constitutes, or if not promptly corrected, will constitute, a fire
hazard or a serious threat to the life, health or safety of occupants thereof." Id. at
§ 302-a(2)(a).
101. Id.
102. To invoke the protection of § 302-a in an action by the landlord to recover
rent or to evict for nonpayment of rent, the tenant must affirmatively plead and prove
the existence of the rent impairing violation, the notation thereof in the official
records of the enforcement agency, the giving of notice to the landlord, and the sub-
sistence of the violation for six months after the landlord was notified.
In a condition constituting a rent impairing violation exists in any part of a multiple
dwelling used in common by residents or under the control of the owner, the violation
"shall be deemed to exist in the respective premises of each resident of the multiple
dwelling." Id. at § 302-a(3)(a).
When a tenant asserts his § 302-a defense, the landlord will prevail if "(i) the condi-
tion referred to in the department's notice to the owner ... did not in fact exist,
notwithstanding the notation thereof in the records of the department; (ii) the condi-
tion ... has in fact been corrected, though the note thereof in the department has not
been removed or cancelled, (iii) the violation has been caused by the resident from
whom rent is sought to be collected or by members of his family or by his guests or by
another resident of the multiple dwelling or the members of the family of such other
resident or by his guests, or (iv) the resident proceeded against for rent has refused
entry to the owner for the purpose of correcting the condition giving rise to the viola-
tion." Id. at § 302-a(3)(b).
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correction of the rent impairing violations is recoverable by the land-
lord even if the landlord ultimately corrects all rent impairing viola-
tions. It seems clear that the legislature intended this as a penalty for
the landlord's failure to act within a reasonable time-probably with
the hope that the complete forfeiture of rent in such instances would
provide a strong incentive for landlords to take corrective action
within the six-month period.
When the New York City Commission of Housing and Buildings
promulgated a list of conditions considered as rent impairing viola-
tions for purposes of section 302-a, a suit was immediately brought to
invalidate twenty-five of the fifty-seven listed violations as arbitrary
and capricious, and to invalidate the statute itself on the ground that,
by sanctioning withholding of rents by tenants while they enjoyed the
use of the property, it deprived landlords of property without due
process of law. 10 3 The New York Supreme Court, at Special Term,
upheld the statute, finding that it addressed a legitimate end and that
the measures taken were reasonable and appropriate to secure that
end."° The court sustained the entire list of rent impairing violations
as having a "rational basis in fact and law."'05 The court did not
expressly deal with the argument that substantive due process re-
quired that the landlord recover at least the fair rental value of the
premises in their defective condition, but the court apparently
thought that the statutory bar to recovery of any rent for the period of
rent impairment was justified as a "new means to induce or compel
owners of multiple dwellings to maintain and repair their proper-
ties." '06
Commentators have expressed conflicting views on section 302-a,
both as to its constitutionality and its desirability from a policy view-
point. In any case, as one commentator writing in 1968 stated,
103. Ten West 28th Street Realty Corp. v. Moerdler, 52 Misc. 2d 109, 275
N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
104. Id. at 111, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 111, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 147. Subsequently, in Amanuensis, Ltd. v.
Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971), the court struck down
the statutory provision requiring that rent demanded by a landlord in a summary
proceeding for nonpayment of rent be deposited in court before the tenant can inter-
pose the § 302-a defense as "wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of proce-
dural due process." Id. at 23, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 21. The court also held that it was not
in accord with the legislative intent to require such deposit, despite the clear statutory
language on this point.
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Section 302-a of the Multiple Dwelling Law, with its careful
attempts at balancing landlords' and tenants' interests, has seen
almost no application at all in New York State, despite the
prompt promulgation of a lengthy list of rent impairing viola-
tions by the New York City Department of Buildings. The rea-
son for the neglect of the provision is that, simultaneously with
302-a, the legislature enacted an entirely new Article 7A of the
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, which not only
gave the initiative for bringing the action to the tenants, but also
allowed a group of tenants to proceed immediately without any
lengthy waiting period and without the necessity for demonstrat-
ing that violations noted by the code enforcement agency had
remained uncorrected. It is Article 7A of the Real Property Ac-
tions and Proceedings Law that now carries the major burden of
tenant rent strike efforts in New York. 1 7
b. Article 7A
New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law Article 7A
authorizes one-third of the tenants in a building having six or more
dwelling units (or the administrator of the New York City code en-
forcement agency) to maintain a special proceeding on the ground
that the building has a "lack of heat or of running water or of light or
of electricity or of adequate sewage disposal facilities, or any other
condition dangerous to life, health or safety, which has existed for
five days, or an infestation of rodents, or any combination of such
conditions."' 8 If the court finds in favor of the petitioners, it must
direct that all rents due from the petitioners at the date of judgment,
all rents due from other tenants in the building on the dates of service
107. F. GRAD, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS 128 (1968).
By substituting relatively specific standards for the vague concept of construc-
tive eviction, this statute [§ 302-a] eliminates much of the risk the tenant would
otherwise have to undergo. Once the tenant has produced a copy of the Depart-
ment of Buildings record showing that a violation has existed for six months, the
burden shifts to the landlord, who must prove that the violation has been re-
moved. Owing to the six-month waiting period, however, many serious viola-
tions, such as lack of heat, are unaffected by the statute.
Note, Tenant Rent Strikes, 3 COLUM. J. OF L. & SOC. PROB. 1, 6 (1967).
108. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 770(1) (Consol. Supp. 1977).
Such a special proceeding may also be initiated by the New York City housing
code administrator, but "one-third or more of the tenants may, at any time thereafter
during the pendency of the proceeding or after final judgment ... petition for substi-
tution of themselves in place ... of such administrator" and the court is required to
order such substitution "unless good reason to the contrary shall be shown." Id. at
§ 770(2).
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of the judgment on them, and all future rents of all tenants in the
building be deposited with an administrator appointed by the
court, 09 who may be the New York City housing code administrator
or his designee, "o and that sufficient amounts of such deposited rents
shall be used to remedy the conditions found to exist in the build-
ing."' The court-appointed administrator is, in fact, a rent receiver
and has the usual powers of a rent receiver. 1 2 Appointment of an
administrator may be averted if the owner or mortgagee of the build-
ing, on application to the court, can demonstrate "the ability
promptly to undertake the work required," posts adequate security
for performance, and receives the authorization of the court." 1
3
Unlike section 302-a, article 7A does not allow abatement of rent
because of dangerous conditions on the premises. It only authorizes
the payment and application of rent to correct such conditions. Thus
article 7A appears less vulnerable to constitutional attack on due
process or "taking" grounds. The statute was, in fact, sustained
against constitutional challenge in Himmel . Chase Manhattan
Bank,14 where the court said that article 7A merely creates a new
remedy for enforcement of preexisting tenants' rights' and is a valid
exercise of the state's police power."16 The Himmel court also held
that defective air conditioning equipment and elevators in a luxury
apartment could be "dangerous conditions" within the meaning of
the statute.' 17
109. Id. at § 776(b).
110. Id.at§778(l).
111. Id. at § 776(b).
112. The administrator is not only empowered to collect the rents and to remove
or remedy the conditions specified in the judgment, but also "to institute all necessary
legal proceedings, including, but not limited to, summary proceedings for the removal
of any tenant or tenants; and to rent or lease for terms not exceeding three years any
part of said premises." Id. at § 778(1).
113. Id. at § 777.
114. 47 Misc. 2d 93, 262 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1965).
115. Id. at 96, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
116. Id. at 97-98, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
117. Id. at 98, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 520-21. See also DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty
Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1965). In DeKoven, the court
found that, despite a high incidence of crime and inadequate police protection, the
absence of a round-the-clock doorman did not constitute a "condition dangerous to
life, health or safety" within the meaning of article 7A. Id. at 954, 266 N.Y.S.2d 466.
In addition, the tenants had alleged 34 dangerous conditions which were found too
trivial or non-existent, after an on-site inspection by the court, to support withholding
of rents. Id. at 956-57, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 468-70 ("conditions found by the inspector
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Article 7A has proved to be an effective tool for rent withholding in
connection with rent strikes in New York. Although only one-third
of the tenants in an apartment building are required to join in the
petition, a finding in favor of the petitioners allows the deposit of
rents from all tenants in the building. This obviously gives strong
leverage to a minority of tenants who are willing to take the initiative
in bringing an article 7A proceeding."' In a period of inflationary
cost increases, however, the effectiveness of article 7A as a remedy for
large-scale code violations requiring structural improvements would
seem to be dependent on the administrator's willingness and ability
to raise rents.
Apparently not satisfied with section 302-a and article 7A, in 1969
the New York legislature adopted several important amendments to
section 755 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. 119
One of these changes made the statute applicable to all New York
municipalities. 2 ° Another amendment broadened the authority of
the court to stay an action to recover rent or to evict for non-payment
of rent, including situations where any condition "is, or is likely to
become, dangerous to life, health, or safety," as well as cases where
conditions "constructively evict" a tenant from a portion of the prem-
ises. 2 ' The new statute makes it unnecessary for a tenant to prove
that the housing code enforcement agency has issued a notice or or-
der to "remove or cease maintaining a nuisance or violation" or to
make necessary repairs, as required by the previous formulation.' 22
are not of such a magnitude, individually or collectively, as to constitute a danger to
the life, health or safety of the tenants").
118. This statute provides the first coercive remedies directly enforceable by the
tenant. Theoretically, therefore, a tenant no longer is compelled to live with dan-
gerous violations because of inefficiency or laxity of the public authorities and/or
inability on the part of the landlord. Whether or not this theory does achieve a
practical reality will depend upon the ability of tenants to effectively join to-
gether an pursue their remedy.
Comment, Rent Strike Legislation--New York's Solution to Landlord-Tenant Con-
flicts, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 253, 264 (1966).
119. 1969 N.Y. Laws, ch. 820 (currently codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW
§ 755 (Consol. Supp. 1977)).
120. Id. The Act prior to the 1969 amendment was only applicable in New York
City.
121. Id. at § 755(l)(a).
122. The 1969 amendments added a new subsection (b), which allows a tenant to
prove the existence of a dangerous condition without having to show any prior in-
volvement by the local agency. Id. at § 755(l)(b).
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The new language as to conditions dangerous to life, health, or safety
establishes substantially the same standard for relief under section
755 as required under section 302-a, 123 and it eliminates any doubt as
to the right of the tenant to remain in possession of his entire dwell-
ing unit, withhold rent, and assert the section 755 defense.' 24
c. Section 756
Section 756 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
provides that if "utilities are discontinued in any part of a multiple
dwelling because of the failure of the landlord. . . to pay for utilities
for which he may have contracted, any proceeding to dispossess a
tenant from said building or. .. for rent shall be stayed until such
time as the landlord. . pays the amount owing for said utilities and
123. Under this standard, of course, the tenant's lawyer is never quite sure how
things will go in court, even when the code enforcement agency has issued a notice or
order with respect to dangerous conditions on the leased premises. When no notice or
order has been issued, the tenant has the burden of proving the existence of a condi-
tion on the premises that will justify a stay. If such a notice or order has been issued,
"the landlord or petitioner shall have the burden of disproving the condition of the
dwelling as ... is described in the notice or order." Id. at § 755(l)(a). As was the
case prior to the amendment, the tenant is still required to deposit all rent due with
the clerk of the court when the tenant raises the statutory defense, but the court is now
empowered to release all or part of the money deposited with the clerk "to a contrac-
tor or materialman [to pay] for the maintenance of and necessary repairs to the build-
ing... upon a showing by the tenant that the landlord is not meeting his legal
obligations therefor. Upon the entry of an order vacating the stay the remaining
money deposited shall be paid to the plaintiff or landlord. ... Id. at § 755(3).
124. Since § 755 provides a stay of eviction proceedings for nonpayment of rent
when conditions on the premises are such as to constructively evict the tenant from a
portion of the premises, it is clear that the legislature did not intend to require the
tenant to completely abandon the premises as a condition precedent to obtaining a
stay based on constructive eviction. If the tenant has already abandoned the prem-
ises, there is obviously no need for the landlord to bring an eviction proceeding and
the statute would never have any application in such an action. This fact seems to be
recognized in early cases. See, e.g., Malek v. Perdina, 58 Misc. 2d 960, 297 N.Y.S.2d
14 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1969). But confusion arose when the New York City Civil Court
later dismissed a tenant's contention of constructive eviction, in a case where a stay
was sought under § 755, with the offhand comment that "to entitle her to a suspension
of the rent because of partial constructive eviction, tenant was required to actually
abandon the premises. . . .A tenant cannot claim uninhabitability and at the same
time continue to inhabit." Zweighaft v. Remington, 66 Misc. 2d 261, 264, 320
N.Y.S.2d 151, 154 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971). In any case, § 755 no longer requires the
court to find a constructive eviction before staying the landlord's rent action or evic-
tion proceeding, since a stay may be authorized on an alternative finding that a condi-
tion on the premises "is, or is likely to become, dangerous to life, health, or safety."
N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 755(l)(a) (Consol. Supp. 1977).
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. . . the utilities are restored to working order." Although it contains
no express authorization for rent withholding, section 756 is clearly
intended to protect the tenant who withholds rent when utility service
is discontinued as a result of the landlord's default. Presumably the
legislature intended the tenant in such a case to pay the whole
amount of delinquent rent once the landlord has restored the utilities
to working order. It is unlikely that a complete forfeiture of all rents
accruing while utilities are discontinued was intended, although the
legislative intent is unclear. The cognate statute, section 755, does
not authorize any forfeiture of rents. The law is similarly silent as to
whether the discontinuation of utilities creates a condition sufficient
to create a constructive eviction, and thereby invoke section 756 as a
method of paying utility costs out of the rental sums.
d. The Spiegel Law
New York's Spiegel law' 25 provides that payments for or toward
the rents of a welfare recipient may be made directly by the public
welfare department to the landlord, but that "[e]very public welfare
official shall have power to . . . withhold the payment of any such
rent" if he knows of an outstanding violation of law in the welfare
recipient's building that is dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to
life or health.'26 In addition, the statute declares that "[i]t shall be a
valid defense in any action or summary proceeding against a welfare
recipient for non-payment of rent to show existing violations in the
building wherein such welfare recipient resides which relate to condi-
tions which are dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health,
[provided such violations have been reported to the] public welfare
department by the department or agency having jurisdiction over vi-
olations."' 27 Even after the violation of law has been removed by
125. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 143b (Consol. 1976) (enacted by 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch.
997).
126. Id. at § 143b(2). One of the many points not made clear by the draftsman
concerns whose life or health must be endangered or detrimentally affected. It is cer-
tainly not clear that the welfare recipient's life or health must be thus affected by
conditions in the building where he lives. If the tenant is paying his or her own rent,
the statute does not authorize the tenant to withhold rent because of general housing
code violations.
127. Id. at § 143b(5)(a), (c). If the welfare agency should start to withhold rent on
the basis of knowledge of a serious code violation, without an official report, a welfare
recipient whose rent was withheld would have no defense against an action by the
landlord to recover rent or to evict for nonpayment of rent, since the statutory defense
is available only where the violation is reported to the public welfare department by
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correction of the condition constituting the violation, the statute pro-
tects against retaliation by forbidding the entry of any money judg-
ment or any eviction order against the tenant "on the basis of
nonpayment of rent for any period during which there was outstand-
ing any violation of law relating to dangerous or hazardous condi-
tions or conditions detrimental to life or health."' 28 The statute also
provides, however, that nothing therein contained "shall prevent the
public welfare department from making provision for payment of the
rent which was withheld . . upon proof satisfactory to it that the
condition constituting a violation was actually corrected."' 29
Like the more traditional modes of housing code enforcement, rent
withholding under the Spiegel law is dependent upon action by a lo-
cal administrative agency. Rent withholding is not authorized unless
the agency is already paying some or all of the welfare recipient's rent
directly to the landlord, and even then the welfare recipient cannot
compel the agency to withhold rents because of the existence of hous-
ing code violations.
The constitutionality of the Spiegel law was challenged in two
cases in the lower courts of New York. The Binghamton City Court
held the statute unconstitutional, 3 ° while the New York City Court
reached a contrary conclusion.' This split was resolved by the
Court of Appeals in Farrell v. Drew,'3 2 where Judge Fuld, for the
majority, held that the statute does not deny equal protection of the
law merely because it is aimed only at landlords of welfare recipients.
the agency having jurisdiction over code violations. It is thus anomalous that the
statute authorizes withholding by the welfare agency on the basis of "knowledge that
there exists ... any violation ... which is dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to
life or health," without specifying that it must have been officially reported. More-
over, it is not clear from the language of § 143b whether the determination that ex-
isting violations are dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health is to be
made by the code enforcement agency or by the welfare agency.
128. Id. at § 143b(5)(b).
129. Id. at § 143b(6). While § 143b(6) and § 143b(5)(b) are arguably inconsistent,
they may perhaps be reconciled by construing them to authorize the welfare agency to
pay the landlord any rent withheld for a period after correction of the violations that
gave rise to the right to withhold. By construing § 143b(6) to give the public welfare
department discretion to pay all withheld back rents upon correction, this provision
would emasculate the power of a welfare agency to assist the welfare tenant.
130. Trozze v. Drooney, 35 Misc. 2d 1060, 232 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1962).
131. Schaeffer v. Montes, 37 Misc. 2d 722, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Civ. Ct. of N.Y.
1962).
132. 19 N.Y.2d 486, 227 N.E.2d 824, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967).
[VOL. 16.3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol16/iss1/3
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
In addition, the court found no procedural due process violations be-
cause it failed to specifically call for notice and hearing to landlords.
Finally, the statute did not unconstitutionally impair any of the land-
lord's contractual rights since all contracts are made subject to the
exercise of the state's police power, which is paramount to any rights
under contracts between individuals. Unfortunately, however, the
Farrell court did not consider other constitutional issues-e.g.,
whether the statute is made invalid by the lack of statutory standards
to guide the exercise of administrative discretion in determining
whether a particular housing code violation is a danger to, or detri-
mentally affects, life or health; whether the lack of statutory stand-
ards to guide the welfare agency in deciding whether to retain the
withheld rents renders the statute invalid; and whether retention of
the withheld rents by the welfare agency, without paying the landlord
the reasonable value of the tenant's use and occupation, would in any
case deprive the landlord of property without due process of law.
In Farrell, the code violation that triggered the right to withhold
rent involved a faulty door in an apartment occupied by a tenant who
was not a welfare recipient. There was no code violation in the apart-
ment of the welfare recipient on whose behalf rents were withheld. It
thus appears, though somewhat anomalous, that the power of the
welfare agency to withhold rents and the welfare recipient's right to
the statutory defense against an action to recover rent or to evict for
nonpayment is not dependent on the existence of any code violation
in the welfare recipient's dwelling unit, nor even upon any finding
that the code violation is dangerous, hazardous or detrimental specif-
ically to welfare recipients.1
33
3. The Massachusetts Statutes
Massachusetts has two rent withholding statutes, both originally
enacted in 1965.131 One of these statutes,135 in effect, gives tenants a
133. The dissent was critical on this point. Id. at 494, 227 N.E.2d at 828, 281
N.Y.S.2d at 7 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). Judge Van Voorhis noted that the statute
was overinclusive, as it allowed withholding of rent for welfare tenants because of
conditions affecting non-welfare tenants. Also, the non-welfare tenants were forced to
suffer through defective conditions because obliged continue paying rent since not on
public relief. Finally, the provisions of the statute were unrelated to its intended pur-
pose of eliminating slums since the statute prevented any rent from being used for
repairs or improvements.
134. 1965 Mass. Acts, ch. 888 (currently codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 239,
§ 8A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978)); 1965 Mass. Acts, ch. 898 (currently codified
at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 127A-127N (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp.
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right to withhold rents where serious violations of the minimum
standards of fitness for human habitation established by state and
local housing codes have occurred, without bringing suit to obtain a
1978)). Both rent withholding remedies are ultimately based on ch. Ill, § 127A,
which in substance provides for a state housing code. The state public health depart-
ment is enjoined to "adopt. . . public health regulations to be known as the state
sanitary code," which "shall designate those conditions which, when found to exist
upon inspection of residential premises, shall be deemed to endanger or materially
impair the health or safety of persons occupying the premises." Id. Adoption of the
state sanitary code, however, "shall not be deemed to limit the right of any [local]
board of health to adopt such rules and regulations [as to housing] as, in its opinion,
may be necessary for the particular locality under its jurisdiction" so long as such
rules and regulations are consistent with state laws and with the state sanitary code.
Moreover, designation in the state sanitary code of conditions dangerous to health or
safety will not preclude a housing inspector from "certifying that any other violation
or combination or series of violations of said code or other applicable laws, ordi-
nances, by-laws, rules or regulations may endanger or materially impair the health or
safety of said persons when such certification is otherwise appropriate." Id.
§ 127B of the statute provides for enforcement in the traditional manner through
issuance of an administrative order to the owner or occupant, requiring the owner or
occupant "to vacate, to put the premises in a clean condition, or to comply with the
regulations set forth in said [state sanitary] code which are not being complied with or
to comply with the rules and regulations adopted by the board of health as being
necessary for the particular locality," and making the costs incurred by the enforce-
ment agency "in cleaning up the premises or in causing such structure to be demol-
ished or removed" a "debt due the city or town" and "a lien on the land upon which
the structure is or was located." Id. at § 127B.
135. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 239, § 8A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1978).
This statute does not expressly authorize rent withholding, but the right to withhold
follows from the statute's express protection against eviction for nonpayment of rent,
where such nonpayment is based on the existence of conditions making the premises
unfit for human habitation. Such protection is accorded the tenant, however, only
upon proof that the landlord or his agent "knew of such conditions before the tenant
. . . was in arrears in his rent." Id.
As amended in 1977, ch. 239, § 8A further provides:
Proof that the premises are in violation of the standard of fitness for human
habitation established under the state sanitary code, the state building code, or
any other ordinance, by-law, rule or regulation establishing such standards and
that such conditions may endanger or materially impair the health, safety or
well-being of a person occupying the premises shall create a presumption that
conditions existed . . . entitling the tenant . . . to a counterclaim or defense
under this section. Proof of written notice to the owner or his agents, servants, or
employees,. . . of an inspection of the premises, issued by the board of health,
or in the city of Boston by the commission of housing inspection, or by any other
agency having like powers of inspection relative to the condition of residential
premises, shall create a presumption that on the date such notice was received,
such person knew of the conditions revealed by such inspection and mentioned
in such notice.
Id.
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court order for rent withholding. The other statute136 requires ten-
ants to bring suit and obtain judicial authorization prior to withhold-
ing rents, based on a finding that serious violations of the same
minimum housing standards exist. And there are other significant
differences between the two statutes with respect to which rental
housing is covered; 37 the provisions for giving the landlord notice of
serious housing code violations; 31 the burden of proving that the ten-
ant is not responsible for such violations; 3 9 the necessity of proving
that the tenant is not in arrears in his rent when initiating rent with-
holding; 40 the need for a judicial finding that payment of the "fair
136. Id. ch. 111, §§ 127F-127G (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1978). Al-
though the tenant may prove that the premises have been inspected by an appropriate
agency and found to be in violation of state or local housing codes, he may also
simply allege and prove that a violation exists, that a request for inspection was made
to the appropriate agency at least 24 hours before the petition was filed, and that no
inspection was made. Id. §§ 127C & 127H. In either case, the tenant under ch. 111
must allege and prove that the violation "may endanger or materially impair the
health and well-being of such tenant," although if the tenant relies on an official in-
spection, he apparently need not allege or prove that such a potential effect was noted
in the inspection report itself.
137. Section 127C applies to rental units in "any building or any part thereof used
for residential purposes." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 127C (Michie/Law. Co-op
1975 & Supp. 1978). Section 8A expressly exempts rental housing located in a hotel
or motel or in "a lodging house or rooming house wherein the occupant has main-
tained. . . occupancy for less than three consecutive months." Id. ch. 239, § 8A.
138. See notes 134 & 135 supra.
139. The tenant must allege and prove that "the conditions in question were not
substantially caused by the tenant or any person acting under his control." MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 11, § 127C (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1978). In contrast,
the landlord who brings a summary action to evict under § 239 must prove that a
code violation raised as a defense by the tenant was caused by the tenant or "any
other person acting under his control," except where the violation exists "solely within
that portion of the premises" under the tenant's control "and not by its nature reason-
ably attributable to any action or failure to act" of the landlord. Id. ch. 239, § 8A.
Furthermore, "the tenant" in the phrase from ch. 111 quoted above seems to mean
"the petitioner or any other affected tenant" whose health, safety or well-being may
be threatened by the code violation. If so, the petitioning tenant is not entitled to
relief under ch. Ill unless he proves that no tenant in the building was responsible for
the violation complained. But "the person occupying the premises" in the quoted
phrase from ch. 239, § 8A clearly means the person who is authorized to set up the
code violation as a defense against eviction. Thus a tenant who withholds rent and
otherwise qualifies for protection under ch. 239, § 8A is immune from summary evic-
tion even if the landlord can prove that the violation was caused by some other tenant
in the same building.
140. A tenant seeking a rent withholding order under ch. 11, §§ 127F-127H need
not show that he is not in arrears, provided he is willing to pay any arrearage into the
court if ordered. Id. §§ 127F-127H. But a tenant withholding rent without a court
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value of the use and occupation of the premises into court is neces-
sary to remedy the condition constituting the violation;" the court's
authority, in determining how much the tenant should pay into court,
to reduce the fair value of the use and occupation by the amount
awarded a tenant for any counterclaim;' 4 ' and the definition of "ar-
rears of rent."14
2
Despite these significant differences, the two Massachusetts statutes
have important similarities. A tenant who properly withholds rent is
protected against eviction for nonpayment of rent under both stat-
utes. 14 3 A court acting under either statute may order the tenant who
order and relying on ch. 239, § 8A apparently is required to show that he was "not in
arrears in his-rent" wkhen the landlord learned of the conditions making the premises
unfit for human habitation, and cannot rely on his willingness to pay the arrearage
into court after determination of the amount in arrears. Id. ch. 239, § 8A. If a tenant
withholds rent without notifying the landlord of the conditions which in the tenant's
view justify rent withholding, the tenant would be well advised to file a petition under
ch. 111, § 127F or § 127H indicating his willingness to pay any arrearage into the
court as ordered. A tenant who follows this course and obtains a court order for rent
withholding and payment of "the fair value of the use and occupation" into court
under those sections would be protected against eviction for nonpayment of rent de-
spite failure to comply with the notice requirement of ch. 239, § 8A. See note 142
infra.
141. Under ch. 111, § 127F the court must find that payment of the "fair value of
the use and occupation of the premises" into court is "necessary to remedy the condi-
tion constituting the violation," MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. I 11, § 127F (Michie/Law. Co-
op 1975 & Supp. 1978), but no such finding is required under ch. 239, § 8A. Chapter
239, § 8A, however, provides that the court must reduce the fair value of use and
occupation by "the amount awarded the tenant or occupant for any claim." Id. ch.
239, § 8A. Chapter 111 specifies no such reduction.
142. Ch. 111, § 127F provides that:
[a] person occupying the premises shall not be considered to be in arrears in
his rent when the amount of rent the landlord alleges in good faith to be due is
equal to or less than the amount of any counterclaim that said person may bring
in good faith against the landlord, including any damages owed because of a
breach of warranty or a violation of any other law.
Id. ch. I11, § 127F.
143. Chapter 239, § 8A expressly provides that "[tihere shall be no recovery of
possession . . . pending final disposition of the plaintiff's action" if the court finds
that the tenant has established the statutory prerequisites for a defense or counter-
claim based on "the condition of the premises or the services or equipment provided
therein," and further that "[tihere shall be no recovery of possession ...if the
amount found by the court to be due the landlord equals or is less than the amount
found to be due the tenant. . . by reason of any counterclaim or defense under this
section." Id. ch. 239, § 8A. Moreover:
[i]f the amount found to be due the landlord exceeds the amount found to be due
the tenant. . . , there shall be no recovery of possession if the tenant. . . within
one week after having received written notice from the court of the balance due,
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withholds rent to pay into court "the fair value of the use and occu-
pation," taking into account any evidence relative to the conditions
allegedly constituting a breach of warranty or housing code viola-
tions in determining fair value; and a court may order moneys
paid by the tenant to be used for making repairs. 145 References in
the current versions of both of the Massachusetts rent withholding
statutes to "breach of warranty," "defense," "counterclaim," and
"fair value of the use and occupation" are obviously based on the
judicial recognition of an implied warranty of habitability in Boston
Housing Authority v. Hemingway.1 4
6
Withholding and receivership may be combined in Massachusetts
pays to the clerk the amount due landlord, together with interest and costs of
suit, less any credit due the tenant ... for funds already paid by him to the clerk
under this section. In such event, no judgment shall enter until after the expira-
tion of the time for such payment and the tenant has failed to make such pay-
ment.
Id. An editorial note indicates that the 1977 amendment, approved Jan. 11, 1978,
"completely rewrote the section to provide procedures for tenants' assertion of claims
and defenses in landlords' summary proceedings." Id.
Chapter 111, §§ 127A-127N, does not expressly protect a tenant who withholds rent
and pays it into court pursuant to court order. However, in any case where the land-
lord knew of the conditions making the leased premises unfit for human habitation
when the tenant began paying the rent into court and the tenant was not then "in
arrears," the tenant is clearly protected against eviction for nonpayment of rent by ch.
239, § 8A. But if the tenant begins withholding rent on his own, before the landlord
learns of the conditions making the premises unfit for human habitation, he is not
entitled to protection under ch. 239, § 8A. Instead, he apparently must rely on § 4 of
the act, which originally added §§ 127A-127N to ch. 111 in 1965. This section, for
reasons unknown, was never assigned either to ch. 111 or ch. 239 and still remains
uncodified. As amended in 1968, this statute provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, in any action of summary
process to recover possession of ... premises occupied for dwelling purposes
where the tenancy has been terminated ... for nonpayment of rent, no judg-
ment and execution shall issue for the plaintiffs while the rents payable for said
premises are to be paid into court pursuant to an order issued under section one
hundred and twenty-seven F or section one hundred and twenty-seven H of
chapter one hundred and eleven of the General Laws and are so being paid nor
shall any such judgment and execution issue during the nine month period next
following the date of such order ceases to be operative or is revoked if that ten-
ancy has been terminated without fault of the tenant.
Editorial note to MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 111, § 127F (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975).
144. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 127F-127H (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978);
id. ch. 239, § 8A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978).
145. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. I11, §§ 127F-127H (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978);
id. ch. 239, § 8A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978).
146. 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
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if the tenant initially files the rent withholding petition in the superior
court, or if an action started in the district court is removed to the
superior court, 147 but the right to withhold rent is not dependent on
appointment of a receiver as under New York's article 7A 48 and the
Connecticut statute modeled on article 7A. 149 Once appointed under
chapter 111, the Massachusetts receiver is authorized to "collect all
rents and profits of the property as the court shall direct and use all or
any of such funds. . . to enable such property to meet the standards
of fitness for human habitation." 5 '
In 1972 the Massachusetts legislature authorized residential tenants
to "repair or have repaired the defects or conditions constituting the
violations" found to exist by the board of health or other local code
enforcement agency, and certified by it or by a court of law as likely
to "endanger or materially impair the health, safety or well-being of a
tenant or tenants," and to deduct from any subsequently due rent the
amount paid for repairs.'' This broad authorization is limited, how-
ever, by a proviso that no tenant may deduct "an amount greater
147. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I 11, § 127H (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978).
148. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW. Art. 7A, §§ 769-782 (Consol. Supp. 1977). See
note 99 supra.
149. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-347g (1977).
150. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 1271 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975), which also
provides: "A receiver shall have such powers and duties as the court shall determine,
including the right to evict for nonpayment of rent. A receiver may be a person,
partnership or corporation." Id.
The statute also provides that:
The court, after hearing, may, by decree, authorize the receiver to apply for
such financial assistance, if it finds such assistance is necessary, that it is in a
reasonable amount and that the sum required to repair and rehabilitate the
premises is not so excessive as to constitute an imprudent and unreasonable ex-
penditure to accomplish the purpose .... The balance owed by the receiver to
the commonwealth shall, together with interest thereon . . . , constitute a debt
due the commonwealth, upon the rendering of an account therefor to the owner
of record, and shall be recoverable from such owner in an action of contract.
Any such debt ... shall constitute a lien on the property involved, if a notice of
such lien is recorded on behalf of the commonwealth ... within ninety days
after the debt becomes due.
Id. § 127J.
It appears that the draftsman of the 1965 Massachusetts tenants' rights legislation
anticipated that a tenant might first qualify for ch. 239, § 8A protection against evic-
tion for withholding of rent and then, after the court had entered an order for pay-
ment of the fair value of use and occupation into court, obtain appointment of a
receiver pusuant to ch. I 11, § 127H.
151. Id. ch. 111, § 127L (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978).
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than four months' rent in any twelve-month period, or period of oc-
cupancy, whichever is shorter," and that "[wihere the violation affects
more than one unit of a multi-unit structure, or a portion of the struc-
ture reserved for the common use of tenants, the amount deducted
for repairs for all affected tenants shall not exceed the total of four
months' rent due to the owner from all affected tenants." Moreover,
the owner is authorized to "recover from the tenant any excessive
amount deducted from the rent," defined as any amount in excess of
four months' rent, or an amount unreasonable under all the circum-
stances, including "the alternatives available to the tenant at the time
the violations were first reported, the urgency of the need to repair,
and the quality and cost of the work done." However, the landlord
can only recover the "excessive amount" in a contract action, not in
an action for possession of the rental premises. Although this last
provision is rather ambiguous, the legislature apparently intended to
preclude summary eviction of a tenant for nonpayment of rent in
cases where the tenant makes repairs and deducts an excessive
amount, but to allow the landlord to recover any sums wrongfully
deducted in an ordinary action for rent.
For many years a Massachusetts statute'52 had provided for fines
or imprisonment of any landlord of rental housing, "other than a
room or rooms in a hotel, lodging house or rooming house," who was
required by express or implied terms of the rental agreement to fur-
nish specified services such as water, heat, light, gas, or elevators, and
who wilfully or intentionally failed "to furnish any of those services,
or who wilfully or intentionally interfere[d] with the quiet enjoyment
of such ...premises." Although this statute was apparently little
used, it seems to have been intended to cover cases in which the ten-
ant retained possession of the premises and therefore, under tradi-
tional common law theory, could not recover damages for breach of
the express or implied covenant of quiet enjoyment in the lease. A
recent amendment now makes it applicable to all rental housing ex-
cept hotel rooms, expands "specified services" to include those re-
quired by law, and provides that a landlord who violates the statute
shall also be liable for any actual and consequential damages or three
months' rent, whichever is greater, and the costs of the ac-
tion-including a reasonable attorney's fee-all of which may be ap-
plied in setoff or recoupment against any claim for rent owed.' 53
152. Id. ch. 186, § 14 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1969) (originally enacted in 1927).
153. Id. as amended by 1973 Mass. Acts, ch. 778, § 2.
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This amendment, in referring to specified services "required by law,"
is presumably intended to encompass all services required by the
state sanitary code or local housing codes. In addition to providing a
new damage remedy, the statute also gives the superior and district
courts jurisdiction in equity to restrain violations. 5 4
Abbott surveyed records of landlord suits for possession and un-
paid rent in the Boston Housing courts to ascertain the incidence of
rent abatement defenses under the Massachusetts tenants' rights leg-
islation, and found that less than fifteen per cent of the tenant-de-
fendants ever raised the abatement defense, although most of the
cases involved low-income tenants represented by legal service attor-
neys.' 55 In most cases when the defense was raised, the tenant was
given a rent abatement and the landlord was given a judgment for
possession. The success of landlords in obtaining judgments for pos-
session suggests that most tenants who withheld rent failed to comply
with the requirements of chapter 239, section 8A, and therefore had
no valid defense against eviction for nonpayment of rent, although
under Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway 56 they were able to
set off their damages for breach of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity against the landlord's rent claim. As Abbott notes:
The provisions of section 8A in effect when the survey was taken
required the tenant, while not in arrears in the rent, first to give
written notice of his intention to withhold rent to the landlord,
then to secure an inspection of the unit to certify the existence of
a code violation that 'may endanger or materially impair the
health or safety' of the occupants. Failure to follow these proce-
dures eliminated the tenant's defense to eviction, although his
defense against the landlord's claim for back rent remained.'57
In its present form, chapter 239, section 8A does not require written
notice to the landlord of a tenant's intention to withhold rent, nor
does it require an inspection of the dwelling unit to certify the exist-
ence of a serious code violation.' 58 Thus it would seem that under
154. Id.
155. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: .4n Integra-
tion, 56 B.U.L. REv. 1, 63-64 (1976). For the data on which Abbott's conclusions are
based, see id. at 142-43 (Appendix, Table IV).
156. 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
157. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remdies: An Integration,
56 B.U.L. REv. 1, 62 (1976).
158. See note 135 supra. Proof ofwritten notice of an official inspection creates a
presumption that on the date of receipt of the notice the landlord "knew of the condi-
tions revealed by such inspection and mentioned in the notice," and ch. 239, § 8A
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the statute in its present form tenants should more often be successful
in defeating summary eviction suits.
4. The Pennsylvania Statute
The Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act 5 9 provides that, notwith-
standing "any agreement, whether oral or in writing," whenever one
of several designated housing code enforcement agencies "certifies a
dwelling as unfit for human habitation, the duty of any tenant of such
dwelling to pay, and the right of the landlord to collect rent shall be
suspended without affecting any other terms or conditions of the
landlord-tenant relationship, until the dwelling is certified as fit for
human habitation or until the tenancy is terminated for any reason
other than nonpayment of rent."' 60 The statute further provides that,
if the tenant continues to occupy the dwelling during any period
when the duty to pay rent is suspended, the tenant shall deposit the
rent in an escrow account, to be paid the landlord when the dwelling
is finally certified as fit for human habitation. 6' If the dwelling has
still not been certified as fit for human habitation at the end of six
months from the date it was certified as unfit, any money in escrow
becomes payable to the depositor, except that funds may be used to
make the dwelling fit for habitation or to pay utility bills that the
landlord, though obligated, has refused to pay.' 62 Tenants who with-
hold rent under the statute are protected by a prohibition against
eviction "for any reason whatsoever while rent is deposited in es-
crow."' 1
63
The Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act was upheld in Depaul v.
Kauffman,'" where the court rejected constitutional challenges
based on improper delegation of power, vagueness, 65 substantive
requires only that the landlord shall have known of the conditions alleged make the
premises unfit for human habitation "before the tenant . . .was in arrears in his
rent." Chapter 239, § 8A also makes "[a] copy of an inspection report issued by" any
code enforcement agency "admissible in evidence and ... prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein." Id.
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971).
165. The holding on this point was based largely on PHILADELPHIA, PA., Hous-
ING CODE § 7-506 (1970), which defines as "unfit for human habitation any dwelling
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due process, 166 and impairment of contract arguments.167 The court
which constitutes a serious hazard to the health or safety of the occupants or to the
public because it is dilapidated, unsanitary, vermin-infested or lacking in the facilities
and equipment required by" the Code. See 441 Pa. at 393, 272 A.2d at 504. It is not
clear why the court thought its reference to the standards applicable in Philadelphia
should be conclusive as to the validity of the general standard set forth in the statute,
since the statute applies to housing throughout Pennsylvania. However, a study pub-
lished in 1972 found generally that "in Pennsylvania the appropriate inspecting units
have specified certain guidelines for certification" so that "the interpretation problem
caused by the vagueness of other jurisdiction's standards is substantially avoided."
Comment, The Pennsylvania Prolect-A Practical Analysis of the Pennsylvania Rent
Withholding.4ct, 17 VILL. L. REv. 821, 853 (1972).
166. On this point, the court said:
• * * [A]mong the legitimate objects of the regulation of property for the gen-
eral welfare [under the police power] is an adequate supply of safe and decent
housing ...
It is evident that the sanctions imposed by the Act bear a real and substantial
relationship to its objective of assuring decent and habitable rental prop-
erty. . . .It seems a matter of common sense that one in the business of renting
real estate for profit who is faced with the temporary or permanent loss of rental
income will, in some instances, take steps to avoid that loss ...
Appellants' real complaint is that the Act is too severe, that it is 'unduly op-
pressive' or patently beyond the necessities of the case. In this regard, they note
that under the terms of the Rent Withholding Act a tenant may but need not
necessarily employ the escrow funds to make the needed improvements and can
avoid eviction during the period of rent suspension notwithstanding his mistreat-
ment of the property or other violation of his lease, and the landlord may irre-
trievably lose rentals if, after making a good faith and reasonable effort, he
cannot rehabilitate the property within six months after its certification as un-
fit ....
That the Rent Withholding Act permits but does not require the necessary
improvements to be made with the escrow funds is surely not unreasonable ...
[lit is to be expected that most landlords possess either the skills needed to make
property repairs or, at least, the knowledge of whom to hire to make such repairs.
Tenants, as a class, are not likely to possess these skills and this knowledge in the
same degree. Thus, it is far from unreasonable to put the burden on the landlord
rather than the tenant to make the needed repairs. Of course, the Act imposes an
additional burden upon the landlord in the sense that he will be out of pocket to
the extent of the cost of the repairs until the repairs are completed and the rents
released from escrow, but we do not deem this unduly oppressive.
Neither are we persuaded by the sample of a landlord who is unable to make
the required improvements within six months notwithstanding his good faith ef-
forts to do so. . . .A half a year is surely not an unreasonably short time. Fur-
thermore, there can be little sympathy for the landlord who despite diligence and
good faith cannot repair his property within the allotted time. Landlords have a
[statutory] duty to maintain their properties in a condition fit for human habita-
tion not only after that property has been certified as unfit but at all times. . ..
Thus it is not unreasonable that a landlord suffer a financial penalty even if he
cannot render his property fit within six months of its certification as unfit. This
situation might have even been contemplated by the Act: the goal of good hous-
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also clarified two important questions in holding that a tenant may
not remain in possession of the premises without paying the withheld
rent into escrow, and that the final sentence of the Act-prohibiting
eviction for any reason whatsoever while rent is in escrow---"does not
require the renewal of an existing lease [which expires during the six-
month withholding period] but only an extension of the original lease
as long as rent is in escrow."' 168
It seems clear that the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania Rent With-
ing would be served not only by rehabilitating houses which are certified as unfit
but also by deterring owners of rental property from allowing their property to
degenerate into a condition of unfitness in the first place.
The provision of the Rent Withholding Act that insulates a tenant from evic-
tion during the rent withholding period is not a constitutional deficiency. To be
sure, this statutory right is a windfall to the tenant. However, it serves as an
additional deterrent inducing the landlord to maintain his property in a habita-
ble condition.
441 Pa. at 393, 395-98, 272 A.2d at 504-06.
167. The court brushed aside the impairment of contract argument by observing:
We have already concluded that the Rent Withholding Act is a legitimate exer-
cise of the police power. In light of the paramount public interest in safe and
decent housing, the landlord's pre-existing duty to comply with housing code
standards, and the fact that in most instances there will be no permanent rent
loss, we do not consider the Act to be an unconstitutional impairment of contract
obligations. Id. at 399, 272 A.2d at 507.
168. On this point the court explained:
...Undoubtedly, a portion of those who rent unfit dwellings are tenants from
month to month or at will. With respect to this class of tenants, if the Act were
construed to require no extension of the tenant's possessory right, the landlord
could largely avoid the impact of the Act by giving notice to vacate as soon as the
first rental payment was put in escrow. However, in the case of a tenancy from
year to year or longer set to expire one or two months prior to the expiration of
the rent withholding period, the objectives of the act would not be served and the
landlord would be needlessly burdened, if he were required to renew the lease
for an entire additional term.
Id. at 396, 272 A.2d at 505.
The Kauffman court, in holding that an existing lease is extended by the Act "only
...as long as rent is in escrow," seems somewhat disingenuous in not referring to the
court's own decision, just three months earlier, in Klein v. Allegheny County Health
Dept., 441 Pa. 1, 269 A.2d 647 (1970), where it held that there is to be not only one
six-month withholding period, but as many periods as are necessary "until the dwell-
ing is certified as fit for human habitation." The Klein ruling makes it clear that in
cases where the landlord, despite good faith efforts to do so, is unable to make the
necessary repairs and improvements, the tenant may continue to occupy the premises
rent-free for an indefinite period. At the end of each six-month period, if the dwelling
has not yet been certified as fit for human habitation, the tenant will be able to re-
cover all of the rent paid into escrow, and a new six-month withholding period will
start.
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holding Act will depend in large measure upon the way in which its
escrow procedure works. That there have been problems with the
escrow procedure is evidenced by a lower court decision in 1970169
allowing tenants to bring a class action to compel a city to name a
bank as the depositary for escrowed rents. Moreover, the Act does
not clearly indicate whose authorization is needed to obtain a release
of the escrowed rents for the purpose of making repairs during the
withholding period. In Kauffman, however, the court assumed that
the tenant must authorize any such release. A 1972 study found that
tenants and escrow agents had generally so construed the statutes,
and that the policy of some escrow agents was to counsel tenants to
refuse to authorize any release of rents for repairs. 170
The Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act says nothing about the
disposition of escrowed rents when a tenant moves during the six-
month withholding period. Since there is no requirement in the Act
that a tenant must remain in possession for the full six-month period,
it can be argued that a tenant who moves before the end of the period
should be entitled to the escrowed rents if the dwelling remains unfit
at the end of the period. If the tenant stays in possession, however,
and simply stops paying rent into escrow, it is clear that the tenant
may be evicted during the six-month period. Moreover, it would
seem that the landlord, after evicting the tenant, may obtain the rent
deposited in escrow despite his failure to make the dwelling fit for
human habitation.
5. The Connecticut Statutes
In 1969 Connecticut adopted three new statutes providing for rent
withholding. One of these statutes, in its current form17 1 provides
that "[n1o apartment in any apartment house containing three or
more housing units in any municipality which adopts the provisions
of this section . . . shall be occupied for human habitation, after a
vacancy, until a certificate of occupancy has been issued by the per-
son designated by. . .such municipality to administer the provisions
of this section, certifying that such apartment conforms to the re-
quirements of the applicable housing ordinances of such municipality
and this chapter. . . , and [njo rent shall be recoverable by the owner
169. Feliciano v. City of Lancaster, 63 Lanc. Rev. 191 (C.P. 1971).
170. Comment, The Pennsylvania Project-A Practical.Analysis of the Pennsylpania
Rent Withholding Act, 17 VILL. L. REv. 821, 873 (1972).
171. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-347k to 19-34 7 q (1979).
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or lessor of such apartment house for the occupation of any apart-
ment for which a certificate of occupancy has not been obtained prior
to the rental thereof." '72 There are exceptions for apartment houses
"constructed or substantially reconstructed within a period of ten
years next preceding the date such certificate of occupancy would
otherwise be required hereunder," and for public housing. 17 3 This
statute appears to be potentially more effective than the 1905 statute
previously mentioned, 174 since the new statute requires older rental
housing to comply with current state and municipal housing codes
whenever a new tenant leases a dwelling unit covered by the new
statute. The new formulation was recently sustained in the federal
district court 75 against constitutional challenges that the statute de-
nied equal protection of the laws because it exempted apartment
buildings less than ten years old and public housing, and the statute
deprived apartment owners of property without due process of law
because it failed to establish any particular procedure or time limit
for issuance of certificate of occupancy.
Another of the Connecticut statutes enacted in 1969176 provides for
rent withholding in connection with a receivership granted on the
complaint of a majority of the tenants occupying a tenement house,
defined as a building with dwelling units rented to three or more fam-
ilies. Under this statute, which seems to be modeled on New York's
article 7A, 177 the receiver may be appointed if the court finds "the
existence of one or more of the following conditions: Housing code
violations, lack of heat, running water, electricity, light or adequate
sewage disposal facilities, other conditions dangerous to life, health
or safety and infestation of rodents, vermin or other pests."' 178 Al-
though these conditions are stated in the disjunctive, it is clear that all
of them will, in fact, constitute violations of the state tenement house
law or a local housing code. If a receiver is appointed, the tenants
must deposit the withheld rents with the receiver. 79 As under New
York's article 7A, the court may authorize the owner or mortgagee of
172. Id. § 19-347r(a),(b).
173. Id. § 19-347r(c).
174. See notes 86 and 91 supra.
175. Hill Const. Co. v. Connecticut, 366 F. Supp. 737 (D. Conn. 1973).
176. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-347k to 347q (1977).
177. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW. Art. 7A, §§ 769-782 (Consol. Supp. 1977).
178. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-347k & 19-347q (1979).
179. Id. § 19-347n.
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the building to remove or remedy the conditions found to exist upon
a showing of the ability promptly to undertake the work required and
the posting of adequate security, in which case withholding of rents is
not authorized and no receiver will be appointed.1 80
The third of the 1969 Connecticut statutes 181 authorizes a "munici-
pal fair rent commission" created pursuant to the statute, which is
only an enabling act, to order suspension of rent payments by tenants
in rent-controlled housing after it has determined that violations of
state or local health or safety regulations exist on the premises, until
the landlord brings the premises into compliance. During the period
of suspension, rent must be paid to the local fair rent commission to
be held in escrow, but the statute does not expressly authorize use of
the withheld rents to effect repairs.
The Connecticut statute fails to address the question whether a ten-
ant who has paid his rent to the commission will be protected against
an action by the landlord to recover rent or to evict for non-payment
of rent, but the statute will presumably be construed as giving the
tenant such protection. The Connecticut statute also fails to indicate
whether the landlord, after correcting the violations, is entitled to
rents held by the commission. Perhaps the legislature intended to
leave this issue to local option, although it would seem better to have
a uniform, state-wide rule.
6. Other Statutes
Missouri 182 and New Jersey 83 require the tenant to bring suit and
obtain a court order before he is entitled to withhold rent. Mary-
land,18 4 Michigan, 85 Rhode Island, 8 6 and Tennessee 8 7 permit the
tenant to withhold rent without first bringing suit. Under all of the
statutes just mentioned, the basis of the tenant's right to withhold rent
is the existence of conditions, generally in violation of an applicable
180. Id. § 19-347p.
181. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-148f (Supp. 1978).
182. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 441.500-441.620 (Supp. 1978).
183. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:42-85 to 24:42-96 (Supp. 1978).
184. 1968 Md. Laws, ch. 459 (applicable only to residential tenancies in Baltimore
where the weekly rent is $50 or less).
185. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.520 (1976).
186. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24.2-11 (1970).
187. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-5501 to 53-5507 (Supp. 1978) (applicable only to
residential tenancies where the rent does not exceed fifty dollars per week).
[Vol. 16.3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol16/iss1/3
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
housing code, that seriously threaten the life, health, safety, or wel-
fare of the tenant or make the premises unfit for human habitation. 188
All of these statutes except those of Maryland and Tennessee permit
the rents paid into court, or to another escrow agency, to be used for
the purpose of removing the conditions making the tenant's dwelling
uninhabitable.
The 1968 Michigan "tenants' rights" legislative package provided
other tenant-initiated remedies in addition to rent withholding. Te-
nants as well as the code enforcement agency may bring an action to
enforce the state housing code, and if the court finds any code viola-
tions or unsafe, unhealthy or unsanitary conditions, it may issue a
mandatory injunction requiring the landlord to make repairs, author-
ize the code enforcement agency to make repairs, authorize the ten-
ant to "repair-and-deduct," or appoint the municipality or a proper
local agency as receiver of the premises of the purpose of restoring
them to a safe, decent and sanitary condition.!8 9
The New Jersey statute also combines rent withholding and receiv-
ership.' 90 These receivership provisions, like those in Connecticut
and Massachusetts, seem to be based on New York's article 7A, 191
but the New Jersey provisions differ in that they authorize a receiver-
ship only "if the owner, any mortgagee or lienor of record of parties
in interest. . . apply to the court to be permitted to remove or rem-
edy the conditions specified in [the petition and the court issues] an
order permitting such person to perform the work, [and the court
later] shall determine that such [person] is not proceeding with due
diligence [or has failed] to complete the work in accordance with the
provisions of said order."' 92 There is no express provision for ap-
pointing a receiver if no one applies to the court for permission to
make the necessary repairs, although in that case withheld rents de-
posited by tenants "shall be used, subject to the court's direction, to
the extent necessary to remedy the. . . conditions alleged in the peti-
188. Although the right to withhold rent under the Michigan statute is triggered
by proof that no certificate of compliance with the state housing code is in force, the
substantive standard for refusal to issue, or revocation of, a certificate of compliance
is not a mere violation of the state housing law but the existence of "conditions...
[that] constitute a hazard to the health or safety of those who may occupy the prem-
ises." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 125.530 (1976).
189. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.523 (1976).
190. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-92 to 42-93 (Supp. 1978).
191. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW Art. 7A, §§ 769-782 (Consol. Supp. 1977).
192. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-93 (Supp. 1978).
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tion." 193
The Illinois rent withholding legislation, adopted in 1967, formal-
ized and extended to welfare recipients throughout the state certain
informal procedures used in Chicago since 1961.194 It is similar to
New York's Spiegel law in that it applies only to rental housing occu-
pied by welfare recipients. The statute is broader than New York's,
however, in that it authorizes county or local welfare agencies to
withhold both the rent allowances included in periodic payments to
welfare recipients and rent payments ordinarily made directly to
landlords, if a report of the appropriate municipal or county author-
ity shows that any building occupied by a welfare recipient "violates
any law or ordinance establishing construction, plumbing, heating,
electrical, fire prevention or other health and safety standards and by
reason thereof is in a condition dangerous, hazardous or detrimental
to life or health."'195 The welfare agency must give landlords notice
that rent allowances or direct rent payments on behalf of welfare re-
cipients will be withheld unless the violations are corrected within ten
days after the notice is mailed. 196
Like New York's Spiegal law, the Illinois statute protects welfare
recipients from eviction or other action by landlords as a result of
rent withholding under the syatute. Withholding is authorized when-
ever a serious code violation exists in any building occupied by a
welfare recipient, even if the violation is not in the dwelling unit actu-
ally occupied by the welfare recipient.' 97 Unlike the Spiegel law,
however, the Illinois statute specifically provides for payment of va-
rying percentages of the withheld rent to the landlord if he corrects
code violations within specified periods of time,' 98 and the Illinois
Welfare Department or the local governmental unit, or both, are ex-
pressly authorized to intervene on behalf of a welfare recipient in any
action brought against him by the landlord during the period when
rent is withheld.' 99
193. Id. § 2A:42-92.
194. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. If code violations are corrected within 90 days, all the withheld rent is paid to
the landlord; if not, there is a 20% deduction as an "administrative penalty," and for
each 30-day period after the expiration of the initial 90-day period during which vio-
lations remain uncorrected, and additional penalty of 20% is deducted. Id.
199. Id.
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A 1970 study of experience with the Illinois legislation 2" con-
cluded that these statutes had only limited effect. Rent was in fact
withheld in only twenty-one per cent of the cases in which rent with-
holding was authorized, and compliance with the housing codes was
achieved in only 7.5% of those cases. Moreover, statutory rent with-
holding appeared to have substantially no effect on the rate of demo-
lition of substandard rental housing. Of the seventy-nine per cent of
eligible cases where no rent was actually withheld, the failure to with-
hold rent was due to preventable administrative problems in sixty-
seven per cent of such cases, and only thirty-three per cent was due to
nonpreventable factors. As these statistics suggest, "the administra-
tion of the rent withholding statute is extremely complex."' 0' A com-
parison between buildings in which rent was withheld and other
buildings housing public aid recipients revealed that compliance was
achieved in thirty-six per cent of the buildings where rent was with-
held, as compared to only twenty-two per cent of the other buildings.
Since both groups of buildings were in approximately the same con-
dition, the higher rate of compliance for buildings where rent was
withheld seems to indicate that rent withholding was effective in in-
ducing compliance.
III. TENANTS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION: THE WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY APPROACH
A. The 19th Century Legislation
During the 19th Century, several states adopted legislation impos-
ing a duty on landlords to deliver leased premises in a condition fit
for the tenant's intended use or, more narrowly, fit for human habita-
tion, and an additional duty to make at least some necessary repairs
during the lease term. It is probable that the ultimate source of all
such legislation was the civil law of western Europe. The Louisiana
and Georgia legislation is clearly traceable to civil law sources.
1. The Louisiana Statute
The English common law regarding landlord-tenant relations
never received acceptance in Louisiana, and the French civil law pro-
vided rules for judicial decision even after Louisiana became part of
200. Note, Rent Withholding for Welfare Recpient.s: An Empirical Study of the
Illinois Statute, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 798 (1970).
201. Id. at 816.
1979)
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
the United States. Current Louisiana Civil Code provisions,
originating either in the Code Napoleon or early 19th Century addi-
tions thereto, impose on all lessors a duty, in the absence of a con-
trary agreement, to deliver the leased premises to the lessee in a
condition fit for the purpose for which the lease was made,202 make
all major repairs not required by wrongful conduct of the lessee,20 3
and make even minor repairs made necessary by "unforeseen events
or decay.' ' 2 4 The lessee, on the other hand, is responsible for other
minor repairs customarily undertaken by tenants unless there is a
contrary agreement between the parties.20 5 If the lessor does not
make the repairs for which he is responsible, the lessee may "call on
him to do it," and if the lessor refuses or neglects to make the repairs
"the lessee may himself cause them to be made, and deduct the price
from the rent due [and to become due], on proving that the repairs
were indispensable, and that the price which he has paid was just and
reasonable., 2 6 Moreover, the lessee may obtain a judgment dissolv-
ing the lease if the lessor fails to perform his statutory duties to de-
liver the leased premises in good condition and to keep them in
repair.
207
Lease provisions purporting to impose upon the lessee the duty of
keeping leased premises in repair or stating that the lessee accepts the
202. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2693, 2695 (West 1952). For cases interpreting
these provisions, see Bennett v. Southern Scrap Material Co., 121 La. 204, 46 So. 211
(1908); Dean v. Beck, 46 La. Ann. 1168, 15 So. 357 (1894); King v. Grant, 43 La. Ann.
817, 9 So. 642 (1891); Siracusa v. Leloup, 28 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 1946); Mosher v.
Burglass, 170 So. 416, reinstated, 172 So. 124 (La. App. 1937).
203. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2692-2693, 2717 (West 1952). For cases interpret-
ing these privisions, see Dehan v. Youree, 161 La. 806, 109 So. 498 (1926); Lirette v.
Sharp, 44 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 1950) (roof); Roppolo v. Pick, 4 So. 2d 839 (La. App.
1941) (ceiling); Warren v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 190 So. 855 (La. App. 1939);
Richard v. Tarantino, 131 So. 701 (La. App. 1931) (floor).
204. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2717 (West 1952).
205. Id. art. 2716. The Louisiana Court of Appeals has indicated that the list is
only illustrative and that the lessee is responsible for repair of all those minor defects
customarily assumed to be caused by the lessee's negligence. Lowe v. Home Owner's
Loan Corp., 1 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 1941).
206. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2694 (West 1952). The English translation of the
French text in LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2664 (1825) was incomplete as it omitted the
bracketed words "and to become due."
207. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2729 (West 1952) provides: "The neglect of the
lessor or lessee to fulfill his engagements, may also give cause for a dissolution of the
lease, in the manner expressed concerning contracts in general, except that the judge
can not order any delay of the dissolution."
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premises "in the condition in which they now are" have been very
narrowly construed by the Louisiana courts. Thus it has been held
that a lease provision requiring the lessee to maintain the building at
all times in a good condition to repair at his own expense only re-
lieved the lessor of the duty of making ordinary repairs, and that the
lessor remained responsible for structural repairs.208 Moreover, a
provision reciting that the lessee "accepts the demised premises in the
condition in which they now are, and agrees to keep them at a good
state of repair during the term of this lease" has been held not to
deprive the lessee of warranty protection afforded by articles 2692
and 2695.209
The lessee's repair-and-deduct remedy under article 2694 is op-
tional; the lessee is not under any duty to the lessor to "repair-and-
deduct."2 ' The lessee cannot, however, deduct the cost of repairs
made by him unless he has notified the lessor of the need for re-
pairs21 and, after giving the lessor a reasonable time to make the
208. Maggio v. Cox, 63 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 1953) ("structural repairs" included
restoring the roof and ceiling, painting inside and out, and even replacing a wooden
shed-"if [the shed] involves framework and supporting timbers which ... are of a
structural nature"). Under this construction, the lessee's covenant to repair seems to
add little to the lessee's statutory duty of repair under LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2715
& 2716 (West 1952). See also Barrow v. Culver Bros. Garage, 78 So. 2d 69, 71 (La.
App. 1955) where the lease contained the following clause:
(lessee) agrees during the term of this lease to maintain the building on said
premises in good condition and to make all repairs thereto at his own expense
that become necessary.
The court held that the responsibility for repairing electric wiring condemned by the
city inspector at the beginning of the lease term was the lessor's. "The defects were,
therefore, not such as become necessary during the term of the lease; they already
existed when the lease was executed." Id. at 72.
209. Reed v. Classified Parking System, 232 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1970). In Bar-
row the court noted that the lease did not contain a clause stating that the lessee had
inspected the premises and accepted them "as is," leaving an implication that such a
clause might be effective. But an "as is" clause alone will clearly not relieve the lessor
of his duty to make major repairs that become necessary because of defects arising
during the term of the lease. Barrow v. Culver Bros. Garage, 78 So. 2d 69, 72 (La.
App. 1955).
210. Thomas v. Catalanotto, 164 So. 171 (La. App. 1935). The lessee's right to
make necessary repairs under LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2694 (West 1952) does not
affect the guaranty imposed on the lessor by art. 2695 to protect the lessee from "all
the vices or defects of the thing, which may prevent its being used" and to "indemnify
him for the same." Boutte v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 139 La. 945, 952, 72 So. 513,
515 (1916).
211. Hartz v. Stauffer, 163 La. 382, 111 So. 794 (1927); Boignac v. Boisdore, 272
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repairs, has made them at his own expense.2 12 The lessor's breach of
his duty to make repairs does not justify rent withholding by the
lessee except for the purpose of utilizing the "repair-and-deduct"
remedy under article 2694, or where the lessee has dissolved the lease
under article 2729.23 Some early Louisiana cases indicated that dis-
solution of the lease is not a favored remedy and that the lessee must
attempt to "repair-and-deduct" before seeking the more drastic disso-
lution. 14 The most recent cases take a more favorable view of disso-
lution if the lessor's breach is substantial.2 15  Where the lessee
successfully elects dissolution, he remains liable for the rent until he
vacates the leased premises.2 16 The parallel to constructive eviction
in common law jurisdictions is obvious.
2. The Georgia Statute
Georgia law differentiates between a landlord-tenant relationship
giving the tenant a mere "usufruct" and a landlord-tenant relation-
ship arising from the conveyance of an estate for years.217 The par-
ties may expressly agree as to which type of relationship they are
creating but, absent such an agreement, a lease for less than five years
So. 2d 463 (La. App. 1973), aj'd, 288 So. 2d 31 (La. 1973); Duchain v. Ben Roumain,
Inc., 176 So. 696 (La. App. 1937).
212. Mullen v. Kerlec, 2 Teiss. 340, 40 So. 46 (La. App. 1905). But cf. Leggio v.
Manion, 172 So. 2d 748 (La. App. 1965) (dictum that "the necessary repairs must
begin within a reasonable time after the lessee exercises the privilege of retaining the
rent therefor" in order to give the lessee a defense against summary eviction for non-
payment of rent).
213. Bruno v. Louisiana School Supply Co., 274 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 1973); Leg-
gio v. Manion, 172 So. 2d 748 (La. App. 1965); Mullen v. Kerlec, 2 Teiss 340, 40 So.
46 (La. App. 1905). All three cases allow eviction for non-payment of rent where the
lessee had not made the repairs, but note the Leggio dictum, note 212 supra.
214. E.g., Meyers v. Drewes, 196 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 1967); Lafayette Realty Co.
v. Travia, I1 Teiss. 275 (La. App. 1914).
215. E.g., Shear v. Castrinos, 327 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1976) (dictum); Broussard
v. O'Bryan, 270 So. 2d 127 (La. App. 1972), application denied, 272 So. 2d 374 (La.
1973) (to justify cancellation of lease, lessee must show that lessor's action seriously
disturbed lessee's full use and enjoyment of leased premises); Reed v. Classified Park-
ing System, 232 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1970).
216. Mulhaput v. Enders, 38 La. Ann. 744 (1886); Reed v. Classified Parking Sys-
tem, 232 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1970); Goldstein v. Stone, 12 La. App. 702, 127 So. 73
(1930).
217. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 6 1-101 & 85-802 (1966 & Supp. 1978). A principal differ-
ence is that the tenant may not convey a usufruct except by the landlord's consent,
and it is not subject to levy and sale. Id. § 61-101.
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is presumed to create only a usufruct,218 while a lease for five years or
more is presumed to create an estate for years.2 19 As the Georgia
Supreme Court has stated, "[w]here an estate for years is created, our
Civil Code,. . . following the common law, makes the tenant bound
for all repairs or other expense necessary for the preservation and
protection of the property; but where simply the relation of landlord
and tenant exists, the tenant in such case having no estate but only a
usufruct in the rented premises, the civil law is adopted, and the land-
lord must keep the premises in repair .... ,,221
The statute adopting the civil law rule whereby the tenant has a
mere usufruct22 has been construed to impose upon the landlord not
only a duty to repair but also a duty to lease his property in a condi-
tion reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is intended to be used,
if full rent is reserved.2 z The tenant's remedies for breach of the
landlord's statutory duties have been held to include an action for
damages, 22 3 a rent reduction or recoupment, 224 and the self-help
remedy of "repair-and-deduct. ' 225 Before any of these remedies are
available, however, the landlord must receive notice of the condition
requiring repair.226 The old rule allowing an effective waiver of the
landlord's duty by an express lease covenant obligating the tenant to
218. Id. § 61-101 (1966).
219. Warehouses, Inc. v. Wetherbee, 203 Ga. 483, 46 S.E.2d 894 (1948).
220. Mayer v. Morehead, 106 Ga. 434, 435, 32 S.E. 349, 350 (1899). The "com-
mon law rule" is codified in GA. CODE ANN. § 85-805 (1978), and the civil law rule is
codified at § 61-111. See also § 61-112 (1966), which makes the landlord liable for
personal injuries "arising from defective construction or ... from failure to keep the
premises in repair" when the tenant has only a "usufruct."
221. GA. CODE ANN. § 61-111 (1966).
222. E.g., Driver v. Maxwell, 56 Ga. 11 (1876); Whittle v. Webster, 55 Ga. 180
(1875).
223. E.g., Lewis & Co. v. Chisholm, 68 Ga. 40 (1881); Whittle v. Webster, 55 Ga.
180 (1875).
224. Eg., Mayer v. Morehead, 106 Ga. 434 (1899); Lewis & Co. v. Chisholm, 68
Ga. 40 (1881); Guthman v. Castleberry, 48 Ga. 172 (1873).
225. E.g., Lewis & Co. v. Chisholm, 68 Ga. 40 (1881); Valdes Hotel Co. v. Ferrell,
17 Ga. App. 93, 86 S.E. 333 (1915); Dougherty v. Taylor & Norton Co., 5 Ga. App.
773, 63 S.E. 928 (1909).
226. Ocean Steamship Co. v. Hamilton, 112 Ga. 901,38 S.E. 204 (1901); White v.
Montgomery, 58 Ga. 204 (1877); Cassel v. Randall, 10 Ga. App. 587, 73 S.E. 858
(1912). Even without actual notice, the landlord may be deemed to have received
constructive notice in personal injury cases. Aycock v. Houser, 96 Ga. App. 99, 99
S.E.2d 298 (1957).
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make repairs or releasing the landlord from any duty to do SO227 has
been abrogated by recent legislation,228 which also seems to abrogate
the old rule barring any remedy against the landlord for failure to
make repairs if the tenant knows of the need for repairs at the incep-
tion of the tenancy.229
3. The California Statute and its Descendants
Early California legislation similar to the Louisiana and Georgia
legislation discussed above may perhaps ultimately be traced to the
civil law, but it is immediately derived from the 1848 Field Draft for
a New York Civil Code.2 3' Although the Field Code was not
adopted in New York, sections 990 and 991 of the Draft Code were
adopted in California in 1872 as sections 1941231 and 1942232 of the
California Civil Code. These sections remained unchanged between
1873 and 1970.233 Judicial decisions prior to 1970 made it clear that
227. E.g., Bell House v. Wilkins, 34 Ga. App. 285, 129 S.E. 797 (1925); Heriot v.
Connerat, 12 Ga. App. 203, 76 S.E. 1066 (1912); Carter v. Noe, 118 Ga. App. 298, 163
S.E.2d 348 (1968).
228. 1976 Ga. Laws, p. 1372; GA. CODE ANN. § 61-102(b)(1), (2) (Supp. 1978).
229. Elijah A. Brown Co. v. Wilson, 191 Ga. 750, 13 S.E.2d 779 (1941); Bazemore
v. Burnet, 117 Ga. App. 849, 161 S.E.2d 924 (1968). On the effect of the 1976 legisla-
tion, see Comment, New Act is a Step TowardLandlord-Tenant Equality in Georgia, 28
MERCER L. REV. 351, 355-62 (1976).
230. FIELD'S DRAFT CIVIL CODE (1898).
231. The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings
must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for
such occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it
untenantable, except such as are mentioned in section nineteen hundred and
twenty-nine.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941, Legislative History (Deering 1972).
The phrase, "in the absence of an agreement to the contrary" was added in 1873.
Id. § 1941. Section 1929, based on FIELD'S DRAFT CIVIL CODE § 983 (1848), origi-
nally provided: "The hirer of a thing must repair all deteriorations or injuries thereto
occasioned by his ordinary negligence." In 1905, "want of ordinary care" was substi-
tuted for "ordinary negligence" at the end of the section. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1929,
Legislative History (Deering 1972).
232. If within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which
he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee may repair the same himself, where
the cost of such repairs do not require an expenditure greater than one month's rent of
the premises, and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent, or the lessee may
vacate the premises, in which case he shall be discharged from further payment of
rent, or performance of other conditions. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942, Legislative History
(Deering 1972).
233. The original 1872 version had provided: "If, within a reasonable time after
notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the
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repair-and-deduct or vacation of premises were the only remedies
available to the lessee for breach of the lessor's statutory duty,23 4 and
that these rights under both sections could be expressly waived.2 35
The 1874 versions of sections 1941 and 1942 were adopted practi-
cally verbatim at an early date in Montana,236 Oklahoma,2 37 North
Dakota2 38 and South Dakota.2 39 The only significant differences
were that the Oklahoma, North Dakota and South Dakota formula-
tions did not limit the tenant's repair-and-deduct remedy to one
month's rent of the premises,24 and North Dakota gave the tenant an
additional right, if the landlord should fail to make required repairs,
to recover repair expenditures "in any other lawful manner from the
lessor.",2
4 1
From the viewpoint of the modem urban residential tenant, stat-
utes derived from the Field Draft Civil Code were deficient insofar as
they allowed waiver of the landlord's duty to maintain the leased
premises in habitable condition,242 and (except in North Dakota)
limited the tenant's remedies for breach of the landlord's duties to
either repair-and-deduct or vacation of the premises and termination
of the lease.2 43 Moreover, the "one month's rent" limitation (except
lessee may repair the same himself, and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the
rent, or otherwise recover it from the lessor." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942, Legislative
History (Deering 1972).
234. E.g., Sieber v. Blanc, 76 Cal. 173, 18 P. 260 (1888); Van Every v. Ogg, 59 Cal.
563 (1881).
235. An express waiver of the lessor's § 1941 duty or of the lessee's repair-and-
deduct remedy under § 1942 was effective to waive that remedy. Arnold v. Klighaun,
169 Cal. 143, 146 P. 423 (1915); Curtis v. Arnold, 43 Cal. App. 97, 184 P. 510 (1919).
Presumably an express waiver of the lessor's § 1941 duty would also bar the lessee's
alternate remedy of vacation and termination of the lease under § 1942.
236. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. tit. 42, §§ 201-202 (1961).
237. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 31-32 (West 1954).
238. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-12 (repealed 1977), 47-16-13 (1960).
239. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-32-8 to 43-32-9 (1967).
240. See notes 237-39 supra.
241. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13 (1960). In DeMers, Inc. v. Fink, 148 N.W.2d
820 (N.D. 1967), the court indicated that a tenant could counterclaim for damages,
without having made repairs, in an action for rent, although the counterclaim failed
for lack of proof.
242. See note 233 supra.
243. See text accompanying note 234 supra. For cases indicating that the statu-
tory remedies are exclusive, see, e.g., Lake v. Emigh, 118 Mont. 325, 167 P.2d 575
(1946); Staples v. Baty, 206 Okla. 288, 242 P.2d 705 (1952); Armstrong v. Thompson,
62 S.D. 567, 255 N.W. 561 (1934).
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in North and South Dakota) upon the repair-and-deduct remedy pre-
cluded the tenant's use of this remedy when major repairs were re-
quired to make the premises habitable.
A 1970 amendment to California Civil Code section 1942 further
limited the repair-and-deduct remedy, providing that this remedy
"shall not be available to the lessee more than once in any 12-month
period." 2' Other 1970 amendments, however, substantially enlarged
the rights of tenants by detailing conditions deemed to make a dwell-
ing untenantable,245 invalidating waivers of the tenant's rights under
sections 1941 and 1942 "with respect to any condition which renders
the premises untenantable" unless the tenant agrees "to improve, re-
pair or maintain all or stipulated portions of the dwelling as part of
the consideration for rental,"246 and providing new protection for the
tenant against retaliatory action by the landlord based on the tenant's
assertion of his statutory rights.2 47 Finally, a 1970 amendment de-
tailed the tenant's affirmative obligations, any substantial breach of
which will excuse the landlord from performance of his duties in re-
gard to maintenance of the premises.248
In 1976 South Dakota enacted important amendments to its stat-
utes dealing with the lessor's duty of maintenance of residential
premises. The South Dakota residential tenant is now protected by a
provision, similar to a 1970 California amendment, that the parties to
a lease "may not waive or modify the requirements imposed by" the
statute, except that "the lessor may agree with the lessee that the
lessee shall perform specified repairs or maintenance in lieu of
rent."'249 In addition, the South Dakota residential tenant now has
the right to withhold rent if the cost of necessary repairs exceeds one
month's rent "until such time as the lessor makes the repairs, at
which time the lessee shall release the deposit [of withheld rents] to
the lessor or until sufficient money is accumulated in the account for
244. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942(a) (Deering 1972). § 1942(b), added in 1970, pro-
vides: "For the purpose of this section, if a lessee acts to repair and deduct after the
30th day following notice, he is presumed to have acted after a reasonable time. The
presumption established by this subdivision is a presumption affecting the burden of
producing evidence." Id. § 1942(b).
245. Id. § 1941.1.
246. Id. § 1942.1.
247. Id. § 1942.5.
248. Id. § 1941.2.
249. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 43-32-8 (Supp. 1976).
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the lessee to cause the repairs to be made and paid for."2 5
B. Recent Legislation Creating a Warranty of Habitability
1. Simple Warranty of Habitability Statutes
Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island,
and Wisconsin have recently enacted statutes that simply impose on
landlords a new duty to provide tenants with habitable dwellings
(often phrased in terms of a "warranty of habitability"), without de-
fining the duty or, except for the Maine statute, prescribing the ten-
ant's remedies for breach in much detail. None of these statutes form
part of a comprehensive new code of landlord-tenant law. The
Maine"' and New York252 statutes create a warranty that the leased
premises are habitable without creating an express duty to maintain
them in a habitable condition. The Maine statute contains language
making it clear that the landlord does have a duty,253 and the
Idaho,254 Michigan,255 Minnesota,256 and Rhode Island2 57 statutes
expressly impose such a duty. The Michigan and Minnesota stat-
2581utes, in addition, impose on the landlord a duty to keep the prem-
ises in compliance with applicable housing codes. The Wisconsin 259
statute, on the other hand, imposes a duty to maintain the premises,
but does not expressly state that the landlord "warrants" the premises
to be habitable.
Of the new statutes, only the Maine26" and Wisconsin261 statutes
expressly provide remedies for breach of the landlord's duty. The
Wisconsin act provides that the tenant "may remove from the prem-
250. For a discussion of the 1976 amendments, see Wolff, Balancing Act:
Strengthening South Dakota's Landlord-Tenant Law, 22 S.D.L. REV. 15 (1977).
251. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6021 (Supp. 1977).
252. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1977).
253. Paragraph 4 of the statute authorizes suits by tenants whenever "a condition
exists in a dwelling unit which renders the dwelling unit unfit for human habitation."
See note 253 and accompanying text infra.
254. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-320, 6-322 & 6-323 (Supp. 1977).
255. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (Supp. 1977).
256. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1978).
257. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18-16 (1970).
258. Supra notes 255, 256.
259. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West Supp. 1977).
260. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (West Supp. 1977).
261. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West Supp. 1975).
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ises unless the landlord proceeds promptly to ...eliminate the
health hazard; or. . .if the inconvenience to the tenant by reason of
the nature and period of repair. . . or elimination would impose un-
due hardship on him."262 Moreover, "[i]f the tenant justifiably moves
out . . . the tenant is not liable for rent after the premises become
untenantable and the landlord must repay any rent paid in advance
apportioned to the period after the premises become untenantable."
On the other hand, if the tenant remains in possession while the land-
lord is eliminating the health hazard, "rent abates to the extent the
tenant is deprived of the full normal use of the premises." '263 The
Wisconsin statute clearly gives the tenant less in the way of remedial
rights than the 19th century statutes still in force in Louisiana, Geor-
gia, California, Montana, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and South Da-
kota, for it does not allow the tenant to repair and deduct and limits
the tenant to termination of the lease in cases where the landlord is
unwilling to make the required repairs.
The Idaho statute 64 expressly provides that the remedies for
breach of the landlord's duty to maintain the premises in habitable
condition shall be "damages and specific performance." It is not
clear whether this will be construed to exclude other possible reme-
dies such as termination or "repair-and-deduct."
The remedies provided by the new Maine statute 265 are more ex-
tensive. Maine authorizes the tenant to file a civil complaint "[i]f a
condition exists in a dwelling unit which renders the dwelling unit
unfit for human habitation"-i.e., if there is a breach of the statutory
warranty-but there is no reference at all to housing code violations.
The complaint must allege that the condition "endangers or materi-
ally impairs the health or safety of the tenants; that it was not caused
by the tenant or another person acting under his control; that written
notice of the condition was given to the landlord without unreason-
able delay; that the landlord unreasonably failed to take prompt, ef-
fective steps to remedy the condition; and that the tenant was current
in his rental payments at the time written notice was given. ' '266 If the
court finds these allegations to be true, the landlord is "deemed to
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See note 254 supra.
265. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (West Supp. 1977). The statute is some-
what similar to MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 127C-127H (Michie/Law. Co-op 1977).
266. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 para. 3 (West Supp. 1977).
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have breached the warranty of fitness for human habitation. . . as of
the date when actual notice of the condition was given to the land-
lord"; the court is authorized to provide the following relief "in addi-
tion to any other relief or remedies which may otherwise exist":
A. The court may issue appropriate injunctions ordering the
landlord to repair all conditions which endanger or materially
impair the health or safety of the tenant;
B. The court may determine the fair value of the use and occu-
pancy of the dwelling unit. . . from the date when the landlord
received actual notice of the condition until such time as the con-
dition is repaired, and further declare what, if any, moneys the
tenant owes the landlord or what, if any, rebate the landlord
owes the tenant for rent paid in excess of the value of use and
occupancy. In making this determination, there shall be a rebut-
table presumption that the rental amount equals the fair value of
the dwelling unit free from any condition rendering it unfit for
human habitation ...
C. The court may authorize the tenant to temporarily vacate
the dwelling unit if the unit must be vacant during necessary
repairs. No use and occupation charge shall be incurred by the
tenant until such time as the tenant resumes occupation of the
dwelling unit.
D. The court may enter such other orders as the court may
deem necessary to accomplish the purpose of this section. The
court may not award consequential damages for breach of the
warranty of fitness for human habitation.2 6 7
Presumably the "remedies which may otherwise exist," though not
specified, include an action for damages due to breach of the statu-
tory warranty and the right to terminate the lease and vacate the
premises, as in cases of constructive eviction. Since the statute pro-
vides a rent withholding-rent abatement remedy, it seems unlikely
that the Maine courts will allow tenants to withhold rent "on their
own," without bringing the action contemplated by the statute and
obtaining a court order with respect to the "fair value of the use and
occupancy of the dwelling unit."
Under statutes that expressly create a warranty or covenant of hab-
itability but fail to specify remedies for breach, all the normal reme-
dies for breach of contract are presumably available to the tenant.
Contract remedies would include an action for damages268 (or a
267. Id. para. 4.
268. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 235b (McKinney Supp. 1977) clearly implies in
para. 3 that the damage remedy is available. Paragraph 3 provides that "[i]n deter-
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counter-claim or set-off of claimed damages against the landlord's
claim for rent) if the tenant elects to remain in possession; rescission
or termination of the lease if the tenant elects to surrender possession
(substantially creating a "constructive eviction" defense) coupled, in
many cases, with a claim for restitution or damages; and possibly
even a suit for specific performance of the landlord's warranty obli-
gation. Problems arising in connection with these contract remedies
will be treated in more detail in connection with remedies for breach
of judicially established implied warranties of habitability.
In addition to normal contract remedies, at least two state courts
have held that breach of a statutory covenant of habitability justifies
the tenant in withholding rent while he remains in possession, and
that the tenant who withholds rent can set up the breach of covenant
as a defense in the landlord's summary action to evict the tenant for
nonpayment of rent.26 9 In both of these cases, the landlord's statu-
tory covenant of habitability and the tenant's express covenant to pay
rent were held to be mutually dependent rather than independent,
contrary to the traditional common law doctrine that a tenant's cove-
nant to pay rent is independent of his landlord's express covenant to
maintain the leased premises in a habitable condition.
In Fritz v. Warthen,27° the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
breach of the statutory covenant of habitability is admissible in a
summary action to evict for nonpayment of rent. The court reached
its conclusion without much aid from the statutory language. The
court said that the statute creating the new covenant of habitability
expressly mandated liberal construction of the covenant and that the
statutory objective of assuring "adequate and tenantable housing"
would be "promoted by permitting breach of the statutory covenants
to be asserted as a defense in unlawful detainer actions."27' In Rome
v. Walker272 the Michigan Court of Appeals reached the same con-
clusions as the Minnesota court with the aid of a new provision in the
Michigan summary eviction act authorizing the tenant to interpose
the defense that "the plaintiff [landlord] has committed a breach of
mining the amount of damages sustained by a tenant as a result of a breach of the
warranty set forth in this section, the court need not require any expert testimony."
269. Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Fritz v.
Warther, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973).
270. 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973).
271. Id. at 59, 213 N.W.2d at 342.
272. 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972).
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the lease which excuses the payment of rent., 273 After Rome the
Michigan summary eviction act was amended to provide that in an
action to evict for nonpayment of rent (1) "the jury or judge shall
deduct any portion of the rent which the jury or judge finds to be
excused by the plaintiffs breach of the lease or by his breach of one
or more statutory covenants, 274 and (2) "[w]hen the judgment for
possession is for nonpayment of money due under a tenancy. . . the
writ of restitution shall not issue if, within. . . [ten days after entry
ofjudgment], the amount as stated in the judgment. . . is paid to the
plaintiff.' 275 The use of the word "excused" to describe what is, in
substance, a set-off of damages for breach of the statutory covenant
of habitability is peculiar, but the amended summary eviction act
makes it clear that the Michigan tenant may withhold rent because of
his landlord's breach of the statutory covenant, wait for the landlord
to bring a summary eviction action, and set up the landlord's breach
of the statutory covenant as a defense. If the trier of fact finds that
there was such a breach and that some part of the rent is therefore
"excused," the tenant will be able to retain possession of the premises
by paying the "unexcused" portion of the rent within the ten day
period allowed by the summary eviction statute. In this way the ten-
ant can avoid dispossession and obtain a partial abatement of the
rent. Moreover, the tenant need not pay any rent into escrow unless
the court, in the course of the eviction action, enters a protective or-
der requiring payment of the rent into court. To date, no Michigan
appellate court has held that such a protective order is required when
the tenant asserts breach of the statutory warranty of habitability as a
defense in a summary action to evict for nonpayment of rent.276 The
273. This language was inserted in the summary eviction act in 1968, MICH.
COMp. LAws ANN. § 600.5634, as part of the Michigan tenants' rights legislation en-
acted in that year. See Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 460 n.l, 196 N.W.2d 850,
851 n.1 (1972) (listing six separate acts constituting the "tenants' rights package").
274. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5741 (Supp. 1978).
275. Id. § 600.5744(6).
276. "Non-statutory" rent withholding, in reliance on the rights given the tenant
by MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5741 to 600.5744(6) (Supp. 1978), is clearly a
more attractive course of action for the Michigan tenant than invocation of the statu-
tory rent withholding procedure under MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.130 (Supp.
1978). This is true for several reasons: The tenant can use the breach of statutory
covenant defense even if a certificate of compliance covering his dwelling unit has
been issued and never suspended; the tenant can retain all the withheld rent instead of
having to pay it into escrow; and the substantive requirements for proving a breach of
the statutory covenants seem to be less rigorous than those for initiating a statutory
rent withholding.
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Minnesota court, however, held in Fritz v. Warthen that trial courts
should enter protective orders in such cases. The rationale of this
requirement is stated as follows:
. . . [Plending final determination of the tenant's claim of
breach of the statutory covenants, the landlord will be deprived
of all or a portion of the rent while the tenant remains in posses-
sion. However, during this period the landlord will continue to
experience normal operating and overhead expenses. In a build-
ing where all or a substantial number of tenants withhold their
rent, this could be devastating to the landlord. Because he is
deprived of rental income, he may be unable to correct the very
conditions that the tenant contends render the premises unten-
antable. In some of the cases, the landlord may prevail and may
not then be able to collect the rents due and yet would have been
unable to dispossess the tenant during the delays occasioned by
court proceedings.
Recognizing these potential problems, we have concluded that
once the trial court has determined that a fact question exists as
to the breach of the covenants of habitability, that court will or-
der the tenant to pay the rent to be withheld from the landlord
into court. . . and that until final resolution on the merits, any
future rent withheld shall also be paid into court. The court
under its inherent powers may order payment of amounts out of
this fund to enable the landlord to make repairs or meet his obli-
gations on the property or for other appropriate purposes. In the
majority of cases, final determination of the action will be made
quickly and this procedure will not have to be used. It is antici-
pated that the trial court, in lieu of ordering the rent paid into
court, in the exercise of its discretion may order that it be depos-
ited in escrow subject to appropriate terms and conditions or, in
lieu of the payment of rents, may require adequate security
therefor if such a procedure is more suitable under the circum-
stances.
277
Where the obligation allegedly breached by the landlord is a duty
to repair conditions that render the premises uninhabitable, it is
likely that the landlord will not be deemed "in default" unless he
fails to make the needed repairs within a reasonable time after dis-
covering or receiving notice of the existence of the conditions making
repairs necessary. This is the general rule in cases where the lease
contains an express covenant by the landlord to make repairs, and
there is no apparent reason why the same rule should not be applied
277. 298 Minn. at 61-62, 213 N.W.2d at 343.
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in cases where the duty to make repairs is imposed by statute.278
Of those statutes which simply create a warranty or covenant of
habitability in leases, the Michigan27 9 and Rhode Island280 statutes
authorize "a modification" of the statutory warranty or covenant
where the lease or letting has a current term of "at least 1 year"
(Michigan), or of "nine (9) months or more" (Rhode Island). Neither
the Michigan nor the Rhode Island statute expressly requires the
modification to be embodied in a separate written agreement, or even
to be in writing. The Minnesota statute,28' which is otherwise very
similar to Michigan's, declares that the parties to a lease "may not
waive or modify the covenants imposed by" the statute. The Maine
statute provides that "[a] written agreement whereby the tenant ac-
cepts certain specified conditions which may violate the warranty of
fitness for human habitation in return for a stated reduction in rent or
other specified fair consideration shall be binding on the tenant and
the landlord. Any [other] agreement. . . by a tenant to waive any of
the rights or benefits provided by this section shall be void. '282 The
New York statute simply states that any waiver or modification
agreement "shall be void as contrary to public policy. 2
83
2. The Warranty of Habitability as Part of a Comprehensive New
Landlord-Tenant Code
Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia and Washington have all recently
enacted comprehensive residential landlord-tenant codes which in-
clude detailed provisions amounting, in substance, to warranties of
habitability.284 Because, except for Maryland, all of these states have
based their new residential landlord-tenant codes on the Uniform
278. As indicated in the text accompanying notes 213 & 214 supra, ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021(3) (West Supp. 1977) expressly provides that there is a
breach of the warranty of habitability only if the landlord "unreasonably failed under
the circumstances to take prompt, effective steps to repair or remedy the condition"
alleged to make the premises uninhabitable.
279. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (Supp. 1977).
280. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-16 (1970).
281. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1978).
282. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 6021 (Supp. 1977).
283. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235b (McKinney Supp. 1977).
284. See notes 9-11 supra.
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Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA)2 85 or, to a lesser ex-
tent, the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code (Model Code),28 6
the statutes are generally very similar.
Both the URLTA and the Model Code are applicable to substan-
tially all residential rental units within the state,2 87 not just to multi-
family rental housing or to housing covered by local or state housing
285. 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 506-59 (Supp. 1978). The URLTA was approved by
the commissioners on uniform state laws in 1972.
For discussion of the URLTA as adopted, or proposed for adoption, in particular
states, see Bailis, Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act, 3 OHIO NORTH. L. REV. 122 (1975);
Baird, Unform Landlord-Tenant Act in Arizona. The Needfor Re-examination and
Amendment, 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J. 463 (1975); Boyer, Up From Feudalism-Florida's
New ResidentialLeasingAct, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 115 (1973); Brand, New Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, 44 J. KAN. B.A. 227 (1975); Davis, URLTA, Kansas, and
the Common Law, 21 KAN. L. REV. 387 (1973); Fuller, Landlord-Tenant Reform:
Habitability and Repair Under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 3
UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 123 (1973); Kalish, Nebraska Residential Landlord and Ten-
ant Act, 54 NEB. L. REV. 603 (1975); Lonnquist, Prospectus on the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act in Nebraska, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 336 (1974); Stoebuck,
Law Between Landlord and Tenant in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 291, 363-71
(1974); Williams & Phillips, Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 1 FLA. ST.
J.L. REV. 555 (1973); Note, Reformation ofthe Landlord-Tenant Relation, 4 CAPITAL
U.L. REV. 258 (1975); Note, Survey ofthe Virginia Law of Landlord and Tenant, 8 U.
RICH. L. REV. 459, 494-504, 520-25, 569-83 (1974); Comment, Ohio Landlord-Tenant
Act, 8 AKRON L. REV. 519 (1975); Comment, Landlord-Tenant Reform: Arizona's
Version ofthe Uniform Act, 16 ARIz. L. REV. 79 (1974); Comment, Ohio Landlord and
Tenant ReformAct of 1974, 25 CASE-W. RES. L. REV. 876 (1975); Comment, Kentucky
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: Tenants' New Lease on Lfe?, 14 J. FAMILY L.
597 (1975); Comment, Forcible Entry and Detainer Under the Unform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, 63 Ky. L.J. 1046 (1974); Comment, Overview of Tennessee
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 7 MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 109 (1976); Comment,
The Evolution ofthe Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 56 ORE. L. REV.
655 (1977).
For general discussion of the URLTA, see Unform Residential Landlord and Ten-
ant Act: Some Suggestionsfor Improvement, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 402 (1974);
Blumberg & Robbins, Beyond URLTA: A Program/for Achieving Real Tenant Goals,
11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1976); Note, Unform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act: Facilitation ofor Impediment to Reform Favorable to the Tenant, 15 W. &. M. L.
REv. 845 (1974); Comment, Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act." New Hope
for the Beleagured Tenant?, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 546 (1974). See also Davison,
Un/form Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and its Potential Effects Upon Maryland
Landlord-Tenant Law, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 247 (1976).
286. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (Tent. Draft 1969) [herein-
after cited as Model Code]. See Comment, Tenant's Rights and Remedies Under Dela-
ware's New Landlord-Tenant Code, 78 DICK L. REV. 723 (1974).
287. See URLTA § 1.201; MODEL CODE § 1-104. URLTA § 1.202 lists the fol-
lowing exceptions to the URLTA's coverage:
1) residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention or the
[Vol 16:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol16/iss1/3
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
codes. The URLTA not only imposes on the landlord a duty to
"comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing
codes materially affecting health and safety," but also imposes a duty
to "make all repairs. . . necessary to put and keep the premises in a
fit and habitable condition, [to] keep all common areas of the prem-
ises in a clean and safe condition, [to] maintain in good and safe
working order and condition all . . . facilities and appliances . . .
supplied or required to be supplied by him," and to provide adequate
waste disposal, water, and heat.288 The duties imposed on the land-
lord by the Model Code, apparently the basis for the new Delaware
and Hawaii comprehensive landlord-tenant codes, are substantially
the same as those imposed by the URLTA.289 Although the statutes
based on the URLTA or the Model Code are quite similar, several
states made changes in the section detailing the landlord's duties.
The Washington statute is probably the most detailed.29°
provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious, or similar serv-
ices;
2) occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling unit or the property of
which it is a part, if the occupant is the purchaser or a person who succeeds to his
interest;
3) occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion
of a structure operated for the benefit of the organization;
4) transient occupancy in a hotel, or motel [or lodgings [subject to state tran-
sient lodgings or room occupancy excise tax act]];
5) occupancy by an employee of a landlord whose right to occupancy is condi-
tional upon employment in and about the premises;
6) occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit or a holder of a proprietary
lease in a cooperative;
7) occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the occupant
primarily for agricultural purposes.
VA. CODE § 55-248.5(10) (Supp. 1978) excludes any single-family residence whose
landlord owns ten or more residences. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1308(7) (1974) and
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 521-7(7) (1976) (15 years or more) and NEB. REv. STAT. §
76.1408(8) (1976) (five years or more) exclude long-term leases.
288. URLTA § 2.104.
289. MODEL CODE § 2-203.
290. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (West Supp. 1977) provides as follows:
The landlord will at all times during the tenancy keep the premises fit for human
habitation, and shall in particular.
1) Maintain the premises to substantially comply with any applicable code,
statute, ordinance, or regulation governing their maintenance or operation,
which the legislative body enacting the applicable code, statute, ordinance or
regulation could enforce as to the premises rented if such condition substantially
endangers or impairs the health or safety of the tenant;
2) Maintain the roofs, floors, walls, chimneys, fireplaces, foundations, and all
other structural components in reasonably good repair so as to be usable and
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It is clear that statutes based on the model codes impose substan-
tially greater duties on landlords than do the statutes previously con-
sidered under "The Housing Code Approach," for they require the
landlord to keep a rented dwelling unit habitable to a degree not nec-
essarily mandated by any applicable housing code. Statutes based on
the URLTA and the Model Act do not expressly require the landlord
rent the dwelling unit in a "habitable" condition at the beginning of
the tenancy. A careful reading of the provisions both as to the land-
lord's duties and the tenant's remedies makes it clear, however, that
there is an immediate breach of the landlord's obligation if the dwell-
ing unit is not in fact habitable at the beginning of the tenancy, al-
though some remedies may not be utilized until a stated time after
the tenant gives notice of the breach to the landlord, during which
time the landlord has an opportunity to cure the breach.29'
It is also clear that the URLTA, the Model Code, and the statutes
based on one or the other, do not distinguish between "latent" and
"patent" defects in existence at the inception of the tenancy. There is
nothing in the URLTA, the Model Code or the statutes that suggests
that a tenant may not treat serious "latent" defects as causing an im-
mediate breach of the statutory warranty of habitability, or that such
capable of resisting any and all formal forces and loads to which they may be
subjected;
3) Keep any shared or common areas reasonably clean, sanitary, and safe
from defects increasing the hazards or fire or accident;
4) Provide a reasonable program for the control of infestation by insects, ro-
dents, and other pests at the initiation of the tenancy and, except in the case of a
single-family residence, control infestation during tenancy except where such in-
festation is caused by the tenant;
5) Except where the condition is attributable to normal wear and tear, make
repairs and arrangements necessary to put and keep the premises in as good con-
dition as it by law or rental agreement should have been, at the commencement
of the tenancy;
6) Provide reasonably adequate locks and furnish keys to the tenant;
7) Maintain all electrical, plumbing, heating, and other facilities and appli-
ances supplied by him in reasonably good working order,
8) Maintain the dwelling unit in reasonably weathertight condition;
9) Except in the case of a single-family residence, provide and maintain ap-
propriate receptacles in common areas for the removal of ashes, rubbish, and
garbage, incidental to the occupancy and arrange for the reasonable and regular
removal of such waste;
10) Except where the building is not equipped for the purpose, provide facili-
ties adequate to supply heat and water and hot water as reasonably required by
the tenant.
291. URLTA §§ 2.104, 4.101, 4.103, 4.104; MODEL CODE §§ 2-203 to 2-207.
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defects are not subject to the landlord's statutory duty to make all
repairs necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable
condition.
The URLTA provides a wide variety of remedies if the landlord
violates any of his statutory duties with respect to the condition of the
premises. These remedies include termination of the lease if the
breach materially affects health and safety,292 recovery of dam-
ages, 293 injunctive relief,294 the right to repair minor defects in the
dwelling unit and to deduct the cost of repairs from the rent,295 where
there is a wrongful failure to supply heat, water, or essential services,
the right to "procure reasonable amounts" of the same "and deduct
their actual and reasonable cost from the rent," or "procure reason-
able substitute housing during the period of the landlord's noncom-
pliance, in which case the tenant is excused from paying rent for the
period of . . .noncompliance,"'2 96 and use of a counterclaim for
damages based on the landlord's breach of duty as a defense to any
action by the landlord to evict the tenant or recover rent, subject to
the court's power to "order the tenant to pay into court all or part of
the rent accrued and thereafter accruing, and ...determine the
amount due to each party" and to enter judgment for the tenant in an
eviction action "[i]f no rent remains due after" the net amount owing
from one to the other is paid.297 The last remedy implicitly autho-
rizes the tenant to withhold rent when the landlord violates his statu-
tory duties with respect to maintaining the leased premises in a
292. URLTA § 4.101(a) provides: "[T]he tenant may deliver a written notice to
the landlord specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach [materially af-
fecting health and safety] and that the rental agreement will terminate upon a date
not less than [30] days after receipt of the notice if the breach is not remedied in [14]
days, and the rental agreement shall terminate as provided in the notice" unless the
breach is remedied "by repairs, the payment of damages or otherwise ... before the
date specified in the notice;" and "[i]f substantially the same act or omission ...
recurs within [6] months, the tenant may terminate the rental agreement upon at least
[14 days'] written notice specifying the breach and the date of termination." In the
latter case, the landlord is apparently not entitled to "cure" the breach. Restitution of
any rent paid in advance and any security deposit is also clearly available to the
tenant when he terminates the breach of the URLTA warranty of habitability, under
"the principles of law and equity" whose application is preserved by URLTA § 1.103.
293. URLTA §4.101(b).
294. Id.
295. Id. § 4.103.
296. Id. § 4.104.
297. Id. § 4.105.
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habitable condition. There is no provision in the URLTA for use of
withheld rents to make necessary repairs except through the tenant's
"repair-and-deduct" option, and there is no provision for appoint-
ment of a receiver authorized to make necessary repairs.
It should be noted that none of the statutes based on the URLTA
follows the URLTA in all respects. The most extensive modifications
of the URLTA's provisions with respect to the tenant's right to a hab-
itable dwelling and remedies for breach are found in the Virginia and
Washington formulations.298
The tenant's remedies for breach of the landlord's duties under the
Model Code 99 are generally similar to those under the URLTA.
Note, however, that the Model Code does not expressly authorize in-
junctive relief. Moreover, although the Model Code authorizes the
tenant to interpose any legal or equitable defense, or counterclaim in
a summary action by the landlord to evict,3" the Model Code, unlike
the URLTA, does not expressly provide that in an action to evict for
nonpayment of rent the court may order the tenant to pay rent into
court and that, upon a determination that "no rent remains due, ...
judgment shall be entered for the tenant in the action for posses-
sion.""' On the other hand, the Model Code"' authorizes an action
by any apartment building tenant for establishment of a receivership
as a means of compelling major repairs in the building, independent
298. VA. CODE §§ 55-248.13, .21, .25-.30 (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 59.18.060 to 59.18.120 (Supp. 1977).
299. MODEL CODE §§ 2-204, 2-205, 2-206, 2-207. MODEL CODE §§ 2-204 and 2-
205 contain more complicated "termination" provisions than URLTA § 4.101(a),
MODEL CODE § 2-204 authorizes the tenant to terminate the rental agreement and
vacate the premises at any time during the first week of occupancy, "on notice to the
landlord," if the landlord "fails to conform exactly to the rental agreement, or if there
is a material non-compliance with any code, statute, ordinance, or regulation gov-
erning the maintenance or operation of the premises," without giving the landlord an
opportunity to "cure" the breach. § 2-205 authorizes the tenant to terminate at any
time, upon giving written notice to the landlord of "any condition which deprives the
tenant of a substantial part of the benefit and enjoyment of his bargain. . . . if the
landlord does not remedy the situation within [one week];" and no notice need be
given "when the condition renders the dwelling unit uninhabitable or poses an immi-
nent threat to the health or safety of any occupant." For a case dealing with remedies
under DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5101 (1974), patterned after MODEL CODE, see Brown v.
Robyn Realty Co., 367 A.2d 183 (Del. Super. 1976).
300. MODEL CODE § 3-210.
301. URLTA §4.105.
302. MODEL CODE §§ 3-301 to -307.
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of any municipal agency action. URLTA contains no such authori-
zation.
Neither the URLTA nor the Model Code allows the tenant to util-
ize any of the listed remedies where the code violation or other condi-
tion complained of is caused by the tenant, a member of his family,
or any other person on the premises with his consent.3"3 Both the
URLTA and the Model Code contain provisions designed to protect
the tenant against retaliatory action by the landlord after the tenant
has complained to a governmental agency about housing code viola-
tions, or has complained to the landlord about a breach of the land-
lord's statutory duties with respect to the condition of the premises, or
has organized or become a member of a tenants' union.3 °4
Most of the statutes modeled on the URLTA contain, in substance,
the URLTA provision 30 5 that no rental agreement may properly
waive the tenant's rights or remedies under the Act, but this broad
anti-waiver provision is qualified by the following exceptions:
(c) The landlord and tenant of a single family residence may
agree in writing that the tenant perform the landlord's duties
. . . [with respect to providing facilities for waste removal and
supplying running water, hot water, and heat] and also specified
repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, and remodeling, but only
if the transaction is entered into in good faith and not for the
purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord.
(d) The landlord and tenant of any dwelling unit other than a
single family residence may agree that the tenant is to perform
specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, or remodeling
only if (1) the agreement of the parties is entered into in good
faith and not for the purpose of evading the obligations of the
landlord and is set forth in a separate writing signed by the par-
ties and supported by adequate consideration, (2) the work is not
necessary to cure noncompliance with [the requirements of ap-
plicable building and housing codes materially affecting health
and safety]; and (3) the agreement does not diminish or affect the
obligation of the landlord to other tenants in the premises.
(e) The landlord may not treat performance of the separate
agreement described in subsection (c) as a condition to any obli-
gation or performance of any rental agreement.306
303. URLTA §§ 4.101(a)(3), 4.103(b), 4.104(d); MODEL CODE §§ 2-205(1).
304. URLTA § 5.101; MODEL CODE § 2-407.
305. URLTA § 1.403(a)(1) and (b).
306. Id. § 2.104.
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Although paragraph (c) does not expressly prohibit the inclusion of
the written agreement between the landlord and tenant of a single
family dwelling in the lease itself, a separate written agreement is
apparently required by the more general provision that any waiver
clause prohibited by the URLTA that is included in a rental agree-
ment is unenforceable. 30 7 The general anti-waiver section of the
URLTA also contains a curious additional provision that, "[i]f a
landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement containing provisions
known by him to be prohibited, the tenant may recover in addition to
his actual damages an amount up to [3] month's periodic rent and
reasonable attorney's fees."3 8 This seems a rather drastic penalty for
use of a standard form lease that may impose on the tenant the duty
to make repairs within his own dwelling unit. Presumably the pen-
alty is only recoverable if "actual damages" resulting from inclusion
of a prohibited provision can be proved. And, if the agreement shift-
ing repair duties to the tenant is embodied in a separate written
agreement that satisfies paragraphs (c) through (e), above,30 9 it would
seem that no penalty would be imposed on the landlord merely be-
cause he also included the provisions of the separate written agree-
ment in the lease itself.
There are significant variations from the URLTA waiver provi-
sions in some of the states which have, in substance, adopted the
URLTA-e.g, Kentucky,310 Oregon,3 1' and Washington.31z The
307. Id. § 1.403(b).
308. Id.
309. Id. §2.104.
310. Ky. REv. STAT. § 383.595 (Supp. 1976) does not include in para. (c) any
authorization to shift to the tenant the duty of supplying facilities for waste removal,
and omits paragraph (3) altogether.
311. OR. REv. STAT. § 91.770(2) (1977 Repl.), in lieu of paragraphs (c) through
(e), includes the following provision:
The landlord and tenant may agree in writing that the tenant is to perform
specified repairs, maintenance tasks and minor remodeling only if:
a) The agreement of the parties is entered into in good faith and not for the
purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord;
b) The agreement does not diminish the obligations of the landlord to other
tenants in the premises; and
c) The terms and conditions of the agreement are clearly and fairly disclosed
and adequate consideration for the agreement is specifically stated.
312. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.230 (West Supp. 1977) allows agreements
exempting the parties from the statute's protective provisions subject to the following
limitations:
I) The agreement may not appear in a standard form lease or rental agreement;
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statutes based on the Model Code are substantially like those based
on the URLTA insofar as they generally purport to prohibit any ef-
fective waiver of the tenant's rights under the Code and then ex-
pressly provide for agreements that shift the burden of maintenance,
to a limited extent, from the landlord to the tenant. The Delaware
statute 313 follows the Model Code3 14 in requiring the agreement to be
embodied in a "conspicuous writing independent of the rental agree-
ment" and to be "supported by adequate consideration apart from
the rental agreement," but the Hawaii statute,31 5 also based on the
Model Code, omits these requirements for an effective waiver. The
Wisconsin statute, not based on either the URLTA nor the Model
Code, expressly allows a waiver of the statutory duty of the landlord
by a "contrary provision in writing signed by the parties." '3 16 It is not
clear whether or not the "writing" may simply be included in the
lease.
Maryland has a new statute317 which, although not part of a com-
prehensive new code of landlord-tenant law such as the URLTA or
the Model Code, contains a very detailed statement of the landlord's
obligation to maintain all residential dwelling units (except farm ten-
ancies) in habitable condition, and also provides in detail for the ten-
2) There is no substantial inequality in the bargaining position of the two parties;
3) The exemption does not violate the public policy of this state in favor of the
ensuring safe, and sanitary housing; and
4) Either the local county prosecutor's office or the consumer protection division of
the attorney general's office or the attorney for the tenant has approved in writing the
application for exemption as complying with subsections (1) through (3) of this sec-
tion.
This provision leaves a number of questions for future judicial decision. For exam-
ple, whether the public policy mentioned in subsection (3) is violated by any violation
of an applicable housing or building code, no matter how trivial, and by the existence
of conditions that render the leased premises unsafe or unsanitary but are not viola-
tions of any applicable housing or building code; and whether the approval of a pro-
posed waiver by the local prosecutor's office, consumer protection division of the
attorney general's office, or the tenant's attorney is binding on the tenant. It would
seem that the tenant should be estopped when the approval is given by his own attor-
ney, but it is not so clear that he should be estopped when the approval is given by
either of the other agencies mentioned in subsection (4).
313. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5109 (1974).
314. MODEL CODE § 2-203(2), (3).
315. HAW. REv. STAT. § 521-42 (1976).
316. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West Supp. 1977).
317. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (Supp. 1977). See also Davison, Uni-
form Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and its Potential Effects upon Maryland
Landlord-Tenant Law, 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 247 (1976).
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ant's remedies in the event of a breach of the landlord's obligation.
The landlord's obligation is defined in the Maryland statute substan-
tially as it is defined in the URLTA and the Model Act, though the
wording differs. The tenant's remedy for breach under the Maryland
statute is either to bring "an action for rent escrow" or to "refuse to
pay rent and raise the existence of the asserted defects or conditions
as an affirmative defense to an action for distress for rent or to any
. . .proceeding brought by the landlord to recover rent or for posses-
sion of the leased premises."3 8 In either case, the tenant must pay
into court "the amount of rent required by the lease" unless the court
orders the rent to "be abated and reduced in amount determined by
the court to be fair and equitable to represent the existence of the
conditions or defects found by the court to exist." '3 19 The court may
order moneys paid into court by the tenant to be paid to the landlord,
the tenant, "or any other appropriate person or agency for the pur-
pose of making the necessary repairs" and, alternatively, may "ap-
point a special administrator who shall cause the repairs to be made
. . . out of the moneys in the [court's] escrow account. 320
IV. EXPANSION OF TENANTS' RIGHTS BY JUDICIAL DECISION
Two principal judicial approaches are discernible in the expansion
of tenants' rights. Most courts have adopted the "implied warranty
(or covenant) of habitability" approach, imposing by implication a
duty on landlords to provide residential tenants with a habitable
dwelling unit enforceable, in most jurisdictions, by a variety of reme-
dies. A few courts have also given tenants the option of treating resi-
dential leases as "void" for "illegality" whenever the condition of the
dwelling unit substantially violates an applicable housing or building
code (the "illegal contract" approach).
A. Historical Introduction
1. The "Implied" Warranty of Habitability Approach
As early as 1931 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that there is
an implied warranty of habitability in any lease of an apartment in a
modern apartment building, whether furnished or not, and whether
318. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (Supp. 1977).
319. Id.
320. Id.
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the lease is for a long or short term. 321 If this holding had been gen-
erally accepted and applied, the recent "revolution" in tenants' rights
would have occurred in the 1930's instead of the 1960's and 1970's.
But the holding was not followed, even in Minnesota, and the mod-
em era of judicial activism in the expansion of tenants' rights began
instead with Pines v. Perssion in 1961.322
In Pines the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the traditional
rule of caveat emptor should be rejected and that a warranty of habit-
ability should be implied in every residential lease. The court stated
that the traditional rule was "inconsistent with the current legislative
policy concerning housing standards" as exemplified in "legislative
and administrative rules, such as the safeplace statute, building codes
and health regulations, [which] all impose certain duties on a prop-
erty owner with respect to the condition of his premises."3  In
reaching its conclusion, the court obviously relied on an unarticu-
lated minor premise: that the traditional administrative modes of en-
forcement of housing codes had proved ineffective. In addition, the
court held that the tenant's covenant to pay rent and the landlord's
implied covenant to provide a habitable dwelling were mutually de-
pendent, and thus a breach of the latter by the landlord relieved the
tenants of any liability under the former, and their only liability was
for "the reasonable value of the premises during the time of actual
occupancy."324
Although Pines v. Perssion may have been overruled sub silentio325
and, in any case, has been at least partly displaced by later Wisconsin
legislation, judicial decisions in at least ten other jurisdictions have
adopted the implied warranty of habitability: California, the District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey and Washington.326 In addition, lower
courts have recognized the implied warranty of habitability in Indi-
ana, Missouri, Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania.327 As previously
321. Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931).
322. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
323. Id. at 595-96, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
324. Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
325. See Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970). For a dis-
cussion of Posnanski, see note 25 supra.
326. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
327. See note 15 supra.
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indicated,328 however, the new common law implied warranty has
been superseded in Hawaii, Kansas and Washington by provisions in
new comprehensive landlord-tenant codes based, respectively, on the
Model Code and the URLTA.3 2 9 In the District of Columbia and in
New York, the new implied warranty has also been codified.33 °
Of the cases decided after Pines v. Perssion, the one most often
cited is Javins v. First National Realty Corporation,331 where the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held, in the alternative, that the common law itself must recognize the
landlord's obligation to keep his premises in a habitable condition,332
and "in any event, . . . the District's housing code requires that a
warranty of habitability be implied in the leases of all housing that it
covers." 333 The court further held that breach of the implied war-
ranty could be used as a defense in a summary action by the landlord
to evict his tenants for nonpayment of rent, and that the trier of fact
should, if it found that the breach existed during the period for which
past due rent was claimed, determine "what portion, if any or all, of
the tenant's obligation to pay rent was suspended by the landlord's
breach. 334
Many of the arguments advanced in Javins as a basis for implying
a warranty of habitability are not very persuasive. Since the condi-
tions alleged to make the plaintiffs' housing uninhabitable were stip-
ulated to have arisen after the inception of their tenancies, the court
was on shaky ground in relying on a supposed analogy with the Uni-
form Commercial Code's warranties in the sale of goods335 in hold-
ing that the landlord has a continuing obligation to keep leased
premises in repair.33 6 Perhaps more startling is the absence of any
discussion of the decision's probable impact on the cost and supply of
328. See notes 16 and 21 and accompanying text supra.
329. HAW. REv. STAT. § 521-42 (1976) (Model Code); KAN. STAT. § 58-2553
(1976) (URLTA); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (Supp. 1977) (URLTA).
330. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATIONS § 2902.2
(1970); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 235b (McKinney Supp. 1977).
331. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
332. Id. at 1077-80.
333. Id. at 1080.
334. Id. at 1082-83.
335. U.C.C. §§ 2-314 & 2-315.
336. See 428 F.2d at 1075, 1079. For a devastating critique of this argument, see
Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies. An Integration, 56
B.U.L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1976).
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housing in the District of Columbia. Moreover, even assuming argu-
endo that the conclusions reached in Javins are justifiable and desira-
ble from a policy viewpoint with respect to the District of Columbia,
it is remarkable that the Javins language has been repeated by so
many other courts in support of decisions applying the new implied
warranty of habitability to entire states.337 Of the later decisions that
rely heavily on Javins, Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway,338
Green v. Superior Court,339 and Foisy v. Wyman340 are especially
noteworthy.
A major question raised by Boston Housing Authority v. Heming-
way is why the Massachusetts court believed it necessary or desirable
to superimpose the new implied warranty of habitability on a large
337. Practically every subsequent decision cites and quotes at length from Javins,
creating a kind of "snowball" effect. Most of the comment on the Javins case in the
legal periodicals has been favorable, although some commentators have emphasized
problems not considered in the Javins opinion. See, e.g., Daniel, Judicial andLegisla-
tive Remedies for Substandard Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in the District
of Columbia, 59 GEORGETOWN L.J. 909, 930-43 (1971); Moskovitz, Rent Withholding
and the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 49, 63-66 (1970);
Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants' Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties of Habit-
abilit y and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 489, 495-501
(1971); Note, Landlord's Violation of Housing Code During Lease Term is Breach of
Implied Warrant, of Habitability Constituting Partial or Total Defense to an Eviction
Based on Nonpayment of Rent, 84 HARV. L. REv. 729 (1971); Note, Javins v. First
National Realty Corp.-The Implied Warranty of Habitability & Rent Withholding in
Urban Leases, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 227 (1971); Comment, New Powerfor Tenants: The
Lessee's Right to a Livable Dwelling, 6,HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RE. 193 (1970); Com-
ment, A Contract Remedyfor the Slum Dweller, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 499 (1970); Com-
ment, Landlord-Tenant Law: Implied Warranty of Habitability in Residental
Leases-4 Defense to Landlord Eviction Actions, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 785 (1972); Com-
ment, Plotting the Long-Overdue Death of Caveat Emptor in Leased Housing, 6 U. SAN
FRANCisco L. REV. 147, 169-71 (1971).
338. 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). See Comment, Plight of the Indigent
Tenant in Massachusetts: An Attempt by the Law to Provide Relief, 8 SUFF. L. REv.
106 (1973).
339. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974). See Comment,
Balancing the California Landlord-Tenant Relationshp, 9 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 326
(1973); Comment, Green v. Superior Court: A New Remedyfor the Calfornia Tenant,
5 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 145 (1974); Comment, Green v. Superior Court: The Im-
plied Warranty of Habitability in California and Montana, 36 MONT. L. REV. 129
(1975); Comment, To Repair or Not to Repair: That Is No Longer the Question, 14
SANTA CLARA LAW. 356 (1974); Comment, The Great Green Hope: The Implied War-
rant of Habitability in Practice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 729 (1976). See also Moreno, The
Warranty of Uninhabitability, 7 SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REv. 67 (1978).
340. 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
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mass of recently enacted legislation 341 specifically designed to make
the enforcement of state and local housing codes more effective. At
the time of Hemingway, new statutory remedies, all capable of initia-
tion by tenants, included rent withholding, full protection against
eviction for non-payment of rent, application of withheld rents to re-
pairs, and the appointment of a receiver to effect necessary repairs
and improvements. Having so recently considered the problem of
tenants' rights and remedies and having supplied such a broad range
of new remedies, it might be supposed that the legislature at least by
implication had rejected the argument that additional tenants' rights
and remedies were needed. Yet the Massachusetts court sought to
justify its adoption of the implied warranty of habitability by assert-
ing that, "If we fail to repudiate the underlying common law concept
of a lease which fostered the independent covenants rule, the land-
lord-tenant law in Massachusetts will remain in an illogical state be-
cause our statutory and common law will be based on different
conceptual assumptions as to the essential nature and consequences
of a lease." '342
Having brought the "underlying common law concept of a lease"
into conformity with the new Massachusetts statutory law by adopt-
ing the implied warranty of habitability, the Hemingway court went
on to hold, however, that the tenant could obtain immunity from
eviction for non-payment of rent only by following one of the statu-
tory rent withholding procedures.343 Since the tenant in Hemingway
did not follow either of the statutory rent withholding procedures, the
court held that he could be evicted for non-payment of rent and that
he could use the landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habita-
bility only as "a total or partial defence to the landlord's claim for
rent being withheld, depending on the extent of the breach." 3"
In Green v. Superior Court3 45 the California court, although con-
ceding that "past cases have held that the Legislature intended the
remedies [of repair-and-deduct or termination of tenancy] afforded
by section 1942 [of the California Civil Code] to be the sole proce-
341. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 127C-127K & ch. 239, § 8A (West Supp.
1978). For a discussion of the Massachusetts tenants' rights legislation see notes 134-
158 and accompanying text supra.
342. 363 Mass. at 199, 293 N.E.2d at 843.
343. Id. at 202, 293 N.E.2d at 845.
344. Id. at 203, 293 N.E.2d at 845.
345. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
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dure for enforcing the statutory duty on landlords imposed by section
1941 [of the Civil Code], ' '3 46 nevertheless held that these statutory
provisions did "not preclude the development of new common law
principles in this area" and that "a warranty of habitability is implied
by law in residential leases in California. 3 47 Thus California land-
lords are now simultaneously subject to an express statutory duty to
put dwelling units into a condition fit for habitation and to "repair all
subsequent dilapidations thereof," with the tenant's only remedies for
breach being either to repair-and-deduct or to terminate the tenancy;
and a completely separate common law implied warranty duty to do
exactly the same things, but with a substantially different set of judi-
cially created remedies for breach.
Judicial activism in the field of landlord-tenant law reached its ap-
ogee in Foisy v. Wyman. 4 s Although the Washington legislature had
just enacted a modified version of the Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act, effective July 16, 1973,349 the Washington Supreme
Court on October 25, 1973, followed the Javins case and held that a
warranty of habitability should be implied in a lease antedating the
enactment of the statute. This holding would perhaps be understand-
able had the case before the court presented substantial equities on
behalf of the tenant. But, in fact, it was conceded that the tenant
knew of a substantial number of defects when he rented the premises
and that he negotiated a reduction in the rent from $87 per month to
$50 per month because he was willing to repair the defects himself.35
In jurisdictions where the new duty of the landlord to provide resi-
dential tenants with a "habitable" dwelling was created by judicial
decisions recognizing an "implied" warranty of habitability, the
346. Id. at 629, 517 P.2d at 1177, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
347. Id. at 631, 517 P.2d at 1178, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
348. 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
349. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.010 (Supp. 1977).
One commentator has suggested that although adoption of a new comprehensive
statute based on the URLTA has made Foisy v. Wyman largely irrelevant with respect
to the "residential" premises covered by the statute, Foiry does state new "common
law" which will continue to apply to farm houses, seasonal farm laborers' housing,
and other housing supplied in connection with employment-categories of rental
housing expressly excluded from the URLTA's coverage. Stoebuck, Law Between
Landlord and Tenant in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 291, 345 (1974).
350. It is difficult to see any public policy reason for refusing to treat the Foisy
case as involving an effective waiver of whatever right to a habitable dwelling the
court might otherwise have wished to recognize. For a discussion of the "waiver"
provisions of the Washington statute, see note 312 supra.
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opinions are far from uniform as to the scope and application of the
warranty.
2. The "Illegal Contract" Approach
In Brown v. Southall,3 5 ' which preceded Jayins, the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals adopted the "illegal contract" rather than
the "implied" warranty of habitability approach. In Brown the land-
lord was suing a tenant for unpaid rent after the tenant abandoned
the premises. The tenant defended on the ground that the lease was
illegal and therefore unenforceable because it was entered into in vio-
lation of a housing regulation prohibiting the renting of "any habita-
tion . . . unless such habitation and its furnishings are in a clean,
safe, and sanitary condition, in repair, and free from rodents and ver-
min."'352 In addition, the tenant relied on another regulation requir-
ing all "premises accomodating one or more habitations" to "be
maintained and kept in repair so as to provide decent living ac-
comodations for occupants. 353 This regulation expressly states that
it is designed to require "more than mere basic repairs and mainte-
nance to keep out the elements; its purpose is to include repairs and
maintenance designed to make a premises or neighborhood healthy
and safe.",35 4 Brushing aside the contention that these regulations
were not intended to make such a lease unenforceable, the court held
the lease "void as an illegal contract," after noting that "the viola-
tions known by [the landlord] to be existing on the leasehold at the
time of the signing of the lease agreement were of a nature to make
the 'habitation' unsafe and unsanitary," and clearly showed that it
had not been "maintained or repaired to the degree contemplated by
the regulations. 355 It is noteworthy that the court in Brown did not
rest its decision on the theory that the housing regulations gave rise to
an implied warranty of habitability, the breach of which would jus-
tify the tenant in "rescinding." The landlord's obligation to have the
leased premises in a "habitable" condition was based directly on the
housing regulations.
The "illegal contract" theory has been recognized in a number of
351. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
352. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATIONS § 2304 (1970).
353. Id. § 2501.
354. Id.
355. 237 A.2d at 836.
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356District of Columbia cases, and an expanded version of the "illegal
contract" defense was added to the District of Columbia Landlord-
Tenant Code in 1970.357 Elsewhere, however, the illegal contract the-
ory has gained little recognition. In King v. Moorehead,358 the Kan-
sas City (Missouri) Court of Appeals adopted both the Brown illegal
contract theory and the Javins implied warranty of habitability doc-
trine, with an explicit holding that the tenant must elect between
them. As the court said:
• . . The first defense asserts the unenforceability of the contract
and the second that a breach of a term of that contract is en-
forceable and should yield damages. The proof of one defense
necessarily disproves the other, so the defenses are inconsis-
tent.359
In Glyco v. Schultz,3 61 the Municipal Court of Sylvania, Ohio, also
accepted both the illegal contract theory and the implied warranty of
habitability doctrine, but did not indicate that the tenant must elect
between them-perhaps because the tenant's recovery was the same
under either theory.
B. Scope of the New "Implied" Warranty of Habitability
1. What Rental Housing is Covered?
In jurisdictions where the new tenants' right to a habitable dwell-
ing rests on judicial decision, it is not always clear what types of
rental housing are covered by the implied warranty. In Pines v. Per-
ssion,36 1 the court recognized an implied warranty of habitability in
the lease of a house to students at the University of Wisconsin for a
356. E.g., Davis v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412 (D.C. App. 1970); Diamond Hous. Corp.
v. Robinson, 267 A.2d 833 (D.C. App. 1970); Diamond Hous. Corp. v. Robinson, 257
A.2d 492 (D.C. App. 1969). See also Curry v. Dunbar House, Inc., 362 A.2d 686
(D.C. App. 1976); Watson v. Kotler, 264 A.2d 141 (D.C. App. 1970).
357. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATIONS § 2902.1
(1970).
358. 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973). See Case Note, Landlord-Tenant: Implied
Warranty of Habitability in Leases, 39 Mo. L. REv. 56 (1974). To date the implied
warranty doctrine has not been adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court.
359. Id. at 79.
360. 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972).
The significance of Glyco has been exaggerated by commentators. It is, of course,
only a municipal court decision; and, in any case, it has been practically superseded
by Ohio's adoption of a modified version of the URLTA. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 5321.01-5321.00 (Page Supp. 1977).
361. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
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nine-month term. Although the court did not make the point clear,
the new warranty was apparently thought to apply only to housing
subject to state or local housing codes. Eight years after Pines, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii, in the companion cases of Lemle v.
Breedon3 62 and Lund v. Mc 4rthur,363 adopted the implied warranty
of habitability without any suggestion in either case that the warranty
was limited to rental housing covered by a state or local housing
code; nor was the implied warranty limited to dwellings leased for a
relatively short term-unlike the new statutory right of Hawaiian te-
nants to a habitable dwelling.3 6
4
In Javins v. First National Realty Corporation365 the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals held that "the District's housing code re-
quires that a warranty of habitability be implied in the leases of all
housing that it covers," and also suggested that, even without refer-
ence to the housing code, a "warranty of habitability [should] be im-
plied into all contracts for urban dwellings" as a matter of common
law.3 66 The latter suggestion really has no significance with respect
to the coverage of the new implied warranty, however, since the Dis-
trict of Columbia housing code applies to "any habitation" in the
District36 and all rental housing in the District is clearly "urban." A
later decision by a lower court interprets Javins as applying only to
dwelling units covered by the District of Columbia housing code.
368
Since Javins, the highest courts of California, Iowa, Massachusetts,
New Jersey and Washington have held that the new warranty of hab-
itability should be "implied" in all residential leases.369 In Illinois
and New Hampshire, on the other hand, the implied warranty is lim-
362. 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
363. 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969).
364. Id at 473, 462 P.2d at 482.
365. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
366. 428 F.2d at 1080.
367. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATIONS §§ 2304, 2501
(1970).
368. Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. App. 1976).
369. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Heming-
way, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308
A.2d 17 (1973); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973). In Washing-
ton, adoption of a comprehensive landlord-tenant code based on the URLTA has
presumably made the judicially declared implied warranty of habitability inapplica-
ble, but WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.040 (Supp. 1977) excludes no important kind
of rental housing except public housing.
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ited to multi-unit rental housing,370 and in Kansas it was limited to
"'urban residential property ' 37' prior to adoption of the URLTA in
Kansas.372
2. To What Extent is "Habitability" Defined by the Applicable
Housing Code?
In jurisdictions where courts have created the new right of tenants
to a habitable dwelling by way of an implied warranty, the cases are
not uniform with respect to the relationship between the new implied
warranty and housing code standards. In Pines,373 the Madison,
Wisconsin, housing inspector found the leased premises to be "unfit
for occupancy" because of the existence of several building code vio-
lations, which included inadequate electrical wiring, plumbing and
heating systems in disrepair, a handrail on the stairs in disrepair, and
lack of screens on windows and doors. On the basis of these facts the
Wisconsin court held that there "clearly" was a breach of the newly
discovered implied warranty of habitability. Although the court did
not purport to limit proof of "uninhabitability" to cases where there
were building code violations, it seems clear that the Wisconsin court
would find a breach of the implied warranty of habitability wherever
there are violations of the applicable housing or building code that
have a substantial adverse effect on the tenant's safety or health.
Whatever the present status of Pines as authority in Wisconsin,
other jurisdictions recognizing the implied warranty or covenant of
habitability share the view that proof of housing code violations hav-
ing a substantial adverse effect on health or safety is sufficient to es-
tablish a breach.374 On the other hand, most of the cases recognize
370. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Kline v.
Bums, Ill N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
371. Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974).
372. KAN. STAT. § 58-2540 (1976), which applies to practically all rental housing
m the state.
373. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
374. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168; 111
Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v.
Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Kline v. Byrns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d
248 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Academy Spires v.
Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (County Dist. Ct. 1970); Glyco v. Schultz,
35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (City Mun. Ct. 1972); Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d
1234 (Pa. Super. 1978); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973) (now
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that minor housing code violations, standing alone, to not pose any
substantial threat to the health or safety of the tenant and thus do not
constitute a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.375 As the
Javins court observed: "one or two minor violations standing alone
which do not affect habitability are de minimis.
'3 76
Nonetheless, in Steele v. Latimer,3 77 the Kansas court seemingly
held that any violation of the applicable housing code would consti-
tute a breach of the landlord's implied warranty of habitability.
Since the case involved multiple violations, however, it is not entirely
clear whether the court would have found a breach of warranty had
there been only a single code violation such as a defective electrical
outlet. As previously noted, however, the implied warranty of habit-
ability has been replaced in Kansas by the adoption of the URLTA,
which requires only that the landlord "comply with the requirements
of all applicable building and housing codes materially affecting
health and Safety." 378
Assuming that most courts will not find a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability on the basis of housing code violations un-
less the violations pose a threat to the health or safety of the tenant,
the question remains whether a breach may be found where there is
no code violation at all. It is not clear what position the Japins court
would have taken on this question, but the District of Columbia
superseded by WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (Supp. 1977)); Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
375. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Lund v. McArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 483 (1969); Boston
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v.
Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308
A.2d 17 (1973); Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. 1978); Foisy v. Wyman, 83
Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973) (now superseded by WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 59.18.060 (Supp. 1977)). URLTA is in accord with this view. See text accompany-
ing note 358 infra.
376. 428 F.2d at 1082 n.63.
377. 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974).
378. URLTA § 2.104(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553 (1976). Cf. MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 554.139 (Supp. 1977); MnN. STAT. ANN. § 504-18 (Supp. 1978); MODEL
CODE § 2-203(1)(a) (1969), none of which expressly limits the duty of compliance
with applicable housing code provisions to those that "materially affect health or
safety." However, the tenant's remedy of termination "at any time" without notice to
the landlord under MODEL CODE § 2-205 (1969) is limited to cases where "the condi-
tion renders the dwelling unit uninhabitable or poses an imminent threat to the health
or safety of any occupant."
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Court of Appeals subsequently interpreted Javins to hold that the im-
plied warranty is measured solely "by the standards set out in the
Housing Regulations" and has refused to "stray from nor expand
upon that holding." '37 9 In several other jurisdictions, however, the
courts have defined the implied warranty of habitability broadly
enough to include all cases where the leased premises are unfit for
human habitation because of health or safety hazards, whether or not
there is a violation of any housing code provision.38 Thus several
courts have stated that whether defects are so substantial as to render
the leased premises unsafe or unsanitary, and thus unfit for habita-
tion, is a fact question to be determined in light of the circumstances
of each case; that one such circumstance would be whether the al-
leged defect violates an applicable housing code; and that other fac-
tors to be considered are the nature of the defect, its effect on safety
and sanitation, the length of time it has persisted, the age of the struc-
ture and the amount of rent.38'
Although many of the opinions focus on "defects" in the premises
serious enough to pose a threat to the health or safety of the tenant, it
seems clear that the implied warranty generally requires the provi-
sion of "essential" or "vital" services such as hot water and (in high-
rise apartment buildings) elevators, even if these services are not
strictly necessary to safeguard health or safety. 2  Of course, where a
379. Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187, 190 (D.C. App.
1976).
380. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974); Lemle v. Breedon, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969) (no code violations men-
tioned); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, - Ind. App. -, 349 N.E.2d 749 (1976);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1973); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363
Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973) ("[T]he protection afforded by the implied war-
ranty of habitability does not necessarily coincide with the Code's requirements.
There may be instances where conditions not covered by the Code ... render the
apartment uninhabitable."); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973);
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460,
308 A.2d 17 (1973); Tonetti v. Penati, 48 App. Div. 2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975);
Pugh v. Holmes, - Pa. Super Ct. -, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978); Foisy v. Wyman, 83
Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 482 (1969); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409
(1961). These cases are in accord with URLTA § 2.104(a), MODEL CODE § 2-203(1)
and all current statutes based on one or the other in creating a standard of habitability
not limited to the standards set out in an applicable housing code (if any).
381. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1973); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Heming-
way, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.
App. 1973); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63
N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
382. Winchester Dev. Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. App. 1976) (hot water,
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housing code applies to the premises, it will usually require the provi-
sion of such services.383
The Restatement (Second) of Property's approach to the problems
now under consideration is clearly set out in sections 5.1 and 5.5 and
the comments appended thereto. Section 5.1 creates an implied war-
ranty that property leased for residential purposes will be suitable for
residential use at the beginning of the tenancy. The draftsman's com-
ment states that the leased property "is unsuitable for residential pur-
poses if it would be unsafe or unhealthy for the tenant to enter on the
leased property and use it as a residence," and that "[a] significant
violation of any controlling building or sanitary code, or similar pub-
lic regulation, which has a substantial impact upon safety or health, is
conclusive that the premises are unsafe or unhealthy, but other modes
of proof are acceptable."3 4 Section 5.5 creates an obligation in the
landlord to keep leased property in repair, which is broader than a
simple duty to keep the premises in compliance with applicable hous-
ing code provisions, although the latter duty is specifically included.
Under the illegal contract theory, it is clear that the only relevant
substantive standards of habitability are those contained in the appli-
cable housing code.
3. "Latent" and "Patent" Defects and the Duty to Maintain
"Habitability"
All the cases holding that a common law warranty of habitability
but not air conditioning, required by housing code, and thus by the implied war-
ranty); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973) (facilities vital to the use
of the premises for residential purposes); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526
(1970) (same); Park Hill Terrace Associates v. Glennon, 146 N.J. Super. 271, 369 A.2d
938 (App. Div. 1977) (defective central air conditioning is breach of implied war-
ranty); Academy Spires v. Brown, 11 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex County
Ct. 1970) (garbage disposal, hot water, elevator service); Pugh v. Holmes, - Pa.
Super. Ct. -, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978) (hot water); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515
P.2d 160 (1973) (hot water). See also Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J.
Super. 577, 338 A.2d 21 (L. Div. 1975) (inability to use outside area because of mud
and water from retaining wall construction project was breach of implied warranty).
In Academy Spires the court also said: "Malfunction of venetian blinds, water leaks,
wall cracks, lack of painting, at least of the magnitude presented here, go to what may
be called 'amenities.' Living with lack of painting, water leaks and defective venetian
blinds may be unpleasant, aesthetically unsatisfying, but does not come within the
category of uninhabitability." I ll N.J. Super. at 482, 268 A.2d at 559.
383. E.g., Winchester Dev. Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. App. 1976).
384. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1, Comment e (1977) (emphasis
added).
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must be implied in residential leases recognize that the warranty
should protect the residential tenant against conditions existing at the
beginning of the tenancy that makes the premises "uninhabitable."
Indeed, most of the cases have involved defective conditions in exist-
ence at the beginning of the tenancy.38 5
To the extent that the landlord's obligation is to assure that the
premises are habitable at the beginning of the tenancy, the further
question may arise as to whether the obligation covers "patent" as
well as "latent" defects. No statute imposing a duty on the landlord
to provide a habitable dwelling and/or providing the tenant with spe-
cific remedies for the landlord's failure to do so contains any lan-
guage suggesting that the "patent" character of defects existing at the
beginning of the tenancy relieves the landlord of his duty or deprives
the tenant of his remedies. But the picture is less clear when we turn
to judicially created implied warranties of habitability.
In Pines v. Perssion... many of the defects in the leased premises
were "patent," but the Wisconsin court said nothing to suggest any
distinction with respect to the warranty." 7 In Lemle v. Breedon388
385. Lund v. McArthur, 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969) (electrical defects);
Lemle v. Breedon, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969) (rat infested); Jack Spring, Inc. v.
Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972) (numerous code violations); Old Town
Dev. Co. v. Langford, - Ind. App. -, 349 N.E.2d 744 (1976) (faulty heating system);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1973) (faulty bathroom ceiling and other de-
fects); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974) (faulty windows, bath-
room tile, kitchen counter); McKenna v. Begin, - Mass. App. -, 362 N.E.2d 548
(1977) (broken windows, inadequate means of egress, inadequate electrical system);
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973) (fourteen specific conditions);
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971) (nature of defects not specified);
Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973) (broken windows, heating de-
fects, electrical system defects, defects in walls, floors, ceilings; sewage backup, ver-
min); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973) (heating, plumbing,
numerous other defects); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961)
(defective plumbing, heating, and wiring). It is not clear whether the defective condi-
tions were in existence at the inception of the tenancy in Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hem-
ingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973), although they probably were. In
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), though many of the
defective conditions may have been present at the beginning of the tenancy, the te-
nants "offer of proof reached only violations [of the housing code] which had arisen
since the term of the lease had commenced." 428 F.2d at 1073.
386. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
387. However, when the prospective tenants looked at the house in June "and
found it in a filthy condition," there was testimony that the landlord "stated he would
clean and fix up the house, paint it, provide the necessary furnishing and have the
house in suitable condition by the start of the school year in the fall." 14 Wis. 2d at
591-92, 111 N.W.2d at 410. Although the court held that parol evidence was inadmis-
1979]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
and Lund v. McArthur389 all the defects appear to have been "latent,"
but the Hawaii court said nothing to indicate that this was significant.
In Javins v. First National Realty Corporation390 the tenants offered to
prove some 1500 violations of the District of Columbia housing code,
but they conceded that "this offer of proof reached only violations
which had arisen since the term of the lease had commenced." 39'
Thus the Javins court had no reason to discuss the question whether
the implied warranty would cover patent defects existing at the incep-
tion of the tenancy. The opinion does contain dictum that the
shortage of housing in the District of Columbia compels tenants to
accept rental units notwithstanding observable defects, 392 and the
court's emphasis on the need to give tenants new remedies to enforce
their right to a habitable dwelling in substantial compliance with the
housing code strongly suggests that the Javins court would draw no
distinction between latent and patent defects.
In New Jersey, on the other hand, the court in Marini v. Ireland3g3
held that a residential letting impliedly covenants "that at the incep-
tion of the lease, there are no latent defects in facilities vital to the use
of the premises for residential purposes because of original faulty
construction or deterioration from age or normal usage."3 94 This lan-
guage was later adopted by the New Hampshire court in Kline v.
Burns,3 95 and by the Iowa court in Mease v. Fox.396 But the signifi-
sible to vary the terms of the written lease, which did not include any warranty of
habitability, it is clear that the tenants agreed to lease the house in reliance on the
landlord's statement and that the rent was fixed on the basis of the premises being put
"in suitable condition by the start of the school year in the fall."
388. 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
389. 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969).
390. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
391. Id. at 1073. But cf the statement that "there is no allegation that appellants'
apartments were in poor condition or in violation of the housing code," which sug-
gests that the presence of such an allegation might have made a difference. Id. at
1079.
392. Id. at 1079 n.42.
393. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
394. Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534 (emphasis added). The quoted language was
repeated with approval in Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 466, 308 A.2d 17, 20
(1973). Berzito actually involved an express rather than an implied warranty of habit-
ability, and the only real issue was as to the scope of the remedies available for breach
of such a warranty (whether express or implied).
395. 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
396. 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1973).
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cance of the latent defect limitation is hard to determine since these
three cases also held that the implied warranty includes a continuing
duty to keep the premises in a habitable condition.397 It is possible
that these courts would define this continuing duty as requiring only
the repair of conditions traceable to latent defects, but this seems un-
likely in view of the broad language in the opinions with respect to
the continuing duty of maintenance. Moreover, although the Iowa
and New Jersey courts have indicated a willingness to consider
whether the tenant in a particular case voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived the defects, 398 merely accepting possession while
patent defects exist hardly seems to satisfy the requirement that any
waiver be knowing and intelligent.399
In Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway,4" the court relied on
and quoted from Kline v. Burns,4 ' but it changed the formula to read
as follows: "At the inception of the rental there are no latent [orpat-
ent] defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential
purposes," expressly rejecting any limitation of the implied warranty
to latent defects.4" 2 Presumably the court wished to make clear that
the tenant's entry into possession does not constitute a waiver of his
right to insist that the leased premises be put and kept in a habitable
397. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970) ("further it is a
covenant that these facilities will remain in usable condition during the entire term of
the lease. . . the landlord is required to maintain these facilities in a condition which
renders the property livable . . . [and] to repair damage to vital facilities caused by
ordinary wear and tear during said term"); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d
248, 252 (1971) ("these essential facilities will remain during the entire term in a con-
dition which makes the property livable"); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa
1973) (same).
398. See generally Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Berzito v.
Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973) (quoting Mease v. Fox).
399. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY takes the position that the landlord
should not be able to treat the tenant's entry as an implied waiver of the landlord's
duty to provide a habitable dwelling unit, and that "the remedies available to the
tenant before entry, because of the unsuitable condition of the leased property for the
use contemplated by the parties, are available to him after entry if the landlord does
not correct the situation within a reasonable period of time after being requested to do
so. . ." Id. at § 5.3. The quoted language is subject to the proviso "[e]xcept to the
extent the parties to the lease validly agree otherwise." Id. Comment c states: "The
tenant as a matter of law is unable to waive any remedies available to him at the time
of entry, if at the time of entry it would be unsafe or unhealthy to use the leased
property in the manner contemplated by the parties." Id.
400. 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
401. 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
402. 363 Mass. at 199, 293 N.E.2d at 843.
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condition. In the other states where the implied warranty of habita-
bility has been recognized, judicial opinions suggest no limitation of
the warranty to latent defects. Insofar as courts refuse to distinguish
between patent and latent defects, it is clear that the implied warranty
of habitability is not really a common law implied warranty at all,
since generally the latter would not cover defects known to, or readily
ascertainable by, the person claiming the benefit of the warranty.4"3
Since dwelling units are seldom rented without an inspection by the
prospective tenant, patent defects in the unit will usually be known to
him before he agrees to rent, and by hypothesis such defects are read-
ily discoverable by him. Moreover, since-in the absence of an ex-
press covenant by the landlord to put and keep the premises in
habitable condition-the existence of patent defects is ordinarily re-
flected in the rent agreed upon by the parties, it is clear that the ten-
ant does not really bargain, or agree to pay for, a habitable
dwelling-in the absence of such an express covenant-when serious
patent defects exist at the beginning of the tenancy.
Since all courts agree that the implied warranty covers latent de-
fects in existence at the inception of a tenancy, in the absence of an
effective waiver of warranty protection, it is clear that the landlord
has a duty to correct such defects when they manifest themselves dur-
ing the course of the tenancy. The more difficult issues are whether
the landlord has a duty to correct patent defects in existence at the
beginning of the tenancy, and whether the landlord has a duty to
carry out repairs made necessary by ordinary wear and tear on the
leased dwelling unit and common facilities used in connection there-
with.
The opinion in Pines v. Perssion,4° proclaiming the existence of an
implied warranty that residential premises are habitable at the incep-
tion of a tenancy, contains no language indicating any continuing
duty of the landlord to maintain the premises in a habitable condi-
tion, although the legislative policy embodied in housing codes ar-
403. For a statement of the common law rule on implied warranties in the sale of
goods, see, e.g., Reiny, Schmidt & Plessner v. Healy, 161 Mich. 266, 268, 126 N.W.
202, 203 (1910) ("It is a settled rule that one who buys an article which is present and
subject to his inspection cannot afterwards assert an implied warranty of fitness, qual-
ity, or condition, in the absence of fraud, except possibly where the seller is the manu-
facturer or grower, or the vendor of articles intended for consumption as food; 'caveat
emptor is the invariable maxim.' "). But cf U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to 2-317 (1976) (implied
warranties in the sale of goods).
404. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
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guably supports the view that there should be such a continuing duty
running directly from landlord to tenant and enforcable by private
tenant remedies. Even assuming that the subsequent decision of the
Wisconsin court in Posnanski v. Hood"°5 did not completely overrule
Pines, Posnanski at least rejected the idea that a landlord should be
subject to a judicially created duty to repair defective conditions aris-
ing after the beginning of the tenancy. Thus Wisconsin tenants must
rely on a new statute, effective only in mid-1971 though it was
adopted in 1969,4"6 for establishment of the landlord's continuing ob-
ligation to maintain the premises in a tenantable condition.
Neither of the implied warranty of habitability cases from Hawaii
contains any language suggesting that the new warranty includes a
continuing duty of the landlord to maintain the premises in habitable
condition.4°7 But the judicially declared implied warranty of habita-
bility has been superseded in Hawaii by recent legislation based on
the Model Code, which clearly imposes such a continuing duty on the
landlord, and thus requires him to correct all defects existing at the
inception of the tenancy or arising as a result of normal wear and tear
during the term of the tenancy.
40 8
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.409 the only issue before the
court, strictly speaking, was whether the landlord was subject to a
duty to repair numerous defects (housing code violations) which the
state of the record required the court to consider as having arisen
since the term of the lease commenced. The court's affirmative an-
swer is clearly not sustained by the supposed analogy to consumer
protection cases relied on by Judge Wright, 4 0 but it is arguably sus-
405. 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
406. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 1975).
407. Lemle v. Breedon, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Lund v. McArthur, 51
Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 483 (1969).
408. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 521-542 (1976).
409. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
410. Id. at 1079.
If the warranty were limited to latent defects existing at the commencement of
the tenancy, the analogy to consumer protection principles in the law of sales
would be sound. But the warranty extends to patent defects and imposes an
ongoing duty to repair on the landlord. Hence, the analogy breaks down. Under
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) no implied warranty covers patent defects
which "an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to [the
buyer]." This limitation of warranty applied whenever the buyer has examined
the goods "as fully as he desired" before entering into the contract. Because
residential premises are seldom leased without an inspection by the prospective
1979]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
tained by the policy of the District's housing code. Since Javins, al-
though most of the cases have involved defective conditions in
existence at the beginning of the tenancy, the courts have consistently
said that the new implied warranty of habitability includes a broad
continuing duty to maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condi-
tion-ie., to make all repairs necessary to keep the premises habita-
ble, whether the conditions requiring repairs existed when the
tenancy began or only arose later.411 None of the opinions limits the
landlord's duty of repair to latent conditions existing at the inception
of the tenancy.412 All this makes it quite obvious that the implied
warranty of habitability is not really a common law implied warranty
and that the supposed analogy with consumer protection cases is
specious.413
Where the landlord's duty to make repairs is based upon a judi-
tenant, the UCC would suggest that he take subject to obvious defects, and the
defects presumably would be reflected in the rent he agreed to pay. Additionally,
the UCC provides no implied warranty that the seller will repair defects arising
from ordinary deterioration of durable goods over time. Only when a defect
latent at the time of sale later becomes patent does the implied warranty of
merchantability afford the buyer a remedy.
* * * Under the UCC, a seller with reason to know that the goods are required
for a particular purpose and that the buyer is relying on the seller to furnish
suitable goods must furnish the goods with an implied warranty that they are fit
for such purpose. Judge Wright's discussion of the sale-of-goods warranties indi-
cated that landlords, by analogy, impliedly warrant habitability because they
must know that habitation is the particular purpose for which the tenant seeks
the premises. The problem is that the tenant's purpose is not a particular pur-
pose, as the official comment to the UCC defines it; rather it is an ordinary pur-
pose for which residential units are used .... "Particular purpose" under the
UCC implied warranty differs from ordinary purpose in that it requires a use
peculiar to the buyer's business.
Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56
B.U.L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1976). Abbott's overall critique of the Javins rationale is the
best I have seen. See id. at 25-40.
411. Eg., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1973); Kline v. Bums, 111
N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d
526, 534 (1970). See note 397 and accompanying text supra for further discussion of
these three cases. Accord, Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208
(1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973);
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J.
460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania
Mun. Ct. 1972); Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Foisy v. Wy-
man, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
412. See text accompanying notes 394-400 supra.
413. See notes 403 & 410 supra.
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cially created implied warranty or covenant, it would seem that, at
least where the defective conditions arise or become apparent only
after the tenancy begins, the landlord should not be deemed in
breach of his obligation unless he fails to make the necessary repairs
within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the defective condi-
tions. This is the applicable rule where the lease contains an express
covenant by the landlord to make repairs. 4 ' The Massachusetts Ap-
peals Court in MfcKenna v. Begin' said that the tenant was entitled
to damages from "the time the landlord first knew or was notified of'
any defective conditions "shown to have arisen during the tenancy."
But this statement is only dictum insofar as it purports to deny the
landlord any time to repair defects arising or only becoming apparent
after the tenancy begins, since the evidence revealed "that the land-
lord knew of the conditions in the apartment at the inception of the
tenancy.
4 16
All the cases recognize that the implied warranty of habitability
does not cover conditions resulting from the deliberate or negligent
conduct of the tenant or anyone for whose conduct the tenant is re-
sponsible.
The Restatement (Second) of Property approach to the problems
now under consideration clearly differs from that in any of the de-
cided cases. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 create an implied warranty, without
using the term, that property leased for residential purposes will be
suitable for residential use both when the lease is made and at the
date when the tenant is entitled to possession. The draftsman's com-
ment makes it clear that the property "is unsuitable for residential
purposes if it would be unsafe or unhealthy for the tenant to enter on
the leased property and use it for a residence" but that "[t]he prem-
ises may not be unsafe or unhealthy to occupy but may nevertheless
be unsuitable for residential purposes. '417 Section 5.5 creates a sepa-
414. The rule is well-settled. See, e.g., Chambers v. Lindsey, 171 Ala. 158, 55 So.
150 (1911); Bowling v. Carroll, 122 Ark. 23, 182 S.W. 514 (1916); Woodbury Co. v.
Tackaberry Co., 166 Iowa 642, 148 N.W. 639 (1914); Brewington v. Loughran, 183
N.C. 558, 112 S.E. 257 (1922); Kennedy v. Supnick, 82 Okla. 208, 200 P. 151 (1921).
415. 325 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Mass. App. 1975).
416. Id. at 589. Compare McKenna with URLTA §§ 4.401, 4.103 and MODEL
CODE §§ 2-205 to 2-207, both of which allow the landlord time to "cure the breach"
before giving the tenant stated remedies, but which seemingly allow recovery of dam-
ages from the date of the breach without allowing time for the making of the needed
repairs.
417. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1, Comment e (1977).
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rate "obligation of landlord to keep leased property in repair," as
follows:
(1) Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree
otherwise, the landlord, under a lease of property for residential
use, is obligated to the tenant to keep the leased property in a
condition that meets the requirements of governing health,
safety, and housing codes, unless the failure to meet those re-
quirements is the fault of the tenant or is the consequence of a
sudden non-manmade force or the conduct of third persons.
(2) Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree
otherwise, the landlord is obligated to the tenant to keep safe
and in repair the areas remaining under this control that are
maintained for the use and benefit of his tenants.
(3) The landlord is obligated to keep the leased property in
repair to the extent he has expressly or impliedly agreed to do so.
The draftsman's comment4"' indicates that the duty imposed by par-
agraph (2) exists even if areas remaining under the landlord's control
are damaged by one of the tenants (although he may be able to re-
cover damages from the tenant) or the damage results from a non
man-made force or the wrongful conduct of third persons. Moreover,
in cases not covered by paragraphs (1) or (2), and where there is no
express agreement by the landlord to repair, "a conclusion is justified
that the landlord impliedly promised to make. . . major repairs [if]
it would not be reasonable in the light of the term of the lease, the
rent that is being paid, the purposes for which the leased property is
used, and other circumstances, to expect the tenant to assume the cost
of major repairs to the leased property that become necessary
through no fault of the tenant;" and "[t]o the extent the implied war-
ranty of habitability [created by § 5.1] goes beyond the requirements
of subsection (I), it may be the basis of an implied promise to keep
the leased property in repair after the tenant enters."4 9
In Saunders v. First National Realty Coro.,420 the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals refused to extend the Brown4 2 ' illegal con-
tract doctrine to a case where the alleged housing code violations
were not proved to have been in existence at the beginning of the
defendants' tenancies. Both the Brown illegal contract doctrine and
418. Id. § 5.5, Comment c.
419. Id. § 5.5, Comment f.
420. 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. App. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
421. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
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the Javins42 z implied warranty of habitability were later incorporated
into the District of Columbia Landlord-Tenant Code.423 Although
the Code rejects the Saunders limitation and allows tenants to elect
between the two doctrines in any case, whether the code violations
arise before or after the inception of the tenancy,424 a later District of
Columbia case ignored the Code and refused to apply the illegal con-
tract doctrine where violations of the housing code arise after com-
mencement of the lease.
425
4. Can the Protection of the Implied Warranty be Waived?
The courts of Iowa and New Jersey, in recognizing an implied war-
ranty of habitability in leases, have also indicated a willingness to
consider whether the tenant in a particular case voluntarily, know-
ingly and intelligently waived the defects, or is estopped to raise the
question of the breach,4 6 but the New Jersey court, on the facts, sus-
tained the trial court's conclusion that "the scarcity in the Elizabeth
area of available housing for low-income families with children" pre-
cluded an effective waiver where a tenant moved into substandard
housing and paid the contract rent for nearly a year and a half.42 7
And in Jayins v. First National Realty Corp.,428 the court refused to
consider whether the tenant's express covenant to repair constituted a
waiver of the just-invented implied warranty of habitability because
the implied warranty of the landlord could not be excluded, and any
private agreement to shift the burden of compliance with the housing
code to the landlord would be illegal and unenforceable. 429 Most of
the other cases have followed favins in stating that the implied war-
ranty cannot be waived or excluded.43' None of the cases, however,
422. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
423. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATIONS §§ 2902.1 to
2902.2 (1970).
424. Id. § 2902.1.
425. Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. App. 1976).
426. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791,797 (Iowa 1972); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J.
460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973) (quoting from Mease v. Fox).
427. 63 N.J. at 464, 308 A.2d at 19.
428. 428 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
429. Id. at 1080 n.49, 1082 n.58.
430. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625 n.9, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173 n.9,
S11 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 n.9 (1974) ("landlords generally [should] not be permitted to
use their superior bargaining power to negate the warranty of habitability rule"); Bos-
ton Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (1973)
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dealt with a fact situation such as the URLTA envisages, where the
parties enter into a separate written agreement, for an adequate con-
sideration, to shift at least some maintenance duties from the land-
lord to the tenant.4 3 '
In those states where the waiver issue has not yet been decided, it is
likely that the Restatement (Second) of Property will influence future
decisions.432 Section 5.6 of the Restatement allows the parties by
agreement "to increase or decrease what would otherwise be the obli-
gations of the landlord with respect to the condition of the leased
property and. . . to expand or contract what would otherwise be the
remedies available to the tenant for the breach of those obligations,"
provided the agreement is not "unconscionable or significantly
against public policy. '43 3 Comment e of section 5.6 lists a number of
factors that may be considered in determining whether an agreement
in a lease is in whole or in part unenforceable because unconsciona-
ble or against public policy. Of those factors, the following would
seem to be the most relevant to residential leases:
(1) Whether and to what extent the agreement will be
counter to the policy underlying statutory or regulatory provi-
sions, especially those relating to the public health and safety
and those relating to the tenants of moderate income in multi-
unit residential. . . properties;
(2) Whether the agreement. . . appears in a lease of. . .a
substantial residence or estate designed for single family occu-
pancy,. . . concerning which freedom of negotiation is usually
permissible:
(3) Whether and to what extent the agreement. . . appears
("This warranty (in so far as it is based on the State Sanitary Code and local health
regulations) cannot be waived by any provision in the lease"); Foisy v. Wyman, 83
Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973) ("this type of bargaining by the landlord
with the tenant is contrary to public policy and the purpose of the doctrine of implied
warranty").
431. URLTA § 2.104(c), (d). In Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973), there was such an agreement reducing the rent from $82 to $50 per month, but
it was not in a separate instrument. The Folsy court refused to give any effect to the
agreement, although the opinion quoted from the recently adopted Washington stat-
ute (not yet in force when the Foisy lease was made), based on the URLTA, which
expressly states that "[niothing ... shall prevent the tenant from agreeing with the
landlord to undertake the results himself in return for ... a reasonable reduction in
rent." See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 59.18.100 (West Supp. 1977).
432. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (1977).
433. Id. § 5.6.
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to have been the result of conscious negotiations for the distribu-
tion of risks as part of the total bargain contained in the lease;
(4) Whether the provision appears to be part of an unduly
harsh and unreasonable standard, "boilerplate" lease document;
(5) Whether and to what extent the parties or either of them,
habitually (or on a discriminatory basis) disregard and do not
enforce the agreement. . . in actual operations under the lease
or, in the case of a landlord, under similar leases;
(6) Whether and to what extent the agreement . . . (espe-
cially if it relates to low or moderate income residential prop-
erty) imposes unreasonable . . . burdens on persons who are
financially ill-equipped to assume those burdens and who may
have had significant inequality of bargaining power;
(7) Whether and to what extent the parties were each repre-
sented by counsel in the course of negotiating the lease.43 4
Moreover, in another Comment, the Restatement unequivocally
states that "[t]he tenant as a matter of law is unable to waive any
remedies available to him at the time of entry, if at the time of entry
it would be unsafe or unhealthy to use the leased premises in the
manner contemplated by the parties, ' 435 and further states, in a Re-
porter's Note, that "[tihe rule of this section does not allow waiver of
housing code violations" because of "public policy considerations;
i.e., forcing the landlord to place the premises in habitable condition
as defined by the legislature, and not allowing his reliance on waiver
by the tenant. 436 The latter statement clearly goes beyond a refusal
to recognize waiver where there are conditions hazardous to health or
safety, since it is obvious that not all housing code violations endan-
ger health or safety and many are quite trivial in nature.437
434. Id. § 5.6, Comment e.
435. Id. § 5.3, Comment c. Note, however, that Comment d provides: "The par-
ties may expressly or impliedly agree that the landlord is to have a reasonable time
after the tenant's entry to make the condition of the leased property suitable for the
use contemplated by the parties. . . . In this situation the reasonable time is mea-
sured from the date of the tenant's entry." Id. § 5.3, Comment d.
436. Id. § 5.3, Reporter's Note 3.
437. Although RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1 creates an implied
warranty of suitability for residential use that would not be broken by unsubstantial
housing code violations, see Comment e following the § 5.1 blackletter, § 5.5 creates a
continuing duty of the landlord "to keep the leased property in a condition that meets
the requirements of governing health, safety, and housing codes" not qualified by any
language indicating that the duty is only to keep the property free from substantial
code violations that affect health or safety. It thus appears that the draftsman's intent
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C. Tenantv' Remedies for Landlord's Breach of Duty
In jurisdictions where the implied warranty of habitability has
been established either by judicial decision or by simple warranty of
habitability statutes, it is generally accurate to say that the tenant's
remedies for the landlord's breach of duty depend on whether the
tenant chooses to terminate or to affirm the lease. If the tenant elects
to terminate, he is free from liability for rent that would otherwise
accrue under the lease, and he may also either obtain restitution of
rent paid in excess of what he is legally obligated to pay or recover
damages for the landlord's breach of duty. If the tenant elects to af-
firm the lease, however, he must then make additional decisions, in
light of the particular circumstances of his case, as to the availability
and comparative advantages of several quite different remedies.
1. Termination of the tenancy
Judicial recognition of an implied warranty or covenant of habita-
bility has generally been accompanied by holdings or dicta that per-
formance of the landlord's warranty obligations and performance of
the tenant's obligations under the lease are mutually dependent and,
consequently, that the landlord's breach of the implied warranty enti-
tles the tenant to terminate the lease and avoid further rent liabil-
ity."' Presumably the breach of a statutory warranty or covenant of
was not to allow effective waiver of the tenant's right to have full compliance with all
housing code requirements, however unsubstantial, or even trivial, in nature.
438. Termination-often called "rescission" in the cases-requires the tenant to
vacate the premises and is, obviously, very similar to a traditional "constructive evic-
tion" based on the landlord's failure to perform an express covenant to maintain the
premises in a habitable condition, to keep it in repair, or to provide essential services.
The termination remedy is recognized in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071, 1082 n.61 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1971) (dictum: "all con-
tract remedies" are extended); Lemle v. Breedon, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969);
Lund v. McArthur, 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Lang-
ford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976) (dictum); Steel v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521
P.2d 304 (1974); (dictum: "traditional remedies for breach of contract are available to
the tenant"); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831
(1973) (dictum); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973) (dictum: "the
basic remedies for contract law, including damages, reformation and rescission, are
available to the tenant"); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971) (dictum:
"basic contract remedies of damages, reformation, and rescission"); Marini v. Ireland,
56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) (dictum); Tonetti v. Penati, 48 App. Div. 2d 25. 367
N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania
Mun. Ct. 1972) (dictum: "normal contract remedies"); Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d
1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (dictum: "the rent may be discharged if the tenant surren-
ders possession); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). Termina-
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habitability will normally give the tenant the same right to terminate
the lease and avoid further liability.439 In substance, the tenant now
has the right to vacate the leased premises and treat the landlord's
breach of the implied or statutory warranty as a constructive eviction,
just as he could when there is a substantial breach of an express cove-
nant to keep the premises in repair or to provide essential services.
This is a self-help remedy not dependent on any court order to make
it effective, and, as under the traditional constructive eviction doc-
trine, the tenant must vacate the leased premises (assuming he took
possession before the breach occurred) in order to assure that the ten-
ant will not be able to avoid payment of rent while retaining the ben-
efits of possession under the lease.
The traditional rule is that a tenant cannot claim a constructive
eviction and avoid liability for rent unless he has vacated the leased
premises within a reasonable time after the landlord's breach of duty
occurs.' 4 When termination for breach of the implied warranty of
habitability is the basis of the tenant's defense, however, it may be
that the "reasonable time" limitation will be relaxed or even elimi-
nated, since most courts have held that a tenant may withhold rent
because of a breach of the implied warranty without vacating the
premises at all. Thus courts may decide that a tenant, faced with a
breach of the implied warranty, may stay in possession and withhold
rent for a very substantial period without forfeiting the right to termi-
nate the lease and vacate the leased premises at a later time. In any
case where there is a serious shortage of rental housing, even a rather
long delay before terminating and vacating is likely to be held rea-
sonable. But the tenant's right to terminate will probably depend
upon his having taken reasonable steps to notify the landlord of his
decision to terminate and the reason therefor, and upon the continu-
tion is authorized by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 5.1(1), 5.5(1), 5.4(l)
and 5.5(4) (1970). Section 10.1 prescribes the procedure for termination.
439. As to the right of a tenant to terminate under URLTA § 4.101(a), see note
292 supra. As to such right under Model Code §§ 2-204, 2-205, see note 299 supra.
Current state statutes based on the URLTA or Model Code, respectively, contain
identical provisions for termination by the tenant. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West
Supp. 1975) expressly provides for termination upon breach of the landlord's statu-
tory duty. See text accompanying notes 262-64 supra. Some of the statutory provi-
sions creating warranties or covenants of habitability do not, however, expressly
provide for remedies at all. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (Supp.
1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504-18 (Supp. 1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235b (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1977).
440. Eg., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
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ance of the landlord's default until the time specified for termina-
tion.44'
As previously indicated, the tenant cannot terminate or rescind the
lease because of the landlord's breach of duty without vacating the
premises. But the question whether the tenant was entitled to termi-
nate is likely to be tested in an action by the landlord for recovery of
unpaid rent. If the court finds that the tenant was not in fact entitled
to terminate the lease-because either there was no breach of the
landlord's duty, or the tenant failed to vacate within a reasonable
time, the tenant failed to give notices required by statute, or the land-
lord cured the breach before the tenant vacated-the defense will be
rejected and the tenant will remain liable for rent for the balance of
the term even though he has vacated the leased premises and, per-
haps, secured other housing." 2 Hence, if there is any doubt as to the
effectiveness of the tenant's attempt to terminate the lease, it may be
advisable for him to obtain a declaratory judgment as to his rights
before vacating, as the tenant did in Charles E Bur, Inc. v. Seven
Grand Corp.' 3 Although none of the statutes authorizing termina-
tion expressly provides for a declaratory judgment, it seems clear that
none of them would preclude it if declaratory judgments are other-
wise available under the law of the jurisdiction.
2. Restitution of Amounts Paid by Tenant
Assuming that the tenant has effectively terminated the lease be-
cause of the landlord's breach of an implied warranty or covenant of
habitability, or a statutory equivalent thereof, thus relieving himself
of further rent liability under the lease, the tenant is also entitled to a
441. Compare "notice" requirements in URLTA § 4.101(a) and MODEL CODE
§§ 2-204 to 2-205 (summarized in note 292 supra) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 10.1(3) (1977). The Model Code does not require notice to the landlord
if "the condition renders the dwelling unit uninhabitable or poses an imminent threat
to the health or safety of any occupant." MODEL CODE § 2-205(1). The Restatement
(Second) of Property, on the other hand, requires the tenant to vacate and to take
"reasonable steps to assure that the landlord has knowledge of his decision to termi-
nate the lease and the reason therefor." Id. § 10.1(3).
442. See, e.g., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969)
(dictum); Lemle v. Breedon, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
443. 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959). "The trial judges could properly (1)
declare that Seven Grand's material breach of the lease constituted, or would consti-
tute, a constructive eviction upon Burt's abandonment of the premises, and that Burt,
upon such abandonment, was or would be excused from further performance of the
lease and (2) assess damages." Id. at 130, 163 N.E.2d at 7.
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judgment either for restitution or for damages. If the tenant has paid
rent in advance or made a security deposit and then terminates the
lease before his right to possession accrues, he is clearly entitled to
recover all the advance rent paid and any security deposit on either
restitutionary or damage theories.'" In the more common situation
where the tenant vacates the leased premises after having been in
possession for a period of time, it was held in Pines v. Perssion44 5 that
the landlord's duty to have the premises in habitable condition and
the tenant's duty to pay the agreed rent are "mutually dependent,"
and therefore a breach of the landlord's duty-said to constitute a
failure of consideration-relieved the tenants of any "liability for
rent under the lease and their only liability is for the reasonable
rental value of the premises during the time of actual occupancy." 446
However, it is not clear whether the court thought the landlord's
breach simply suspended the tenant's duty to pay rent, leaving the
lease in all other respects still in force, or whether the court regarded
the lease itself as void ab initio with the tenant assuming the status of
a tenant at will or periodic tenant.' 7 Under either theory, of course,
the tenant's duty to pay a reasonable rental value ends when the ten-
ant vacates the premises.
In most of the cases from jurisdictions other than Wisconsin where
the tenant vacated the premises and clearly indicated that he in-
tended to terminate or "rescind" the lease, the courts have considered
the tenant liable for the lease rent until he vacated, with an offsetting
claim for damages for the landlord's breach of the implied warranty
444. In such a case, where the lease never becomes operative as a "conveyance,"
the tenant's right to recover back anything paid on the "lease contract" is clear, and if
the tenant seeks nothing more, it is immaterial whether he relies on a restitutionary or
a damage theory. The tenant may, of course, assert his claim either in an independent
action or as a counterclaim in an action by the landlord for rent.
445. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). In all the cases where breach of the
implied warranty of habitability was the basis for the tenant's termination of the
lease, the tenant was in possession for some period, however short. Eg., Lemle v.
Breedon, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969) (three days); Lund v. McArthur, 51 Haw.
473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969) (six months); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972)
(over four months); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973) (five
months); Tonetti v. Penati, 48 App. Div. 2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975) (one month);
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961) (less than a week).
446. 14 Wis. 2d at 597, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
447. The "void ab initio" notion is consistent with the "illegal contract" theory,
but not with the "breach of implied warranty" theory.
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of habitability." 8 But there has been a good deal of judicial disa-
greement as to the proper damage formula.
3. Damages for Breach
There appears to be unanimous agreement that a breach of the
landlord's implied or statutory warranty or covenant of habitability
entitles the tenant to recover damages, whether the tenant does or
does not terminate the lease." 9 As several courts have pointed out,
the tenant may often prefer not to terminate the lease because that
will require him to vacate the leased premises and find another place
to live, which may be difficult in light of the "scarcity of adequate low
cost housing in virtually every urban setting."4
50
When the tenant does elect to terminate the lease and vacate the
leased premises the damage remedy may often be preferable to the
restitutionary remedy, since the former may enable the tenant to re-
cover any provable "expectancy" damages-ie., any excess of rea-
sonable rental value of the lease over the agreed lease rent (reduced
to present value)45 '-and consequential damages-e.g., any loss sus-
448. Lund v. McArthur, 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
449. Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974), seems to be the only
appellate case where the tenant stayed in possession and sued for damages. Most of
the cases allowing the tenant to sue or counterclaim for damages after vacating the
leased premises indicate that the damage remedy would have been available whether
or not the tenant chose to vacate (and thus terminate the lease) or stay in possession
(and thus affirm the lease). See also Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469, 308 A.2d
17, 21-22 (1973). Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.5,
10.2 (1977).
It should be emphasized that the tenant, after terminating or rescinding the leabe
because of the landlord's breach of duty, may generally recover all the damages to
which he is entitled either in an independent action or by counterclaim in an action
by the landlord for unpaid rent. As a practical matter, the issue is likely to be raised
only if the landlord elects to sue for unpaid rent, so the tenant's right to recover dam-
ages is most often asserted by way of counterclaim. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breedon, 51
Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Lund v. McArthur, 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363
Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App.
1973); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972).
In comparison, see Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973), where the
tenant sued to recover part of the rent paid and the landlord counterclaimed for the
amount of rent remitted to the tenant in an earlier eviction proceeding. In Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), the tenants sued for recovery of
their security deposit and the cost of labor performed by them on the leased premises.
450. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1974).
45 1. This is the generally accepted basic formula for damages for breach of con-
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tained by the tenant as a result of reasonable pre-default expendi-
tures in relation to the leased premises which the landlord could
reasonably have foreseen the tenant would make, and any reasonable
relocation costs of the tenant.452 It should be noted, however, that
the Maine statute, although it authorizes the tenant in the event of a
breach of the statutory covenant and warranty of habitability, to re-
scind and recover a just proportion of the rent, in addition to "any
remedies which may otherwise exist," expressly prohibits any award
of "consequential damages for breach of the warranty." 45
3
If the tenant elects to stay in possession and sue periodically for
damages, he should presumably be subject to the same general rules
as to measure of damages as he would if he elected to terminate the
lease. Several decisions, however, indicate that this is not, in fact, the
case. Broadly speaking, the courts have enunciated three different
rules as to measure of damages for breach of the implied or statutory
warranty of habitability in cases where the tenant elects to stay in
possession: first, the familiar rule that the damages for breach of the
warranty are "the difference between the agreed rent [paid by the
tenant] and the fair rental value of the premises as they were during
their occupancy by the tenant in the unsafe, unsanitary or unfit con-
dition;"454 second, the rule that damages should be measured by "the
difference between the fair rental value of the premises if they had
been as warranted and the fair rental value of the premises as they
were during occupancy by the tenant in the unsafe or unsanitary con-
dition;, 455 and third, the rule that the agreed rent should be reduced
tract. It is the formula stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2 (1977).
See also id., Comment b.
452. Such consequential damages are within the limits set by Hadley v. Bax-
endale, 156 Eng. Rep., 9 Exch. 341 (1854). Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY §§ 10.2(2)-(3) (1977). See id., Comments c & d.
453. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (West Supp. 1977).
454. E.g., Kline v. Bums, II1 N.H. 87, 93-94, 276 A.2d 248,252 (1971) (tenant did
not terminate, but was evicted by summary process; the only issue on appeal was the
balance due the landlord for unpaid rent); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 34, 289
N.E.2d 919, 925 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972). See also Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460,
469, 308 A.2d 17, 22 ("tenant will be charged only with the reasonable rental value of
the property in its imperfect condition during his period of occupancy"). The Berzito
formula appears similar to that stated in Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111
N.W.2d 409 (1961).
455. Eg., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 638, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974) (quoting Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 791 (Iowa 1972)). See
Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 339, 521 P.2d 304, 311 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 203, 293 N.E.2d 831, 845 (1973).
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by a percentage equal to the percentage of the tenant's rightful use
and enjoyment which has been lost to him because of the breach of
warranty.
456
The first damage formula above apparently assumes that the
"agreed rent" is the fair value of the lease premises when in compli-
ance with the warranty of habitability, and it produces the same re-
sult as the formula used in Pines v. Perssion457 if in fact this is true.
But if, on the contrary, the "agreed rent" represents the value of the
premises subject to defects that make them uninhabitable, this dam-
age formula will necessarily produce a "no-damages" result. The
second damage formula above does not assume that the agreed rent
is "the fair rental value of the premises if they had been as war-
ranted," but will obviously produce the same result as the first
formula if, in fact, this is the case. The third damage formula, de-
rived from the Model Code,45 8 is essentially a practical expedient
adopted by some courts because of the difficulty in establishing dam-
ages under either of the other formulas.459
Added complications in damage determination have been intro-
456. The following cases actually involve an application of the "percentage dimi-
nution" approach in determining the rent abatement to be allowed when a tenant sets
up the breach of warranty as a defense in a summary action to evict for nonpayment
of rent: Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex
County Ct. 1970) (25% reduction); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996,
343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973) (50% reduction); Morbeth Realty Corp. v.
Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971) (20% reduction);
Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972) (two-
thirds reduction). See also Cooks v. Fowler, 455 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (one
third reduction in determining amount tenant must deposit in court pending appeal
from landlord's judgment for possession for nonpayment of rent).
457. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). See text accompanying notes 445-46
supra.
458. MODEL CODE § 2-207 (Tent. Draft 1969) (tenant's remedies for landlord's
failure to supply heat, water, or hot water).
459. These difficulties arise because of the expense involved in any attempt by a
tenant to obtain expert testimony as to rental values, even where the premises were in
good condition at the inception of the tenancy and deteriorated later, the problem of
determining the rental value of a "patently uninhabitable" dwelling if the agreed rent
cannot be considered evidence of such rental value, as is the case, e.g., in Massachu-
setts, and the desire of courts to avoid concluding that the tenant has suffered no
damages when the premises are "patently uninhabitable" at the beginning of the ten-
ancy. For a discussion of the damage measurement problem, see Abbott, Housing
Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U.L. REv. 1, 20-25
(1976).
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duced in Iowa and Missouri. In Mease v. Fox4 6 0 the Iowa court held
that the second formula applies with respect to the period of occu-
pancy by the tenant-! e., "damages shall be measured by the differ-
ence between the fair rental value of the premises if they had been as
warranted and the fair rental of the premises as they were during
occupancy by the tenant in the unsafe or unsanitary condition."'461
But, "when tenant vacates he is then unaffected by the condition of
the premises, and that factor loses relevance in the damage question.
For the balance of the term, the tenant has lost the benefit of his
bargain, assuming he had an advantageous lease. He is therefore en-
titled to recover at that time for the value of the lease for the
unexpired term, that is, the then difference between the fair rental
value of the premises if they had been as warranted and the promised
rent, computed for that period." '462 Thus, for the period after vaca-
tion of the premises, the Iowa court uses the expectancy damage
formula applicable when the tenant terminates the lease before he
becomes entitled to possession. In King v. Moorehead,463 however,
the Missouri appellate court approved the expectancy damage
formula for the period after the tenant vacates the premises, but re-
verted to the first formula mentioned above-the "difference between
the agreed rent [paid by the tenant] and the fair rental value of the
premises as they were during their occupancy by the tenant in the
unsafe, unsanitary or unfit condition"-to determine damages for the
period of occupancy by the tenant. The King formula would allow
the tenant the benefit of his bargain for the period after vacation of
the premises, if the lease is advantageous to the tenant-ie., if the
fair value of the premises when in compliance with the warranty of
habitability is greater than the agreed rent-but would not allow the
benefit of the bargain to the tenant for the period he occupied after
breach and prior to vacation.
Either the "difference between the agreed rent and the fair rental
value of the premises as they were during occupancy" formula or the
"difference between the fair rental value of the premises if they had
been as warranted and the fair rental value of the premises as they
were during occupancy" formula is workable if the dwelling unit is in
compliance with the implied warranty at the inception of the tenancy
460. 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
461. Id. at 797.
462. Id.
463. 495 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo. App. 1973).
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and later becomes uninhabitable. In such a case the agreed rent and
the "fair rental value as warranted" are prima facie the same. But
suppose that patent conditions rendering the premises uninhabitable
exist at the inception of the tenancy, in which case the fair rental
value of the premises "as they were during occupancy in the unsafe
or unsanitary condition" may well be exactly equal to the contract
rent. As Abbott has pointed out, "[t]his situation is common in the
low income housing market, particularly with respect to the worst
units and the neediest tenants. 464 Under the first damage formula,
the tenant will be unable to prove any damages, at least where the
premises have not deteriorated further since the inception of the ten-
ancy. Under the second damage formula, however, the tenant would
be entitled to recover the excess of the fair rental value of the unit "as
warranted" over the contract rent and the landlord would, in effect,
have to pay the tenant for living in the unit!
465
In Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway,466 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court adopted the second damage formula, "the
difference between the value of each apartment as warranted and the
rental value of each apartment in its defective condition. 467 Some of
the difficulties inherent in this damage formula are illustrated by the
efforts of the Massachusetts intermediate court of appeals to apply
the formula in a case where substantial patent defects existed at the
beginning of the tenancy. On the first appeal in McKenna v. Be-
gi', 468 the court illogically-but quite sensibly-rejected the possibil-
ity that the landlord might be required to pay the tenant for living in
a patently defective dwelling although the court said that "it is possi-
ble, in a given instance, for substantial defects to reduce the fair
rental value of the premises to zero,"' 469 and held that "[i]n any event
the tenant shall not be awarded damages in excess of the rent actually
paid by him during the period of his occupancy of the premises. 470
The court further held, however, that the trial court erred in taking
the rent agreed upon "as evidence of the value of the premises in a
464. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integra-
tion, 56 B.U.L. REv. 1, 21 (1976).
465. Id. at 22.
466. 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
467. Id. at 203, 293 N.E.2d at 845.
468. 325 N.E.2d 587 (Mass. App. 1975).
469. Id. at 591.
470. Id. at 592.
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defective condition" because "[u]nder the formula applied by the
judge, a rental of defective premises would be tantamount to a waiver
of the statutory provisions for enforcement of the State Sanitary
Code and the landlord's implied obligation to let and maintain the
premises in a habitable condition."47 But this is obviously incorrect.
Taking the rent agreed upon as evidence of the value of the premises
in a defective condition clearly does not preclude a finding that the
value of the premises as habitable would be higher, so that the tenant
would be entitled to the difference as damages for breach of the im-
plied warranty of habitability.
The first McKenna opinion4 7 placed the trial judge in a difficult
position since it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the rental
value of a patently defective dwelling if the agreed rent cannot be
considered as evidence of such rental value. On remand the trial
judge "computed the damages by finding the fair rental value of the
defective premises to be the agreed upon rent less the amortized cost
of repairing the major code violations." '473 On the second McKenna
appeal,474 this method of computing damages was held to be errone-
ous and the trial judge was ordered instead to "assess the major code
violations and determine the percentage by which the use and enjoy-
ment of the apartment has been diminished by the existence of those
violations. . . . [a]nd then assess as damages that percentage of
McKenna's weekly rent for each of the weeks during which the defect
remained unrepaired."475 In adopting this solution to the trouble-
some damage problem, the McKenna court relied heavily on Acad-
y 476 inuemy Spires Inc. v. Brown, which in turn relied primarily on the
Model Code.477
Despite its essentially arbitrary results in practice, the Model
Code's "percentage diminution" approach to determination of dam-
ages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability has been
adopted in several cases478 in addition to Academy Spires and MeK-
471. Id. at 590.
472. 325 N.E.2d 587 (Mass. App. 1975).
473, McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 522 (Mass. App. 1977) (second appeal).
474. Id.
475. Id. at 553.
476. 111 N.J. Super. 477, 264 A.2d 556 (Essex County Ct. 1970).
477. MODEL CODE § 2-207 (Tent. Draft 1969).
478. Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Civ. Ct.
N,Y. 1973) (50%, reduction); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325,
323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971) (20% reduction); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio
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enna. A careful reading of this group of cases clearly bears out Ab-
bott's conclusion that with the percentage diminution approach, "the
tenant's recovery really amounts to a civil fine levied on the landlord
which recaptures some or all of the contract rent depending upon the
court's judgment as to the condition of the [dwelling] unit." '4 79
The Property Restatement, in the section dealing with damages,
rather curiously fails to state any general measure of damages to be
applied when the tenant does not terminate.48° A Reporter's Note
states that such a measure of damages-generally said to be "the dif-
ference between the value of the lease without the default and with
the default"--is no longer necessary because the Restatement "has
adopted many other remedies, such as rent abatement and rent appli-
cation, to compensate the tenant.",481 A comment to section 11.1,
dealing with rent abatement, indicates, however:
If the tenant has paid the rent stipulated in the lease during a
period of time when he was entitled to an abatement of the rent,
e is entitled to sue for the excess he has paid to the landlord and
the judicial proceeding will establish the proper amount of the
abated rent for the period of the landlord's default.482
This appears to be a rather tortured way of saying that when the
tenant remains in possession he may sue for damages for breach of
the implied warranty of habitability as well as using the breach of
warranty as a defense in an eviction action. The Restatement adopts
Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972) (two thirds reduction). See also
text accompanying note 456 supra.
479. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integra-
tion, 56 B.U.L. REV. 1, 24 (1976).
It can also be argued that the percentage diminution approach really rests on a tort
rationale-ie., the tenant should be compensated for discomfort and annoyance. SeeMoskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: .4 New Doctrine Raising New Is-
sues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1470-73 (1974). But the difficulty of monetizing dis-
comfort and annoyance will tend to lead the fact finder to set a damage recovery
designed to induce the landlord to provide a habitable dwelling in the future. Thus
damages for discomfort and annoyance will also tend to amount, in substance, to a
civil fine intended to influence the conduct of landlords. Cf Sax & Hiestand,
Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1967), suggesting that deterrence and
punishment should be an objective and that the damages should depend (in part) on
the landlord's wealth. Id. at 887-89 & 913. See also Blum & Dunham, Slumlordsm
as a Tort-A Dissenting View, 66 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1968); Sax, Slumlordism as a
Tort-A Brief Response, 66 MICH. L.REv. 465 (1968).
480. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2 (1977).
481. Id., Reporter's Note 3 at 352.
482. Id. § 11.1, Comment b at 352.
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the second damage formula discussed above, in modified form, as the
measure of rent abatement when the tenant remains in possession.483
In addition to the damages for breach of the implied or statutory
warranty of habitability discussed above, in cases where the tenant
elects to remain in possession it would seem clear that consequential
damages should be recoverable unless a statute expressly bars this.
484
4. Equitable Relief Against Breach
In Lemle the court said that breach of the landlord's implied war-
ranty of habitability makes available to the tenant "the basis contract
remedies of damages, reformation and rescission. '' 485 This language
has been repeated in most of the subsequent cases in which an im-
plied warranty of habitability was recognized by the court.486 Rescis-
sion, accompanied by vacation of the leased premises, really amounts
to termination or constructive eviction. It is not immediately appar-
ent how the remedy of reformation can aid the tenant in the event of
a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, and the statement
from Lemle quoted above should probably be dismissed as judicial
hyperbole. More significant, perhaps, is the statement in Javins that,
"[I]n extending all contract remedies for breach to the parties to a
lease, we include an action for specific performance of the landlord's
implied warranty of habitability. 487
In Steele v. Latimer,488 the tenant sought both damages and spe-
cific performance, ie., an injunction, against continued violation of
the housing code, but most of the court's opinion dealt with the ques-
tion whether an implied warranty of habitability should be recog-
483. If the tenant is entitled to an abatement of the rent, the rent is abated to the
amount of that proportion of the rent which the fair rental value after the event
giving the right to abate bears to the fair rental value before the event. Abate-
ment is allowed until the default is eliminated or the lease terminates, whichever
first occurs.
Id. § 11.1.
484. See notes 464 & 465 supra. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§§ 10.2(2), (4), (6) (1977).
485. 51 Haw. 426, 436, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969).
486. E.g., Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 761 (Ind. App. 1976);
Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 336, 521 P.2d 304, 310 (1974); King v. Moorehead,
495 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo. App. 1973); Kline v. Bums, 11 N.H. 87, 93, 276 A.2d 248,
252 (1971).
487. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.61 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
488. 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974).
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nized. Nothing explicit was said as to the claim for specific
performance, although the court stated that "traditional remedies for
breach of contract are available to the tenant, including the recovery
of damages." '489 No other appellate case has been found where spe-
cific performance was sought by a tenant because of the breach of an
implied or statutory warranty of habitability, although there is some
authority for permitting a tenant to have specific performance of an
express covenant by the landlord to keep the premises in repair.49
Certainly specific performance (mandatory injuction) could be an
extremely valuable remedy in cases where the tenant wishes neither
to terminate the lease because of the landlord's breach of the implied
or statutory warranty of habitability nor to wait for the landlord to
sue him for rent and/or for possession. In view of the disadvantages
involved in the use of any of the tenant's legal remedies-e.g., the
difficulty of finding alternative housing if he vacates the leased prem-
ises, and the likelihood of involvement in continuing litigation with-
out necessarily getting the landlord to put the premises in habitable
condition if the tenant remains in possession and relies on his dam-
age or rent abatement remedies-it is strongly arguable that all the
tenant's legal remedies are inadequate and that he is entitled to the
equitable remedy of specific performance. A court order requiring
the landlord to perform his warranty obligation or face punishment
for contempt might well be more effective than the traditional tech-
niques used by local administrative agencies to enforce local housing
codes. But specific performance is obviously no panacea, and in
many cases might prove ineffective.49'
489. Id. at 336, 521 P.2d at 310.
490. Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044 (1895). See Darnan v. Day, 240
Iowa 665, 37 N.W.2d 277 (1949) (relief refused because inequitable under the circum-
stances). Contra Beck v. Allison, 56 N.Y. 366 (1874) (equity will not enforce specific
performance of an agreement contained in a lease, upon the part of the lessor, to
repair damages caused by fire).
491. Some of the factors that make traditional code enforcement methods ineffec-
tive in practice may also make specific performance ineffective as a private rem-
edy-e.g., the landlord's abandonment of the building under the circumstances that
make it impossible to locate him. Moreover, "judicial reluctance to supervise the
abatement of multiple violations might, as a practical matter, limit the remedy to
cases involving a single, severe condition." Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes
and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U.L. REv. 1, 64 (1976). Abbott concludes.
despite the potential difficulties involved in reliance on mandatory injuctions, that it
should be the ony private tenant remedy in cases where the leased premises are not
subject to latent defects at the inception of the tenancy and where the landlord fails to
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5. Self-help: Repair-and-Deduct
Although the "repair-and-deduct" remedy has more commonly
been made available to tenants by statute,492 in Pines v. Perssion
493
the tenants were held entitled to the return of their security deposit
plus the cost of materials and labor expended in making repairs on
the premises, less the reasonable rental during their actual occupancy
of the premises. Subsequently the repair-and-deduct remedy was
also allowed in New Jersey and in New York.494
In both Marini v. Ireland49 and Jackson v Rivers496 the repairs
had in fact been completed and the respective courts did not discuss
the question whether the elimination of the defective condition is a
prerequisite for deduction of the repair costs. It would seem that this
should generally be a prerequisite for deduction, and that the land-
lord should be given appropriate evidence of the completion of the
repairs and their cost, as required by many of the repair-and-deduct
statutes.497 In Marini the court did not consider the question whether
the tenant must present such evidence, but in fact the tenant had
make repairs necessary to keep the premises in compliance with minimum housing
code standards (as redefined by the author). Id. at 135-36.
492. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (Deering 1972); URLTA § 4.103 (1972);
MODEL CODE § 2-206 (1969).
493. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
494. See notes 495 & 496 infra. 4ccord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 11.2 (1977).
495. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
If, therefore, a landlord fails to make repairs and replacements of vital facilities
necessary to maintain the premises in a livable condition for a period of time
adequate to accomplish such repair and replacements, the tenant may cause the
same to be done and deduct the cost thereof from future rents. The tenant's
recourse to such self-help must be preceded by timely and adequate notice to the
landlord of the faulty condition in order to accord him the opportunity to make
the necessary replacement or repair. If the tenant is unable to give such notice
after a reasonable attempt, he may nonetheless proceed to repair or replace.
Id. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
Although the Mar/ni court said that breach of the implied warranty of habitability
gives the tenant "only the alternative remedies of making the repairs or removing
from the premises," 56 N.J. at 147, 265 A.2d at 535, the New Jersey Supreme Court
later rejected this restrictive reading of Marini and held that other contract remedies
are available to the tenant. Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 468-69, 308 A.2d 17, 21-
22 (1973).
496. 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971).
497. "Since the tenant must present evidence that the sum deducted from the rent
has been applied to the elimination of the landlord's default, generally he may not
begin making deductions until the default has been eliminated and may not deduct
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presented the landlord with a receipt for the repair work done.4 98
And in Jackson the court permitted the tenant to deduct for repair of
a toilet but also stated: "I find that the tenant failed to sustain her
burden of proof that she had contributed a certain sum toward the
purchase of a new front door and had been required to expend an-
other sum for repairing a window not broken by her. 499
It is clear that the defective condition giving rise to a tenant's right
to repair-and-deduct must be one that the tenant can eliminate at a
cost not exceeding the amount of rent that will be available to apply
against that cost.5°° But in the absence of a statutory limit50 1 the
courts should not arbitrarily limit the amount deductible by the ten-
ant to one month's rent, or to any particular dollar amount. It is
arguable that the tenant should not be allowed to deduct from rents
already in arrears when he eliminates the defective condition, but,
after giving adequate assurance that the work will be completed, it
seems clear that the tenant should at least be allowed to make appro-
priate deductions from the rent in arrears during the progress of the
work in special situations-e.g., where the work involves emergency
repairs and the tenant has no readily available funds other than the
rent money.5 °z
Where the landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity can be eliminated by the tenant through an exercise of his right to
repair-and-deduct without unreasonable inconvenience and at com-
paratively little expense compared with the damages that would ac-
crue if the breach went uncured, the tenant should be required to
exercise his right to repair-and-deduct or have his damages limited to
the repair cost. In such-cases, the normal obligation of the injured
party to mitigate the damages resulting from the other party's breach
of duty should be applied. Except for situations where the obligation
to mitigate damages arises, however, a tenant may, when there is a
from rents which are already in arrears when he eliminates the default." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.2, Comment b at 368 (1977).
498. 56 N.J. at 134-35, 265 A.2d at 538.
499. 65 Misc. 2d at 471, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
500. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.2, Comment c at 368
(1977).
501. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (Deering 1972) (one month's rent); URLTA
§ 4.103 (1972) ($100 or one-half the periodic rent); MODEL CODE § 2-206 (1969)
(under varying circumstances, $50 or one month's rent).
502. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.2, Comment b at 368
(1977).
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breach of the implied warranty of habitability, elect among the vari-
ous remedies available to him when he decides not to terminate the
lease-recovery of damages, exercise of his right to repair-and-de-
duct, or rent withholding and rent abatement.
6. Rent Withholding and Rent Abatement
Except when there was a breach of the landlord's express or im-
plied covenant of quiet enjoyment, the traditional common law doc-
trine that lease covenants are independent deprived the tenant of any
remedy for the landlord's breach of covenant except an action or
counterclaim for damages.5 3 Although the doctrine of constructive
eviction authorized the tenant to vacate the premises and treat the
landlord's failure to perform an obligation to keep the leased prem-
ises habitable as a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the
tenant had no right to remain in possession and withhold rent be-
cause of the landlord's breach.5° Because the landlord could always
summarily evict the tenant for nonpayment of rent despite his own
breach, even where the landlord failed to perform an express cove-
nant to put and keep the premises in habitable condition the tenant
was often faced with a dilemma: he must either "continue to pay rent
and endure the conditions of untenantability or abandon the prem-
ises and hope to find another dwelling which, in these times of severe
housing shortage, is likely to be as uninhabitable as the last." 50 5 In
recent years, however, many courts have not only recognized the new
implied warranty of habitability but have also held that the tenant
may plead the breach of the implied warranty as a defense in a sum-
503. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172
(1974) ("a lessee's covenant to pay rent was considered at common law as independ-
ent of the lessor's covenants"); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184,
188, 293 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1973) (under the doctrine of "independent covenants be-
tween the landlord and the tenant ... even where the landlord is bound by custom or
express covenant to repair, and by his failure to do so the premises become uninhabit-
able,. . . the tenant has no right ... to refuse to pay the rent according to his cove-
nant, but his ownly remedy is by action for damages").
504. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973);
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo. App. 1973) ("Abandonment was re-
quired to maintain the fiction of an eviction and thus the breach of the dependent
covenant of quiet enjoyment. The effect of the abandonment requirement was to pre-
vent a tenant from remaining in possession without paying rent"); Two Rector Street
Corp. v. Bein, 226 App. Div. 73, 76, 234 N.Y.S. 409, 412 (1929) ("tenant cannot claim
uninhabitability and at the same time continue to inhabit").
505. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76-77 (Mo. App. 1973).
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mary eviction action for nonpayment of rent.5" 6 This, in effect, gives
the tenant the right to withhold rent, remain in possession of the
leased premises, and obtain a judicially determined abatement of the
agreed rent because of the landlord's breach. °7
New case law authorizing rent withholding seems to be based pri-
marily on two propositions: the landlord's warranty of habitability,
implied or statutory, and the tenant's covenant to pay rent are mutu-
ally dependent rather than independent,5" 8 and breach of the land-
506. Cooks v. Fowler, 455 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bell v. Tsintolles Realty
Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.
3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208
(1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973) (but
only if statutory withholding procedure is followed); Rowe v. Walker, 38 Mich. App.
458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972) (statutory warranty); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213
N.W.2d 339 (1973) (statutory warranty); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.
App. 1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973) (dictum); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Park Hill Terrace Assocs. v. Glennon, 146
N.J. Super. 271, 369 A.2d 938 (App. Div. 1977); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, I11
N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex County Ct. 1970).
507. In Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), the defense was based
on use of the withheld rent to repair the defective conditions; but later cases, e.g.,
Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973), make clear that the withheld
rent need not be used for repairs in New Jersey.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 11.1, 11.3 (1977) provide, respectively,
for the remedies of "rent abatement" and "rent withholding." Id. § 11. 1, Comment b
at 358, states:
Frequently the rent abatement will be accomplished in a judicial proceeding
brought by the landlord to evict the tenant for the failure to pay the rent. In this
proceeding, if the tenant is entitled to abate the rent, he is entitled to defend
against eviction by establishing his right to abate the rent and paying to the land-
lord the amount of the abated rent as judicially determined in the proceeding.
As indicated in the text, this really gives the tenant a right to withhold all the rent
until a judicial determination has been made. The term "rent withholding" is given a
different meaning in § 11.3, however:
If the tenant is entitled to withhold the rent, the tenant, after proper notice to the
landlord, may place in escrow the rent thereafter becoming due until the default
is eliminated or the least terminates, whichever first occurs. Whenever there has
been a proper abatement of the rent, only the abated rent is placed in escrow.
Id. § 11.3. A comment to § 11.3 explains:
If the tenant is entitled [to] an abatement of the rent but does not elect to do so
initially, the entire rent may be withheld. Later if there is an abatement in the
rent, the rent in escrow is treated as a prior overpayment of rent and the excess
payments in escrow may be recovered by the tenant from the escrow fund.
Id. § 11.3, Comment c at 376.
508. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cer. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168
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lord's warranty is germane to the purpose of the summary eviction
action." 9 The first case to recognize the tenant's right to withhold
rent because of the landlord's breach of the warranty of habitability
was Ja ,ins v. First National Realy Corp. ,5 where the court reasoned
that, -[i]n order to determine whether any rent is owed to the land-
lord, the tenants must be given an opportunity to prove the housing
code violations alleged as breach of the landlord's warranty.""' The
Javins court then concluded as follows:
At trial, the finder of fact must make two findings: (1) whether
the alleged violations existed during the period for which past
due rent is claimed, and (2) what portion, if any or all, of the
tenant's obligation to pay rent was suspended by the landlord's
breach. If no part of the tenant's rental obligation is found to
have been suspended, then a judgment for possession may issue
forthwith. On the other hand, if the jury determines that the
entire rental obligation has been extinguished by the landlord's
total breach, then the action for possession on the ground of
nonpayment must fail.
The jury may find that part of the tenant's rental obligation
has been suspended but that part of the unpaid back rent is in-
deed owed to the landlord. In these circumstances, no judgment
for possession should issue if the tenant agrees to pay the partial
rent found to be due. If the tenant refuses to pay the partial
amount, a judgment for possession may then be entered. 5l 2
The court's reference to "suspension" or "extinguishment" of the
tenant's obligation to pay rent is rather puzzling. When the court
speaks of suspension of "part of the tenant's rental obligation" or
extinguishment of "the entire rental obligation," the court may sim-
ply have meant that the damages for breach of the implied warranty
of habitability are to be set off against the rent due to the landlord,
(1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973);
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J.
460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Pugh v.
Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
509. Eg., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974); Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
However, most of the cases allowing the defense simply assume the point.
510. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
511. LId. at 1082.
512. Id. at 1082-83. The quoted language was repeated essentially verbatim in
Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234, 1241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
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and that the jury may find either that there is still a difference in
favor of the landlord or that the damages are equal to or in excess of
the rent claim. If this is all the court means, however, it is hard to see
the relevance of the court's prefatory statement that, "Under contract
principles,. . . the tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent upon
the landlord's performance of his obligations, including his warranty
to maintain the premises in habitable condition."5 3 Certainly the
adoption of the theory of mutual dependency of lease covenants is
not required in order to justify a set-off of damages for breach of
warranty against the lease rent claimed; only a decision that such a
set-off is "germane" to the purpose of a summary eviction action is
required in order to permit the set-off as a defense in such an action.
The Javins language as to dependency of lease covenants is drawn
from Pines v. Perssion, and it is possible that the Japins court
meant-as the Pines court stated5 '4 -that the breach of the implied
warranty completely relieved the tenant of his obligation to pay the
lease rent and left him with only a quasi-contractual obligation to
pay the reasonable rental value of his use and occupation. But that is
certainly not what the Javins court said. Moreover, the Pines case
was one where the breach of the implied warranty occurred at the
inception of the tenancy, which enabled the tenants to avoid the lease
ab initio.5t 5 But in Javins the breach was assumed to have occurred
513. 428 F.2d at 1082.
514. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 597, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961).
515. It is not clear in Pines whether the court thought the tenants were relieved
from any obligation to pay the lease rent only because the tenants elected to termi-
nate, or whether the court thought that in any case a breach of the implied warranty
of habitability would "suspend" the tenants' obligation to pay rent and leave them
with only a quasi-contractual obligation to pay the reasonable value of their use and
occupation for whatever period they might elect to remain in possession. The latter
view might be sustained on the theory that the landlord's breach of the implied war-
ranty resulted in "partial nonperformance" of his obligations under the lease which
would privilege the tenant, as the injured party, to "refuse to render any performance
if he can and does return to the wrongdoer the part performance received or its value
in money." See 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 660, at 164 (1960). Payment of the rea-
sonable value of the tenants' use and occupation would constitute a "return to the
wrongdoer" (the landlord) of the "value in money" of the "part performance re-
ceived." But the Javins language allowing the trier of fact to find that only part of the
tenant's rental obligation has been "suspended" is not consistent with the theory now
under consideration, since the landlord's "partial nonperformance" would either sus-
pend the entire contractual obligation to pay rent or leave it in full force under that
theory.
The Javins court's language as to suspension of "part of the tenant's rental obliga-
tion" or extinguishment of "the entire rental obligation may simply indicate the
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after the tenancy began, which made it impossible for the tenants to
avoid the lease ab initio.
The most likely explanation of the language in Javins as to "sus-
pension" or "extinguishment" of the tenant's rental obligation is that
the Javins court viewed the breach of the implied warranty of habita-
bility as operating directly to reduce or-in unusual circum-
stances-extinguish entirely the tenant's obligation to pay rent during
any period when the leased premises were uninhabitable. The court
may have thought this approach more easily justified recognition of a
breach of implied warranty as a defense in the summary eviction ac-
tion, since the trial court would be able to determine simply that less
than the agreed rent was due rather than finding that there was a
valid counterclaim for damages that might be deducted from the
agreed rent. It is perhaps easier to argue that proof of a breach of
duty by the landlord that directly reduces the rent due is germane to
the purpose of a summary eviction action than it is to argue that
proof of a breach of duty giving rise to an independent cause of ac-
tion for damages is germane. At least where the tenant does not try
to prove consequential damages the result should be same whether
the end result-a partial or complete abatement of the rent-is based
in theory on a set-off of contract damages against the contract rent or
on a direct reduction or extinguishment of the rental obligation of the
tenant. If the latter theory is adopted, however, it would be difficult
to take consequential damages into account.
The Javins opinion is unfortunately devoid of any standards for
determination of "what portion, if any or all, of the tenant's obliga-
tion to pay rent was suspended by the landlord's breach." The court
thus left open the question whether trial courts should apply the "dif-
court's recognition of the fact that payment of the full lease rent after breach of the
implied warranty of habitability would build up a credit in favor of the tenant which
could be set off against the unpaid rent accruing after the tenant began to withhold
rent. This credit, added to the damages for the period of rent withholding might, in
some cases, equal or exceed the net rent due to the landlord.
The Javins court's reference to "the landlord's total breach" is also puzzling. If the
court was referring to a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, it is clear that
every breach is a total breach since the leased premises must be found either habitable
or uninhabitable. As the Jayins court noted, "one or two minor violations [of the
housing code] standing alone which do not affect habitability are de minimis and
would not entitle the tenant to a reduction in rent." The court may have used the
term total breach to describe cases where the reasonable value of use and occupation
is zero (a case hard to imagine) or where the damages are equal to or in excess of the
accrued unpaid rent.
1979]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
ference between the agreed rent and the fair rental value of the prem-
ises as they were during occupancy" formula, the "difference between
the fair rental value of the premises if they had been as warranted
and the fair rental value of the premises as they were during occu-
pancy" formula, or the "percentage diminution" formula in making
the required determination.
516
Under the first formula, the trial court could presumably find that
"the entire rental obligation has been extinguished by the landlord's
total breach" only where the premises were uninhabitable for a pe-
riod longer than that during which the rent was unpaid, so that the
rent paid by the tenant was equal to or in excess of the fair rental
value of the premises-or, if the Javins formula allows consequential
damages to be taken into account, where the tenant received no net
benefit from possession of the leased premises because the conse-
quential damages were in excess of the fair rental value of the leased
premises. It does not appear that the first formula would authorize a
finding that "the entire rental obligation has been extinguished"
where the tenant received some net benefit from possession of the
uninhabitable premises.
Under the second formula, which is designed to give the tenant the
benefit of his bargain, it would obviously be much easier for the trial
court to find that "the entire rental obligation has been extinguished
by the landlord's total breach." Under the third (percentage diminu-
tion) formula, as under the first, it would seem that the trial court
could only find that "the entire rental obligation has been extin-
guished by the landlord's total breach" where the premises were un-
inhabitable for a period longer than that during which the rent was
uppaid or where the tenant received no net benefit from possession of
the premises because the consequential damages were in excess of the
fair rental value of the premises.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit adopted a kind of percentage diminution approach in decid-
ing the amount to be deposited in court by the tenant under a protec-
tive order pending an appeal from the trial court's judgment
awarding possession to the landlord for nonpayment of rent.517
516. For a discussion of these formulas in connection with the fixing of damages
for breach of the implied or statutory warranty of habitability, see text accompanying
notes 471-79 supra. As previously indicated, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 11.1 (1974) adopts a modified version of the second of these formulas. See note 483
and accompanying text supra.
517. Cooks v. Fowler, 455 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Since no evidence as to the
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However, the court made it clear that it was not making a final deci-
sion as to abatement of rent, and that its approach to determination
of the amount to be paid into court under a protective order would
not necessarily be applied in a final determination of the amount by
which rent should be abated because of a breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability.5 8 The percentage diminution approach was
also adopted by trial courts in a number of reported cases for the
purpose of determining the amount of the rent abatement when
breach of implied warranty was asserted in a summary eviction ac-
tion. 19
Among the post-Javins cases recognizing an implied warranty of
habitability and allowing the tenant to set up a breach of the war-
rental value of the premises "as is," with substantial violations of the housing code,
was introduced at the trial, the court adopted the following "interim formulation af-
fording the landlord reasonable protection pending the tenant's appeal":
We start by accepting the rent contracted for-72.50 per month-as evidence of
the occupancy value of the apartment if it fully complied with applicable housing
regulations. As a rough division, . . we take one-third of that value as repre-
senting shelter in the narrowest sense, and the remaining two-thirds as reflecting
the qualitative improvements and facilities required by the regulations. By that
yardstick, the apartment in "as-is" condition seems worth the first third since it
does in fact shelter appellant and her children. It is, however, in determining the
value of the qualitative two-thirds that the conditions disclosed by appellant's
presentation exact their toll. The substantial imbalance between affirmative and
negative qualitative factors persuades us to include in the amount of the monthly
security deposits only one-half of the qualitative two-thirds .... Our protective
order will require deposits consistingof $24.17 for shelter and $24.17 for qualita-
tive factors above bare shelter, or $48.34 in the aggregate ....
Id. at 1282-83.
The court's initial assumption that the lease rent was "evidence of the occupancy
value of the apartment if it fully complied with applicable housing regulations" is
questionable. It is more likely that it was evidence of the value of the apartment "as
is," since the housing code violations were apparently patent and were in existence at
the inception of the tenancy.
See also Cooks v. Fowler, 459 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (second appeal).
518. 455 F.2d at 1282.
519. See cases cited note 456 supra. In Ann Arbor, Michigan, the trial courts
have generally used the percentage diminution approach when tenants have defended
summary eviction actions by setting up the landlord's breach of the statutory war-
ranty of habitability. Since none of the cases was appealed, the views of the Michigan
appellate courts on the propriety of this approach are still unknown. The applicable
summary eviction statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5741 (Supp. 1977), simply pro-
vides that in an action to evict for nonpayment of rent, "the jury or judge shall deduct
any portion of the rent which the jury or judge finds to be excused by the plaintiff's
breach of the lease or by his breach of one or more statutory covenants." (The cove-
tiant of habitability is statutory in Michigan.)
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ranty as a defense in a summary action to evict for nonpayment of
rent, Jack Spring, Inc. v.. Little52 is especially interesting. The land-
lord's breach of warranty was held to be germane to the distinctive
purpose of the summary action because a 1937 amendment of the
Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act authorized a judgment for
the landlord for unpaid rent in such an action.521 And the court
clearly regarded the landlord's breach of the implied warranty as giv-
ing the tenant a claim for damages that could be set off against the
landlord's rent claim in the summary action, not as directly reducing
the rent due under the lease.522
It seems generally to have been assumed that Jack Spring adopts
the Javins rule523 that if the tenant is found to owe some, but not all,
of the rent claimed by the landlord, the court should give the tenant a
short grace period to pay the amount found due and that eviction
should be ordered only if the tenant fails to pay within the time al-
lowed. But a careful reading of the Jack Spring opinion does not
bear out this assumption. The Illinois court, in substance, says only
that the tenant should be "permitted to prove that damages suffered
as a result of the plaintiff's breach of warranty equalled or exceeded
520. 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
521. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 57, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1972). The court's rationale was as
follows:
...To hold that a landlord, at his option, may expand the issues in a proceeding
brought under the statute and the tenant may not is violative of common sense
and accepted rules of statutory interpretation . . . .In these cases there is no
question that . . . unless, as claimed by plaintiffs, rent is due and remains un-
paid, possession is not "unlawfully withheld." It is apparent, therefore, that even
though the plaintiffs do not seek to recover rent in these actions, the question of
whether rent is due and owing is not only germane, but in these cases where the
right to possession is asserted solely by reason of nonpayment, is the crucial and
decisive issue for determination. . . .It would be paradoxical, indeed, to hold
that if these were actions to recover sums owed for rent the defendants would be
permitted to prove that damages suffered as the result of the plaintiffs' breach of
warranty equalled or exceeded the rent claimed to be due, and therefore, no rent
was owed, and at the same time hold that because the plaintiffs seek possession of
the premises, to which admittedly they are not entitled unless rent is due and
unpaid after demand, the defendants are precluded from proving that because of
the breach of warranty no rent is in fact owed. The argument that the landlord's
claim is for rent and the tenant's for damages should not be permitted to obfus-
cate the sole and decisive issue, which simply stated is whether the tenants owe
the landlords rent which is due and remains unpaid.
50 IU. 2d at 358-59, 280 N.E.2d at 213.
522. 50 Ill. 2d at 358-59, 280 N.E.2d at 213.
523. 428 F.2d at 1083.
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the rent claimed to be due, and therefore, no rent was owed"; and
that "the sole and decisive issue . . . is whether the tenants owe the
landlords rent which is due and remains unpaid." '524 This language
has been literally construed by the trial courts in Chicago to mean
that, even though the breach of warranty is proved by the tenant, he
cannot escape eviction for nonpayment of rent unless he satisfies the
trier of fact that the damages equal or exceed the rent claimed to be
due so that no rent "is due and remains unpaid." '525 Such a rule
seems inconsistent with settled doctrines as to equitable relief against
forfeiture and, as a practical matter, makes rent withholding a risky
venture for the tenant.
The New Jersey court has clearly adopted the view that the land-
lord's breach of the implied warranty of habitability gives the tenant
a damage claim that may be asserted by way of defense and set-off in
a summary eviction action and that since equitable as well as legal
defenses are available in such actions the tenant may avoid eviction
by showing "absolution from payment in whole or in part. . . in a
dispossess action." '526 This presumably means that, if the tenant
shows the landlord is entitled to less than he claims because of the
set-off for breach of warranty damages, the tenant may retain his
right to possession by paying the amount found to be "due, unpaid
and owing" within whatever time the court specifies. This is essen-
tially the Javins rule.
In Foisy v. Wyman,5 27 the Washington court also substantially
adopted the Javins approach in holding that the landlord's breach of
the implied warranty of habitability could be asserted as a defense in
a summary eviction action and that the action must fail if it was de-
termined "that the entire rental obligation is extinguished by the
landlord's total breach" 528-a phrase taken verbatim from Javins.529
However, in dealing with the possibility that the trial court might
determine "that the premises are partially habitable, and the tenant
failed to tender to the plaintiff a sufficient amount to pay rent due for
524. 50 I11. 2d at 359, 280 N.E.2d at 213.
525. This information is derived from conversations with a member of the clinical
law faculty of the University of Chicago Law School.
526. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 140, 265 A.2d 526, 531 (1970) (emphasis ad-
ded).
527. 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
528. Id. at 34, 515 P.2d at 168.
529. 428 F.2d at 1083.
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the partially habitable premises," the court said that judgment should
be entered in accordance with the summary eviction statute,5 30 which
allows the tenant to avoid eviction by paying the amount found to be
owing within five days. The result in that case would be substantially
the same as under lavins or the New Jersey decisions, but the grace
period in Washington is expressly provided by statute rather than by
judicial application of equitable principles.
Although Washington enacted a version of the URLTA531 before
the decision in Foisy, the new statute was not applicable to the lease
involved in that case. The new statute expressly provides that its gen-
eral requirement that the tenant "shall be current in the payment of
rent before exercising any of the remedies accorded him" under the
statute "shall not be construed as limiting the tenant's right in an
unlawful detainer proceeding to raise the defense that there is no rent
due and owing." '532 It will be interesting to see whether the Washing-
ton court will construe this to allow a tenant who establishes that the
premises are only partially habitable and that only part of the rent
claimed is owing to escape eviction by paying the amount within five
days, as would be the case under Foisy.
Massachusetts, like Washington, has both case law recognizing an
implied warranty of habitability in residential leases and legislation
authorizing rent withholding where the landlord fails to keep the
leased premises in habitable condition. In Boston Housing Authority
v. Hemingway,5 33 although holding that the landlord's implied war-
ranty and the tenant's obligation to pay rent should be deemed to
"constitute interdependent and mutual considerations,, 534 the court
nevertheless held that because he failed to follow the statutory rent
withholding procedure, the tenant could not use the landlord's
breach of the implied warranty as a defense against summary evic-
tion.535 The statutory procedure required a written notice to the
landlord of the tenant's intention to withhold rent.
5 36
530. 83 Wash. 2d at 34, 515 P.2d at 168, citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 59.12.170 (West 1961).
531. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.010-59.18.900 (West Supp. 1977).
532. Id. § 59.18.080 (emphasis added).
533. 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
534. Id. at 198, 293 N.E.2d at 842.
535. Id. at 203, 293 N.E.2d at 845.
536. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 239, § 8A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1973) (prior to amend-
ment). The written notice requirement was eliminated by a 1975 amendment. See
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 239, § 8A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1978).
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It is possible that, in some cases, the tenant's claim for damages for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability may exceed the land-
lord's claim for unpaid rent. If the local summary eviction statute
allows the landlord to obtain a judgment for the unpaid rent in the
summary eviction action, it is possible that the tenant could interpose
a counterclaim for breach of the implied warranty and, if successful,
obtain a money judgment for the excess of the damages over the un-
paid rent. In any case where recovery of the excess is impossible, the
tenant may apparently use his claim for rent abatement or counter-
claim for damages to defeat the summary eviction action, and then
bring an independent suit for the balance of his damages.
Although there is clearly a trend toward admitting the landlord's
breach of an implied warranty of habitability as a defense in sum-
mary eviction actions, it is now clear that the United States Constitu-
tion does not compel state courts to do so. In Lindsay v. Normet,53 7
the United States Supreme Court rejected a tenant's contention that
an Oregon summary eviction statute violates both the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because,
as judicially construed in Oregon, it precluded consideration of de-
fenses based on the landlord's breach of a duty to maintain the prem-
ises. The Court said that "the Constitution has not federalized the
substantive law of landlord-tenant relations,. . . and we see nothing
to forbid Oregon from treating the undertakings of the tenant and
those of the landlord as independent rather than dependent cove-
nants.,
538
Under the new doctrine giving tenants a right to set up the land-
537. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
538. Id. at 68. In addition, the court said:
[. . T]he Constitution does not authorize us to require that the term of an other-
wise expired tenancy be extended while the tenant's damage claims against the
landlord are litigated ...
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe and sanitary housing. But
the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and eco-
nomic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guaran-
tee of access to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of
a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease,
without the payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant
agreement. Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing
and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative not judicial
functions. Nor should we forget that the Constitution expressly protects against
confiscation of private property or the income therefrom.
Id. at 68, 74.
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lord's breach of the implied or statutory warranty of habitability as a
defense in summary actions to evict for nonpayment of rent,539 te-
nants are in substance judicially authorized to withhold all the rent
otherwise due whenever a breach of the warranty occurs, subject to a
duty to pay whatever is found owing within such time as may be
provided by statute or by direction of the court. However, as noted
earlier, determination of the fair rental value of leased premises, ei-
ther "as warranted" or "as is," is often likely to be difficult; and if the
tenant is withholding all the rent, the landlord runs the risk that the
tenant may ultimately be unwilling or unable to pay the amount
found owing by the court. Thus the court may, in appropriate cases,
enter a protective order requiring the tenant to pay all or part of the
agreed rent into court until it is determined whether there is a breach
of the implied warranty and, if so, how large an abatement of rent
should be granted. In discussing recently enacted statutory warran-
ties of habitability, we have already noted the rationale for entry of a
protective order as stated by the Minnesota court in Fritz v.
Warthen.540 Even before Fritz the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit had recognized the need for such
orders, albeit with considerably less concern for the landlord's inter-
est and considerably more concern for the tenant's.54' Protective or-
539. See cases cited note 506 supra.
540. 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973). See the quotation from Fritz in text
accompanying note 277 supra.
541. In Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Dir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), the court said:
Appellants in the present cases offered to pay rent into the registry of the court
during the present action. We think this is an excellent protective measure. If
the tenant defends against an action for possession on the basis of breach of the
landlord's warranty of habitability, the trial court may require the tenant to make
future rent payments into the registry of the court as they become due; such a
procedure would be appropriate only while the tenant remains in possession.
The escrowed money will, however, represent rent for the period between the
time the landlord files suit and the time the case comes to trial. In the normal
course of litigation, the only factual question at trial would be the condition of
the apartment during the time the landlord alleged rent was due and not paid.
Id. at 1083 n.67. However, in Bell v. Twintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir.
1970), the same court said:
We favor . . . granting a protective order only when the tenant has either
asked for a jury trial or asserted a defense based on violations of the housing
code, and only upon motion of the landlord and after notice and opportunity for
oral argument by both parties. We feel the protective purpose of the rent pay-
ment requirement ordinarily will be well served simply by requiring only future
[VOL. 1&3
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ders have also been held necessary or proper in California54 and
Missouri.54 3
payments falling due after the date the order is issued to be paid into the court
registry.
In making a determination of need, the trial court may properly consider the
amount of rent alleged to be due, the number of months the landlord has not
received even a partial rental payment, the reasonableness of the rent for the
premises, the amount of the landlord's monthly obligations for the premises,
whether the tenant has been allowed to proceed informapaupers, and whether
the landlord faces a substantial threat of foreclosure.
Even if the landlord has adequately demonstrated his need for a protective
order, the trial judge must compare that need with the apparent merits of the
defense based on housing code violations. Relevant considerations would be
whether the housing code violations alleged are de minimis or substantial,
whether the landlord has been notified of the existence of the defects and, if so,
his response to that notice, and the date, if known, of the last repair or renovation
relating to the alleged defect.
.. . [I]n the ordinary course of events, if prepayment or rent is required, the
tenant will be called upon to pay into the court registry each month the amount
which he originally contracted to pay as rent. However, there are circumstances
likely to arise which . . . require that the trial court consider imposition of a
lesser amount. Certainly a lesser amount would be desirable when the tenant
makes a very strong showing that the condition of the dwelling is in violation of
Housing Regulations norms. . . Similarly, he may demonstrate that some por-
tion of potential payment of rent was instead expended on repairs to the prem-
ises. We are concerned also that a change in the tenant's financial condition may
render the original burden so heavy as to preclude litigation of meritorious de-
fenses. . . . we suggest that in such a case the court investigate the possibility of
providing the landlord the protection of reasonable interim rent short of the
agreed upon rent. For instance, with mortgaged property the court may impose a
payment requirement less than the agreed upon rent but equivalent in amount to
the cost of the premises to the landlord of principal, interest, taxes, and whatever
proportion of the utilities payments the landlord has assumed, or make every
effort to find some mutually tolerable amount.
Id. at 483-85. See also Cooks v. Fowler, 455 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (ordering the
tenant to pay two-thirds of the lease rent during pendency of an appeal from a judg-
ment for the landlord in a summary action for possession).
542. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974) (protective order proper); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 71, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 661, 666 (protective order proper).
543. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. App. 1973):
A tenant who retains possession, however, shall be required to deposit the rent as
it becomes due, in custodia legis pending the litigation. .. . This procedure as-
sures that those rents adjudicated for distribution to him will be available to
correct the defects in habitability, and will also encourage the landlord to mini-
mize the tenant's damages by making tenantable repairs at the earliest time.
Also, for good cause and in a manner consistent with the ultimate right between
the parties, a trial court will have discretion to make partial distribution to the
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The rent withholding remedy provided by the Restatement of
Property allows the tenant to elect initially (without a court order) to
withhold all the rent and place it "in a private escrow account at the
time when the rent would normally be due" and requires the tenant
in such case to send "a copy of the receipt from the holder in escrow
...to the landlord." 5" If the amount of abatement to which the
tenant is entitled is later determined in a judicial proceeding, "the
rent in escrow is treated as a prior overpayment of rent and the excess
payments in escrow may be recovered by the tenant from the escrow
fund." '545 There is no apparent advantage to the tenant in adopting
the rent withholding remedy, however, since he can always simply
withhold all the rent without paying any of it into escrow and thus
force the landlord to take the initiative by bringing a suit for unpaid
rent and/or to evict for nonpayment of rent.54 6
V. PROTECTION OF TENANTS AGAINST RETALIATORY LANDLORD
ACTION
It is likely that many landlords will seek to retaliate against tenants
who report housing code violations to enforcement agencies, exercise
their rights to repair-and-deduct, withhold rent, participate in "rent
strikes," or take other action to exercise new legal remedies designed
to protect the right of residential tenants to a habitable dwelling.
Such retaliatory action may take the form of terminating a periodic
tenancy by notice, refusing to renew an expired tenancy for a definite
term, increasing rent as an alternative to ending a periodic tenancy or
as a condition to renewal of a tenancy for a definite term, or decreas-
ing services provided to tenants. To forestall such conduct on the
part of landlords, several states have included in their recent tenants'
rights legislation specific prohibitions against retaliatory action by
landlords, and several state courts have developed a new "common
law" doctrine that precludes retaliatory use of the landlord's tradi-
tional right to terminate periodic tenancies by notice without cause.
landlord before final adjudication when to deny it would result in irreparable
loss to him.
544. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.3, Comment e (1977).
545. Id., Comment c at 376.
546. Id. § 11.1, Comment b at 358.
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A. Recent Legislation
1. The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
The URLTA contains a detailed section on retaliatory conduct,
which provides that, as a general rule, a landlord may not retaliate by
increasing rent or decreasing services or by bringing or threatening to
bring an action for possession after:
(1) the tenant has complained to a governmental agency
charged with responsibility for enforcement of a building or
housing code of a violation applicable to the premises materially
affecting health and safety; or
(2) the tenant has complained to the landlord of a violation
under Section 2.104 [imposing on the landlord a duty to
maintain fit premises]; or
(3) the tenant has organized or become a member of a ten-
ant's union or similar organization. 54
7
Whenever the landlord is shown to have acted with a retaliatory mo-
tive, the tenant "has a defense in any action against him for posses-
sion." Furthermore, in any action by or against the tenant, "evidence
of a complaint within [1] year prior to the alleged act of retaliation
creates a presumption that the landlord's conduct was in retaliation,
[unless] the tenant made the complaint after notice of a proposed rent
increase or diminution of services." In any case, however, a landlord
may bring an action for possession if code violations were caused
primarily by lack of reasonable care by the tenant or others on the
premises with his consent, the tenant is in default in rent or compli-
ance with the applicable housing or building code requires alteration
or demolition of the building "which would effectively deprive the
tenant of the use of the dwelling unit.''548 Like the Model Code,549
the URLTA gives protection against retaliatory action to a tenant
whose term has expired as well as to a periodic tenant whose tenancy
could under traditional common law rules be terminated by notice
without cause.
The recently enacted statutes modeled on the URLTA exhibit
some substantial variations from the URLTA provisions against re-
taliatory action by landlords. Thus, e.g., Nebraska" ° and New Mex-
547. URLTA § 5.101 (1972).
548. Id.
549. MODEL CODE § 2-407 (Tent. Draft 1969).
550. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76.1439 (1976).
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ico55" ' do not include tenant complaints to the landlord about the
latter's failure to "maintain fit premises" among the events that may
invoke the tenant's right to protection against retaliatory action,
while Washington fails to include the tenant's involvement with a
tenants' union among such events. On the other hand, Alaska" 2
adds to the list of triggering events any attempt by the tenant to avail
himself of self-help rights and remedies given by the URLTA; and
both Alaska553 and Arizona 554 "protect" a tenant's complaint to any
government agency enforcing wage, price or rent controls.
The Alaska,555 Nebraska,556 New Mexico, 557 Ohio, 558 and Vir-
ginia 559 statutes completely omit any provision for a presumption
that the landlord's actions are retaliatory when they occur within a
stated time after a triggering event. The Arizona 560 and Oregon 56 1
statutes include the URLTA's provision for such a presumption, but
they reduce the period from one year to six months. The Washington
statute reduces the "presumption period" to ninety days, and also
provides that there shall be no presumption that a rent increase is
retaliatory if the landlord specifies reasonable grounds for the in-
crease, including a "substantial increase in market value due to reme-
dial action under" the statute, and that the presumption that the
bringing of an action for possession is retaliatory may be rebutted by
proof that "it is not practicable to make necessary repairs while the
tenant remains in occupancy." 562
The Alaska statute,5 63 although it is generally modeled on the
URLTA, adopts most of the Model Act's justifications for the bring-
ing of an action for possession, and also adopts the Act's three justifi-
551. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-39 (Supp. 1975).
552. ALASKA STAT. § 4303.310 (1975).
553. Id.
554. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974).
555. ALASKA STAT. § 4303.310 (1975).
556. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76.1439 (1976).
557. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-39 (Supp. 1975).
558. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Page Supp. 1977).
559. VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1978).
560. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974).
561. ORE. REV. STAT. § 91.865 (1977).
562. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.240 to 59.18.250 (Supp. 1977).
563. ALASKA STAT. § 4303.310 (1975).
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cations for rent increases.5" 4 The Arizona statute limits the
justifications for the bringing of an action for possession-that the
housing code violation complained of by the tenant "was caused pri-
marily by lack of reasonable care by the tenant or other person...
upon the premises with his consent;" and that "the tenant is in de-
fault in rent." '65 Ohio,56" on the other hand, adds a fourth justifica-
tion to the three stated in the URLTA-that the tenant "is holding
over his term." Virginia567 adds, as its fourth justification, that the
tenant is in default on any lease provision "materially affecting the
health and safety of himself or others." The Nebraska 6 ' and New
Mexico 569 statutes expressly allow reasonable rent increases or
changes in service notwithstanding events that will trigger the ten-
ant's right to protection against retaliatory action, and the Virginia
statute expressly allows the landlord to increase the rent "to that
charged on similar market rentals" and to decrease services provided
they are decreased "equally to all tenants. 570
Although most of the statutes modeled on the URLTA include
among the forbidden retaliatory actions "increasing rent or decreas-
ing services or . . . bringing or threatening to bring an action for
possession" after a triggering event occurs, the Washington statute 71
also includes "increasing the obligations of the tenant." The Florida
statute5 72 is suigeneris in that it entirely omits the URLTA provisions
dealing with retaliatory action by landlords.
2. The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code
The Model Code, substantially adopted in Delaware5 73 and Ha-
waii,5"4 is similar to the URLTA in the protection it provides the
564. See MODEL CODE § 2-407 (rent. Draft 1969), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 573-79 infra.
565. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974).
566. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Page Supp. 1977).
567. VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1978).
568. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76.1439 (1976).
569. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-39 (Supp. 1975).
570. VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1978).
571. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.240-59.18.250 (Supp. 1977).
572. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.40-83.63 (West Supp. 1978). But see Bowles v. Blue
Lake Dev. Corp., 504 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1974) ("retaliatory eviction is now a crimi-
nal offense under Flordia law").
573. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5101-5517 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
574. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 521-577 (1976).
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residential tenant against retaliatory action by the landlord. 5 But
the Model Code strikes a somewhat more even balance between
landlord and tenant by listing more justifications for the bringing of
an action for possession and for increasing the rent in cases where
retaliatory action by the landlord is established.5 76 Moreover, the
Model Code authorizes recovery, by any tenant from whom posses-
sion has been recovered or who has been otherwise involuntarily dis-
possessed in violation of the Model Code's protective provisions, of
"three months' rent or threefold the damages sustained by him,
whichever is the greater, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." '577 The Hawaii version of the Model Code, however,
omits the provision for recovery of three months' rent or treble dam-
ages and gives the tenant a right to recover only his actual damages
plus "the cost of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees." '5 78 The
Delaware version, on the other hand, retains the provision for three
months' rent or treble damages, but omits any reference to attorney's
fees.5 79 Since a tenant who can establish that the landlord's action
for possession is retaliatory has a complete defense thereto, the allow-
ance of three months' rent and treble damages under the Model Code
and the Delaware statute appears to be designed simply to punish the
landlord in cases where the action for possession is defeated by invo-
cation of the retaliatory eviction defense. It is not clear whether the
damage provision is further intended to allow recovery by the tenant
in cases where, although he had a valid retaliatory eviction defense,
he fails to plead it and is therefore evicted by legal process. If the
landlord "otherwise causes the tenant to quit the dwelling unit invol-
untarily"-presumably by self-help-the damage remedy granted by
the Model Code is in addition to the tenant's right to recover posses-
sion by action.
Although the Model Code provisions summarized above are pri-
marily designed to protect periodic tenants from retaliatory action by
their landlords, these provisions also apply when the tenant's rental
agreement has expired, "so long as the tenant continues to tender the
usual rent to the landlord or proceeds to tender receipts for rent law-
575. MODEL CODE § 2-407 (Tent. Draft 1969).
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. HAw. REV. STAT. § 521-74 (1976).
579. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
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fully withheld." ' The effect of this clearly precludes the landlord
from recovering possession at the expiration of a lease for a definite
term, if the tenant tenders "the usual rent" or "receipts for rent law-
fully withheld." This reference to "receipts" is rather confusing since
the Model Code contains no general authorization for rent withhold-
ing by a tenant because of the landlord's breach of his duty to pro-
vide a habitable dwelling. Apparently the reference is to rent
"withheld" under section 2-206 of the Model Code, which provides a
repair-and-deduct remedy when the landlord fails to repair, main-
tain, keep in sanitary condition, or otherwise perform his statutory or
contractual duty to keep the rented premises in a habitable condition,
provided the tenant submits to the landlord "copies of his receipts
[for the cost of repairs] covering at least the sum deducted" from the
rent.
3. Other Legislation
California, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island all have legislation to
protect residential tenants against retaliatory action by landlords.5 81
There is considerable variation, however, as to what conduct of the
tenant is required to set the stage for a charge of retaliatory landlord
action, what landlord actions are proscribed if found to be retalia-
tory, and the effect of the passage of varying periods of time between
the relevant tenant conduct and the proscribed landlord action.
All of the statutes now under consideration treat a tenant's com-
plaint to a housing code enforcement authority about the condition of
leased premises as conduct which may trigger a charge of retaliatory
landlord action. The California statute, for example, specifies the
filing of a written complaint "with an appropriate governmental
agency, of which the lessor has notice, for the purpose of obtaining
correction of a condition relating to tenantability," or "an inspection
or issuance of a citation, resulting from [such] a written com-
plaint." '582 The Massachusetts legislation adds two other forms of ten-
580. MODEL CODE § 2-407 (Tent. Draft 1969).
581. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1942.5 (Deering Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80,§ 71 (1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
186, § 18 & ch. 239, § 2A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5720 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to 2A:42-10.14 (West Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §6
1700-1701 (Purdon Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-20-10 to 34-20-11 (1970).
582. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1942.5 (Deering Supp. 1978).
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ant conduct:58 3 exercise of the tenant's right to pay the amount due
when a gas or electric company gives notice that it will cut off service
for nonpayment of charges for which the landlord is responsible, and
to deduct the amount so paid from the rent or obtain reimbursement
from the landlord and organizing or joining a tenant's union. The
Minnesota statute is broader, specifying the tenant's "good faith at-
tempt to secure or enforce rights under a lease. . or under the laws
of the state, any of its. . . subdivisions, or the United States," and a
tenant's "good faith report to a governmental authority of the...
[landlord's] violation of any health, safety, housing or building codes
or ordinances." '584 The Michigan statute585 is still broader as it speci-
fies the same tenant actions as the Minnesota statute plus "any other
lawful act arising out of the tenancy" or the tenant's failure to "per-
form. . additional obligations" imposed by the landlord because of
any such lawful acts. The New Jersey statute5 86 is substantially the
same as the Michigan statute on this point.
All the statutes under consideration bar the entry of judgment for
the landlord in any summary eviction action based on a retaliatory
termination of a periodic tenancy. Some of the statutes contain very
broad language587 which precludes (or seems to preclude) recovery of
possession by a landlord, even at the expiration of a term of years or
because of the tenant's failure to pay rent, within a stated time after
the tenant conduct which may trigger a charge of retaliatory eviction.
The Illinois statute states that it is "against the public policy of the
State for a landlord to terminate or refuse to renew a lease or tenancy
ofproperty used as a residence on the ground that the tenant has
complained to any governmental authority of a bona fide violation of
any applicable building code, health, ordinance, or similar regula-
583. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18 & ch. 239 § 2A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp.
1978). The right to pay and deduct gas and electric charges, etc., is created by MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 164, § 1240 (Supp. 1978).
584. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1978). See Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 307
Minn. 423, 240 N.W.2d 828 (1976).
585. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720 (Supp. 1978).
586. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.10 (West Supp. 1978).
587. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1942.5 (Deering Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 80, § 71 (1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 239, § 2A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978). Cf. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186,
§ 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978) (eviction allowed if based on termination of
lease for nonpayment of rent).
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tion."'5 8 The effect of such statutory provisions seemingly creates a
new form of tenancy for a definite term as a kind of civil penalty for
retaliatory action by the landlord, despite the fact that the original
tenancy has expired or nonpayment of rent has given the landlord the
right to terminate for cause. On the other hand, Minnesota expressly
preserves the landlord's right to terminate "for a violation by the ten-
ant of a lawful, material provision of a lease," '5 89 and the California
statute expressly preserves the landlord's right to "cause the lessee to
quit involuntarily, increase the rent, or decrease the services for any
lawful purpose," provided the lessor states such lawful purpose "in
the notice of termination, rent increase, or other act."59
As indicated in the last paragraph, some of the statutes now under
consideration proscribe retaliatory rent increases and any retaliatory
decreases in the services provided by the landlord. The New Jersey
statute591 goes further and proscribes any substantial alteration of the
original terms of the tenancy by the landlord. Presumably the pro-
scription of rent increases is intended to be implemented by judicial
refusal to give judgment for the increased rent and by refusal to au-
thorize eviction of the tenant for failure to pay the increased rent.
Implementation of the prohibition on decreases in service would pre-
sumably take the form of awarding damages or specific performance
to the tenant and refusal to authorize eviction of the tenant for with-
holding rent because of the diminished services. The Massachusetts
legislation expressly authorizes the award to the tenant of "damages
which shall not be less than one month's rent or more than three
month's rent, or the actual damages sustained by the tenant, which-
ever is greater, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee," when the landlord engages in proscribed retaliatory conduct.5 92
The New Jersey statute provides for the award of damages, injunctive
relief, and other equitable relief.59 3
The time that has elapsed between the triggering conduct of the
tenant and the alleged retaliatory action of the landlord is highly rel-
588. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 71(1966). See Clore v. Fredman, 59 Il. 2d 20,310
N.E.2d 18 (1974); Bradley v. Gallagher, 14 IUl. App. 3d 652, 303 N.E.2d 251 (1973).
589. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1978).
590. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1942.5 (Deering Supp. 1978).
591. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.10 (West Supp. 1978). See PMS Realty Co. v.
Guarino, 126 N.J. Super. 134, 312 A.2d 898 (Essex County Ct. 1973).
592. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18 & ch. 239, § 2A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp.
1978).
593. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-I0.10 (West Supp. 1978).
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evant under all the statutes. The California statute594 protects the
tenant if the period is sixty days or less, provided "the lessor has as
his dominant purpose retaliation against the lessee because of the ex-
ercise by the lessee of his right" to complain of housing code viola-
tions. Apparently the California tenant has the burden of proving
that retaliation was the landlord's dominant purpose. The Maine
and Massachusetts legislation creates a rebuttable presumption that
the landlord's purpose is retaliation if he brings a summary eviction
action within six months after the tenant has complained of housing
code violations,595 while the Michigan and Minnesota statutes create
a similar rebuttable presumption if the period is ninety days or
less.596 But the Michigan and Minnesota statutes 597 further provide
that, if such period is more than ninety days, there is a presumption
that the landlord's action was not retaliatory and the tenant has the
burden of proving the contrary. Under the Rhode Island statute, 98
the tenant must prove the landlord's retaliatory purpose by a prepon-
derance of the evidence in all cases, and there is no presumption of
such purposes when the termination of a tenancy occurs shortly after
the triggering conduct of the tenant. The California statute599 ex-
pressly provides that the tenant may not assert rights based on a find-
ing of retaliatory purpose more than once in any twelve month
period.
The Michigan and Rhode Island statutes give special protection to
public housing tenants.6" Both statutes prohibit the termination of
tenancies in public housing by the housing authorities "except for just
cause," and the Michigan statute further provides that a public hous-
ing occupant may not be "deemed to be holding over after the time
for which the premises were let, or contrary to the conditions or cove-
nants of any agreement or lease [so as to subject him to summary
eviction], unless the tenancy or agreement has been terminated for
594. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1942.5 (Deering Supp. 1978).
595. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186.
§ 18 & ch. 239, § 2A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978).
596. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 566.03 (West Supp. 1978).
597. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 566.03 (West Supp. 1978).
598. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-20-10 to 34-20-11 (1970).
599. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1942.5 (Deering Supp. 1978).
600. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.694(a), 600.5714 (1976 & Supp. 1978); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-20-10 (1970).
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just cause." 60'I The Rhode Island statute does not define "just cause,"
but the Michigan statute defines it to include "a failure to comply
with the obligations of the lease or the lawful rules and regulations of
the housing commission; the use of any unit for any unlawful pur-
pose; the maintenance of any unsafe, unsanitary or unhealthful con-
dition in any dwelling unit or in any of the common areas; and
ineligibility for continued occupancy by reason of over-income."602
Although the statutory language leaves something to be desired, these
provisions were apparently intended to preclude retaliatory eviction
after a public housing occupant has reported housing code violations,
sued for breach of the statutory warranty of habitability, or lawfully
withheld rent because of housing code violations or a breach of the
statutory warranty.
B. Recent Judicial Decisions
In at least three jurisdictions the courts have developed without
legislative assistance a rule precluding retaliatory evictions. The
leading case is Edwards v. Habib,6 "3 where the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said,
[ ..While the landlord may evict for any legal reason or for
no reason at all [when there is a periodic tenancy], he is not...
free to evict in retaliation for his tenant's report of housing code
violations to the authorities. As a matter of statutory construc-
tion and for reasons of public policy, such an eviction cannot be
permitted.
...Effective implementation and enforcement of the codes
obviously depend in part on private initiative in the reporting of
violations. . . . To permit retaliatory evictions, then, would
clearly frustrate the effectiveness of the housing code as a means
of upgrading the quality of housing in Washington....
This is not. . . to say that even if the tenant can prove a retal-
iatory purpose she is entitled to remain in possession in
perpetuity. If the illegal purpose is dissipated, the landlord can,
in the absence of legislation or a binding contract, evict his te-
nants or raise their rents for economic or other reasons, or even
for no reason at all. The question of permissible or impermissi-
ble purpose is one of fact for the court or jury, and while such a
determination is not easy, it is not significantly different from
601. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5714 (Supp. 1978).
602. Id. § 125.694(a)(2) (1976).
603. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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problems with which the courts must deal in a host of other con-
texts, such as when they must decide whether the employer who
discharges a worker has committed an unfair labor practice be-
cause he has done so on account of the employee's union activi-
ties.6°4
In Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp.60 5 the same court reversed the
judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,606 which had
affirmed a judgment for the landlord in a summary eviction action
after the landlord had terminated the periodic tenancy by notice.
The landlord had originally sought to evict the tenant for nonpay-
ment of rent, but had failed because the tenant established that the
lease was illegal under the doctrine of Brown v. Southall60 7 by virtue
of substantial housing code violations existing at the inception of the
lease. This had converted the tenant into a tenant at sufferance, sub-
ject to eviction on thirty days' notice. But when the notice was given
and a second eviction action was brought, the tenant defended on the
ground that the landlord's purpose was retaliation. The United
States Court of Appeals held that the rule of Edwards v. Habib was
applicable, saying that an attempt to evict a tenant for withholding
rent is as much against public policy as an eviction for reporting
housing code violations. 6 8 The landlord's affidavit that it wished to
remove the property from the rental market was held not to preclude
a finding that the purpose of the eviction was retaliation.60 9 The
court said that an unexplained eviction following a successful asser-
tion of a Brown610 or Javins61I defense creates a presumption of re-
taliation, and that an expressed wish to take the property off the
market does not rebut the presumption because it raises the further
question why the landlord wishes to do so. 612 Moreover, said the
court, the landlord's unwillingness to make necessary repairs is not
sufficient to rebut the presumption, nor is an asserted financial inabil-
ity to make such repairs sufficient unless the jury finds that the land-
604. Id. at 699-703.
605. 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
606. 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. 1969).
607. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968).
608. 463 F.2d at 862.
609. Id. at 859.
610. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968).
611. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
612. 463 F.2d at 865.
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lord is in fact unable to do so.613 Finally, even such a finding may
not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the landlord, since the exist-
ence of a legitimate reason for the landlord's decision to evict will not
aid him if the jury finds that he was in fact motivated by an illegiti-
mate purpose.61 4 Only if the landlord decides to get out of the hous-
ing business entirely will the jury be precluded from examining the
landlord's motives!615
The Edwards doctrine was adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Dickhut v. Norton,616 where, however, the court said that
"[tlo be successful in this defense ... [the tenant] must prove by
evidence that is clear and convincing that a condition existed which
in fact did violate the housing code, that the plaintiff-landlord knew
the tenant reported the condition to the enforcement authorities, and
that the landlord, for the sole purpose of retaliation, sought to termi-
nate the tenancy.' 617
Edwards was also adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Schweiger v. Superior Court,6 18 prior to the effective date of the 1970
amendment which added the statutory protection of tenants against
retaliatory action discussed above.6 19 Despite the adoption of that
amendment, the Schweiger doctrine remains important in California
because it is broader than the statute. Thus, e.g., Schweiger was in-
voked in SP. Growers Association v. Rodriguez' to permit the retali-
atory eviction defense where a farm labor contractor allegedly sought
to evict farm worker tenants in retaliation for their filing of a suit in
federal court charging him with violations of the Farm Labor Con-
tractor Registration Act.
There are lower court decisions in New York recognizing that a
claim that the landlord's motive is retaliatory may properly be ad-
vanced as an equitable defense to defeat the landlord's claim for pos-
session if the tenant establishes the retaliatory motive by clear and
613. Id. at 867.
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
617. Id. at 399, 173 N.W.2d at 302.
618. 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1970).
619. CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 1942.5 (Deering Supp. 1978), discussed in text ac-
companying notes 582 & 599 supra.
620. 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1976).
1979]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
convincing evidence.62'
VI. CONCLUSION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF RECOGNIZING THE
RESIDENTIAL TENANT'S RIGHT TO A HABITABLE
DWELLING
A. Theories as to the Economic Consequences
It is obvious that effective enforcement of the new right of the resi-
dential tenant to a habitable dwelling (through exercise of the new
tenant remedies) will subject landlords to increased costs for mainte-
nance and operation, taxes, insurance, and litigation. Depending on
supply and demand conditions in the rental housing market, land-
lords may either absorb the increased costs and operate at a lower
profit, pass on the increased costs (or part of them) in the form of
higher rents, or abandon their rental properties. Legislators and
courts generally have failed to consider the possibility that landlords
may adopt one or both of the latter options, in response to enforce-
ment of the new tenant's right to a habitable dwelling, thus harming
the very class of persons primarily sought to be protected by legisla-
tures and courts-low-income tenants. One of the few cases in which
this possibility is mentioned is Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Corp. ,622 where Judge Skelly Wright said:
[I]f the housing market is structured in such a way that it
is impossible for landlords to absorb the cost of bringing their
units into compliance with the [housing] code, there may be
nothing a court can do to prevent vigorous housing code en-
forcement from driving low cost housing off the market. But the
most recent scholarship on the subject indicates this danger is
largely imagined. In fact, it appears that vigorous code enforce-
ment plays little or no role in the decrease in low cost housing
stock. When code enforcement is seriously pursued, market
forces generally prevent landlords from passing on their in-
creased costs through rent increases.623
Unfortunately, the article cited by Judge Wright was entirely theo-
621. Tom's Point Apts. v. Goudzward, 72 Misc. 2d 629, 339 N.Y.2d 281 (Sup. Ct.
1972), aft'd, 79 Misc. 2d 206, 360 N.Y.S.2d 366 (App. Term 1973); 401 Boardwalk
Corp. v. Gutzwiler, 82 Misc. 2d 84, 368 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975). See also
Scarpitta v. Glen Cove Hous. Auth., 48 App. Div. 2d 657, 367 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1975).
622. 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
623. Id. at 860, citing Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of
the Poor. Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies, and Income Redistribution Policy, 80
YALE L.J. 1093 (1971).
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retical, lacking any empirical basis. Although the article did not ex-
plicitly consider the economic impact of widespread assertion of the
new tenant's right to a habitable dwelling, Professor Ackerman's the-
oretical analysis of the economic consequences of effective housing
code enforcement is clearly relevant to the issue here under consider-
ation. For present purposes, Professor Ackerman's principal conclu-
sions with respect to the economic effects of housing code
enforcement can be summarized as folows:
6 2 4
* If the supply of slum housing units is fixed and unresponsive to
increased costs of production, and the demand is responsive to
changes in rent, the increased costs imposed on landlords by effective
code enforcement will not be passed on to tenants in the form of
increased rent;
* The additional costs imposed on landlords by effective code en-
forcement will have little effect on investment in either low-income
housing or housing in general, and therefore no substantial decrease
in the supply of low-income rental housing will occur; and
* Improved housing will not cause any substantial inmigration of
624. This summary is adapted from Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of
the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 1175,
1177 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Komesar]. Professor Ackerman's article at 80 YALE
L.J. 1093 (1971) deals, of course, with a great many other issues in addition to the
impact of strict housing code enforcement on the cost and supply of low-income hous-
ing. Ackerman is primarily concerned with the relationship between housing codes,
housing subsidies, and income redistribution policy. Professor Ackerman does, how-
ever, offer the following comment on private tenant remedies near the end of his
article:
S.. [Liocalized rent-withholding actions cannot be expected to be terribly suc-
cessful in vindicating the "decent home" interest if they simply induce the iso-
lated target landlord to improve his building. For in the medium run-if not the
short run-the landlord will succeed in increasing his rent substantially as the
residents of the surrounding slum find the improved apartments more desirable.
Consequently, whatever virtue rent strikes may have in giving the poor a sense of
self-respect, they will frequently be rather ineffective income redistribution de-
vices. The same may be said for even more drastic remedies, like receiverships
and the suggestion that slum-lordism be made a tort. If, however, rent withhold-
ing and similar actions are more than sporadic and isolated affairs, their value as
a redistributive device holds greater promise .... [I]f tenant organizations can
achieve broad effectiveness throughout a particular Slumville, a properly drawn
rent witholding statute may provide a mechanism by which tenant organizations
may themselves take on the task of enforcing the code on a wide ranging basis.
And, as we have shown, comprehensive code enforcement permits a significant
possibility of substantial income redistribution in a wide range of situations.
Id. at 1095-96.
19791
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
tenants into an area, and hence it is unlikely that rents will increase
because of increased demand for improved housing.
Professor Ackerman's conclusions have been severely criticized by
Professors Komesar,625 Posner,626 Hirsch et a!.,627 and Abbott.628
Professor Komesar attacks Ackerman's seemingly unrealistic as-
sumptions that the supply of low-income housing is fixed and unre-
sponsive to increased costs of production and that the demand is
responsive to changes in rent.629 Professor Posner concludes that ef-
fective housing code enforcement would in fact result in higher rents
and a decrease in the housing supply for low-income tenants, and
that assertion of the new tenant remedies for breach of a statutory or
implied warranty would tend to produce these results.630 As Posner
points out, in the absence of government subsidies all costs that result
from housing code enforcement must come either out of "the rentals
paid by tenants or the rent of the land obtained by the landlords." 63'
Posner further concludes, without citing any empirical evidence, that
"tenants forced to pay higher rentals to cover the cost of compliance
. will be made worse off." 6
3 2
Hirsch et al. assert that Ackerman's conclusions can be questioned
625. Komesar, note 624 supra.
626. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 259-63 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
R. POSNER].
627. Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitabilit,
Laws Upon Rent. An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63
CALIF. L. REv. 1098 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Regression Analysis].
628. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integra-
tion, 56 B.U.L. REV. 1, 108-11 (1976).
629. Komesar, supra note 624, at 1186-93.
630. R. POSNER, supra note 626, at 260, 262.
631. Id. at 260.
Economic rent is an especially unpromising source of the funds necessary to
comply with the housing code, because the use of land for slum housing gener-
ally does not generate substantial rent. In New York and Chicago, where the
abandonment of slum dwellings by their owners has become a common phenom-
enon, the value of much land in slum areas, and hence its rent, must be at or near
zero. Even if the land itself has some value, the rent from using it for slum
housing may be zero, depending on the other uses to which the land might be
put. . . . In any case, the result of housing code enforcement is quite likely to be
a reduction in the stock of housing available to the poor, albeit the housing that
is available will be of higher quality than before.
Id.
632. Id. at 260. However, Posner subsequently says more cautiously:
There is no assurance that the poor will be on balance better off. Furthermore,
the renters in this case who bear a part of the cost of compliance are likely to
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on the ground that his abstract model may depart too far from real-
ity, and that while his assumption of a perfectly inelastic supply of
housing may be appropriate in the very short-run, it is contradicted
both by empirical evidence and by theories as to the supply of low-
income housing advanced by other economists.6 33 They further con-
clude, on the basis of an application of supply and demand concepts
to the analysis of the effect of habitability laws, that except under the
most unlikely circumstances, housing costs must increase if a law is
enforced so as to impose additional costs on landlords; if tenants feel
that they derive no benefit from the law, price increases will be less
than the additional costs imposed on landlords, and if tenants place
some positive value on the law, price increases will be
larger-perhaps large enough to offset completely the additional
costs associated with provision of the new, higher quality of hous-
ing.634 Hirsch et al. also recognize that even though tenants are
forced to pay higher rents because of habitability laws this fact does
not necessarily mean that tenants are worse off since the benefits re-
ceived by tenants by virtue of such laws may exceed the rent in-
creases.635 The authors suggest, however, that "habitability laws are
unlikely to effect a redistribution of wealth in favor of indigent te-
nants."636
Professor Abbott is critical of Ackerman's analysis because he
doubts that the conditions postulated for income redistribution from
the landlord class to the generally poorer tenant class by means of
effective housing code enforcement are likely to occur in any real-
world housing market.6 37 Abbott's analysis of the probable effect of
strict code enforcement distinguishes between several different types
of residential neighborhoods: (1) sound neighborhoods with stable or
include a number of almost-poor people for whom ownership of slum property
represents a first step in the escape from poverty.
Id. at 260-61.
633. Regression Analysis, supra note 627, at 1116, 1117 n.74, citing M. REID,
HOUSING AND INCOME (1962); de Leeuw, The Demand for Housing.: 4 Review of
Cross-Section Evidence, 53 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 1 (1971); Lee, Housing andPerma-
nent Income: Tests Based on a Three- Year Re-interview Survey, 50 REv. OF ECON. &
STAT. 480 (1968); Muth, The Demand for Uniform Housing, in THE DEMAND FOR
DURABLE GOODs 29 (A. Harberger ed. 1960).
634. Regression .4nalysis, supra note 627, at 1119.
635. Id. at 1133.
636. Id. at 1139.
637. Abbott, supra note 628, at 108-11.
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rising property values; (2) deteriorated neighborhoods with rising
property values; (3) sound neighborhoods with declining property
values; and (4) deteriorated neighborhoods with stable or declining
property values.63s He also deals with the problem on the alternative
assumptions that the low-income housing market structure is compet-
itive and monopolistic. 6 39 His ultimate conclusion is that, "whatever
it achieves, housing code enforcement is costly to the low income
housing consumer who is most likely to occupy units generating sub-
stantial code compliance costs" because "[h]e is forced either to pay
increased rents or to consume less housing, resulting in overcrowd-
ing"; and further, that "[e]ven when part or all of the cost is absorbed
by the owner, the result may be withdrawal of units from the market,
causing dislocation costs, increased crowding and higher prices for
those consumers who remain. '
Professor Meyers recently addressed the problem of the economic
impact of the implied warranty of habitability on the welfare of low-
income tenants, but without considering the underlying justifications
for adopting housing codes, since he was primarily concerned with
presenting a case against adoption of the implied warranty of habita-
bility in the Second Property Restatement.641 Professor Meyers' con-
clusions are generally similar to those of Professor Abbott. Meyers
distinguishes four categories of housing (rather than neighborhood
types) that may be affected by the implied warranty: (1) dwellings
which substantially comply with the housing code and hence will be
relatively unaffected by the implied warranty; (2) dwellings which do
not comply with the housing code and are considered unsuitable for
residential use but which can be brought up to code standards by
additional investment that can be recovered through higher rents; (3)
dwellings which do not comply with the housing code and are consid-
ered unsuitable for residential use but which can be brought up to
code standards by an expenditure that will reduce the landlord's rate
of return (because rents cannot be raised enough to cover repair
costs) but will not eliminate a positive return on "sunk capital"; (4)
dwellings which do not comply with the housing code and are consid-
ered unsuitable for residential use, for which the costs of repair to
638. Id. at 67-83.
639. Id. at 67-83, 83-85.
640. Id. at 86.
641. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27
STAN. L. REV. 879, 889-93 (1975).
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meet code standards (together with other expenses) will result in a
negative return on "sunk capital.' 642 Professor Meyers' conclusions,
briefly stated, are as follows: 3 Housing in category two will be
brought into compliance with the implied warranty, with the result
that tenants will either have to pay higher rents or move elsewhere.
Low-income tenants in category three housing will be benefited by
the implied warranty in the short-run, for as long as the landlord
recovers from rents all his out-of-pocket costs (including the cost of
repairs plus interest on his investment in repairs) he is likely to make
the repairs, at least while he has some equity in the property. But in
the long-run the quantity of category three housing will decrease be-
cause the operating costs associated with increased building age will
take their toll faster than normal and the housing will be forced into a
deficit position and removed from the market prematurely; and no
new category three property will be built since, while present owners
need only cover their operating costs, potential owners must be able
to cover their initial capital costs. Category four housing will be
withdrawn from the rental market and low-income tenants as a class
will be injured.6"
Other commentators have reached similarly conflicting conclusions
as to the allocation of the costs of effective housing code enforcement
between landlords and tenants.645
642. Id. at 889.
643. Id. at 889-92.
644. Since no one knows how the nation's substandard housing stock is divided
among categories two, three and four, one can summarize even more concisely as
follows: some proportion of the substandard rental housing stock would be upgraded
and rents would be raised to cover the added costs; some proportion would be up-
graded even though rents could not be raised, since landlords could still upgrade it
without incurring a deficit; and some portion would be abandoned as soon as the
owner determines that income will not cover the expenses of required repairs and
concludes that this deficit is likely to persist. Id. at 893.
645. Lyman, 4 Response to ULTRA-The Uniform Landlord Tenant Relationshp
Act, 37 J. PROP. MANAGEMENT 149, 159 (1972) (increased costs will be passed on);
Project, Abandonment of Residential Property in an Urban Context, 23 DE PAUL L.
REv. 1186, 1196-97 (1974) ("code enforcement brings about the finai completion of
the abandonment process which was partially caused, ironically, by ineffective code
enforcement during the previous ten or twenty years"); Note, Leases and the Illegal
Contract Theor--Judicial Reinforcement of the Housing Code, 56 GEo. L.J. 920, 928
(1968) (result will be abandonment, overcrowding, and reduction in supply of low-
income housing); Note, Landlord's Violation of Housing Code During Lease Term is
Breach of Implied Warranty oflHabitability Constituting Partial or Total Defense to an
Eviction Action Based on Nonpayment of Rent, 84 HARV. L. REv. 729, 733-36 (1971)
(increased costs will be passed on to tenant); Comment, An Assessment of the Impact
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B. Empirical Studies
There have been empirical studies of the effects of recognizing the
residential tenant's right to a habitable dwelling as established in
Pennsylvania,"6 Massachusetts, 647 Michigan,6 48 and California," 9 as
well as one study using data from all over the United States.6 '
A study of the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act65 in Pitts-
burgh, two years after its enactment in 1968, showed that only 1340
dwelling units had been certified as eligible for rent withholding, al-
of an Implied Warranty of Habitability in New York State, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 189,
201-04 (1974) ("the warranty would reduce the housing stock in lower-income mar-
kets by triggering some abandonment" but "the extent of this phenomenon would not
be as drastic as some have feared"); Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement
of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 304, 320-22 n.83 (1965) (no rent increases
because landlords are financially able to absorb the increased costs); Comment, Rent
Withholding Won't Work: The Need for a Realistic Rehabilitation Policy, 7 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 66, 83 (1974) (warranty would reduce lower-income housing stock
through abandonment but not as drastically as some have feared); Comment, Housing
Market Operations and the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act-An Economic Analy-
sis, 17 VILL. L. REV. 886, 914-21 (1972) (code enforcement simply hastens the aban-
donment and removal of units in which landlords do not believe further investment to
be justified; and the externalities of disinvestment may be substantially greater than
those of investment); P. Weitzman, An Economic Analysis of the Impact of Repair
and Deduct Legislation (Nov. 1977) (unpublished article available from Nat. Soc. Sci.
& Law Project, Inc., 1990 M St., N.W., Suite 610, Washington, D.C. 20036) (some
housing improvement can be achieved without rent increases).
See also Bross, Law Reform Meets the Slumlord, 3 URB. LAW. 609, 617 (1971);
Machbaur, Empty Houses.- Abandoned Residential Buildings in the Inner City, 17
How. L.J. 3, 40 (1971). Both articles suggest that abandonment is exacerbated by
strict code enforcement in the most-blighted areas.
646. Krumholz, Rent Withholding as an Aid to Housing Code Enforcement, 25 J.
HoUSING 242 (1969); Comment, Housing Market Operation and the Pennsylvania Rent
Withholding Act-An Economic Analysis, 17 VILL. L. REV. 821, 860-85 (1972).
647. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies." An Integra-
tion, 56 B.U.L. REV. 1, 62-64, 139-46 (1976).
648. Mosier & Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results:
A Study of Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. L.J. REF. 8 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Mosier & Soble]; Rose & Scott, "Street Talk" Summonses in Detroit's
Landlord-Tenant Court: A Small Step Forwardfor Urban Tenants, 52 J. URB. L. 967
(1975).
649. Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate: A California Case Stud, 66
CAL. L. REV. 37 (1978); Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of Hab-
itability in Practice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 729 (1976).
650. Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability
Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63
CAL. L. REv. 1098, 1116-36 (1975).
651. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
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though Pittsburgh was estimated to have 28,000 substandard units.
Of the tenants in these 1340 units, 573 opened escrow accounts, but
only 351 were paying into them, and only 100 units, or less than eight
percent of all units certified as eligible, had actually been brought
into compliance with the housing code.65 2 A later study of the opera-
tion of the Act in Philadelphia also seems to demonstrate the ineffec-
tiveness of the rent withholding remedy.653 The Philadelphia study
was based on an examination of some 1,100 escrow accounts of te-
nants living in two low-income, minority neighborhoods just north of
the central business district. The study revealed that between July
1970 and February 1972 more than fifteen percent of the dwelling
units in these neighborhoods were certified as unfit and therefore eli-
gible for rent withholding. But compliance with the housing code
was obtained in only 31.4% of cases where the escrow was closed and
compliance was only forty-one percent for the entire period from en-
actment of the Act in 1968 through February 1972. Moreover, thirty-
nine percent of all the units for which escrow accounts were estab-
lished were vacant by February 1972. This strongly suggests that the
rent withholding procedure forced substandard dwelling units off the
market; and the low percentage of compliance suggests that many
landlords were unable, rather than unwilling, to make repairs when
rents were placed in escrow. 6 5
4
Massachusetts adopted its rent withholding statutes in 1965.655
Abbott's study656 of the Boston Housing Court records for the period
from May 1, 1973, through April 30, 1974, to determine the incidence
of rent abatement defenses by tenants in landlord actions for posses-
sion and back rent indicates that tenant ignorance of the right to an
abatement of rent is widespread. Abbott's summary is as follows:
The survey of the Boston Housing Court records revealed that
only forty percent of the summary process cases were contested
by tenants represented by counsel. Less than fifteen percent of
the tenant-defendants even raised a rent abatement defense, al-
652. Krumholz, Rent Withholding as an Aid to Housing Code Enforcement, 25 J.
HOUSING 242, 243-44 (1969).
653. Comment, Housing Market Operation and the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding
Act-An Economic Analysis, 17 VILL. L. REV. 821, 882-84 (1972).
654. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integra-
tion, 56 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1976).
655. These statutes, as amended, are now MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 127C-L
& ch. 239, § 8A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1975).
656. Abbott, supra note 654, at 60.
1979]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
though most of the cases involved low income tenants repre-
sented by legal service attorneys. Yet, within the group of
contested cases in which the rent abatement defense was raised,
landlords did not fare well. Less than twenty percent of the time
did the landlord obtain the relief he sought-a judgment for pos-
session and the rent alleged due. More often the landlord could
obtain only possession and a substantially reduced rent. This
lack of success for landlords once a tenant raises the rent abate-
ment defense may account for the high percentage-nearly fifty
percent--of the cases disposed of by informal settlement without
any notation in the record ...
Clearly, the rent abatement remedy is not always utilized
whenever a Boston tenant is entitled to it. The ease of filing a
petition for rent reduction or of opposing a request for rent in-
crease before the Boston Rent Control Administration-a tenant
does not even need counsel to make an appearance-diminishes
the need for rent abatement. The other tenant-initiated code en-
forcement remedies available under Massachusetts law also de-
crease the importance of rent abatement. Still, the defense is
clearly effective in reducing the rent when it is employed. Thus,
the threat to utilize rent abatement must carry weight with Bos-
ton landlords, and apparently will trigger repair and mainte-
nance activity that would not otherwise be undertaken.657
A study of the 1968 Michigan tenants' rights legislation,65 based
on the cases filed and tried in the Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court
during 1970 and 1971, reached the "inescapable conclusion" that
"[t]he reform legislation. . . was not meeting the goals that had been
set for it in 1968. "659
The new statutory defenses and warranties affected Detroit te-
nants, and thus landlords, very little. As before the legislation,
landlords continued filing a large number of cases in Detroit
Landlord-Tenant Court, and writs of eviction actually increased
slightly. The court continued to serve the landlords as before,
and the new defenses were only slightly utilized. In over 90 per-
cent of the cases filed, the landlords did not have to contend with
any tenant defenses, old or new; and in only approximately 3
percent of the cases filed did landlords have one of the new de-
657. Id. at 63-64.
658. Mosier & Soble, note 648 supra. The principal focus of the study was on the
statutory warranty of habitability, codified in MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139
(Supp. 1978), and the use of the breach of warranty defense in summary actions to
evict for nonpayment of rent.
659. Mosier & Soble, supra note 648, at 61.
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fenses, either landlord breach or retaliation, raised against them.
Even considering only the cases where the tenants appeared and
contested the action (20 percent of cases filed), the landlords
need not have expected many fierce legal battles: less than 35
percent of the tenants who appeared raised any defense, and less
than 13 percent raised one of the new defenses.
The outcomes of the cases studied show even more clearly
how miniscule was the effect of the new legislation. Of the cases
started, 97 percent resulted in the landlord's obtaining all he
sought, by voluntary dismissal, default, or taking judgment in a
contested case. In contested cases, 85 percent resulted in com-
plete victory for the landlord. So the study showed that neither
the new defenses nor the old defenses significantly affected the
outcome of court cases.66 °
The contrast between results of the Detroit study and results of the
Boston study are striking indeed. Two new reforms were introduced
in Detroit in 1972 in an effort to "address the complementary goals of
right to effective notice of pending suit, right to counsel in civil cases,
and improvement in housing quality"; a legal aid clinic was estab-
lished on the same floor as the Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court, and
"the mystifying legal jargon of the standard summons and other
court forms" was replaced with new forms written in "more compre-
hensible 'street talk'" and including clear instructions on "how to get
legal help."66' A 1975 study of cases in the Detroit Landlord-Tenant
Court concluded that the tenant default rate had declined following
the 1972 reforms,66 2 that the breach of warranty defense was more
often raised, 66 3 and that more tenants were represented by counsel, 664
but that the actual outcome of the litigation remained "almost exclu-
sively pro-landlord" although there was "a slight gain in tenant victo-
ries" in comparison with the 1971-72 period.665
Since Green v. Superior Cour 6 6 6 recognized the implied warranty
of habitability in California, two studies of the impact of Green have
660. Id.
661. Rose & Scott, "Street Talk" Summonses in Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court:
4 Small Step for Urban Tenants, 52 J. URB. L. 967, 986-91 (1975).
662. Id. at 993-97.
663. Id. at 998-99.
664. Id. at 999-1002.
665. Id. at 1002-09.
666. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
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been carried out. The first of these studies667 was based upon docket
searches of the San Francisco Municipal Court for the period Janu-
ary 17, 1974, through June 14, 1974; docket searches of the San Fran-
cisco Small Claims Court for the period between January 29, 1974,
and June 14, 1974;668 and interviews with judges, landlords' attor-
neys, tenants' attorneys, and representatives of tenant organizations
throughout the greater Bay Area.6 6 9 This study reached conclusions
generally similar to those reached in the Pittsburgh, Philadelphia,
Detroit, and Boston studies:
The implied warranty of habitability, established in California
by Green v. Superior Court, is not being extensively used. Sim-
ply stated, the problem is that few low income tenants receive
the legal advice necessary to make use of this innovation in land-
lord-tenant law. Rather, the majority of unlawful detainer ac-
tions are dropped or defaulted. Green appears to be a classic
example of a "progressive" judicial move unknown and rela-
tively unimportant to the very people it was intended to assist.
Even when raised, the uninhabitability defense has had only a
moderate impact on case outcomes. As a result, it is doubtful
that Green has affected the housing market greatly. It is neither
accomplishing its presumed goal of "decent housing" nor result-
ing in the massive dislocation of the housing market predicted
by its critics.67°
A later study conducted in southern California67 1 indicates, how-
ever, that the implied warranty of habitability is beginning to have its
intended consequences, although it continues to face formidable
problems of implementation.672 The study area encompassed about
fifteen square miles and a population of 95,000, of whom 56% were
white, 35% Spanish surnamed, 5% black, and 3% others, including
Native Americans and Samoans. Some 3,800 of the 35,000 rental
units in the area had been rated "unsound" by a municipal agency,
but the standard used included items irrelevant to the implied war-
ranty standard, such as overcrowding.673 As the authors point out,
667. Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty in Practice, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 729 (1976).
668. Id. at 735.
669. Id. at 736-37.
670. Id. at 776-77.
671. Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate. 4 California Case Study, 66
CALIF. L. Rav. 37 (1978).
672. Id. at 59.
673. Id. at 41-42.
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Examination of the housing occupied by the warranty tenants
and the defendants in unlawful detainer actions, and a review of
the complaints of the warranty tenants suggest that the Califor-
nia low-income housing situation differs markedly from the east-
ern image. Much of the California housing stock, including that
in the study area, is dominated by structures smaller and in bet-
ter condition than the infamous abandoned New York walk-up
tenement. About half of the warranty clients and unlawful de-
tainer defendants lived in buildings containing four units or
fewer, and few lived in buildings of twenty units or more.67 4
The study produced the following conclusions (or "grounded hy-
potheses"):
1) Green is being employed more often and violations of the
warranty occur less often than assumed.
2) Most of the California low-income housing stock is in de-
cline and economically repairable as opposed to decayed and ec-
onomically unrepairable.
3) The use of the warranty does not affect the housing mar-
ket.
4) The warranty is leading to the repair of property and
could assist code enforcement if knowledge of it spreads.
5) Tenants who remain in possession do not have their rents
substantially raised.
6) Few tenants who do not seek the aid of an attorney before
the eviction process has begun remain in possession at the con-
clusion of the dispute.
7) While aggressive tenants act in ways consistent with the
warranty and bring their cases to legal services, serious problems
stand in the way of diffusing knowledge of the law.
8) Because of judicial hostility to warranty cases, tenants in-
cur the social and economic cost of moving, landlords lose the
partial rent envisioned in the Green decision and the ambiguity
in the language of the decision is not being clarified.
9) Most tenants or their lawyers are not inclined to abuse the
law.
10) While rent strikes are taking place, there is little move-
ment toward tenant union formation.675
Hirsch, et al.676 applied multiple regression analytical techniques
to data from a survey of 5,000 households undertaken in the period
674. Id. at 43-44.
675. Id. at 67.
676. Hirsch, Hirsch, & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability
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1968-72 by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center.677
The Hirsch study selected for analysis all the low-income households
occupying rented dwellings located in metropolitan areas with popu-
lations greater than 50,000 and that live within 30 miles of the central
business district. The conclusions of Hirsch, et al1.6 78 were that re-
ceivership laws were associated with statistically significant higher
rents, and that there was a positive, but not statistically significant,
relationship between rent levels and "other habitability laws"-ie.,
statutes or judicial decisions authorizing the "repair-and-deduct,"
rent withholding, and rent abatement remedies. With respect to the
lack of a strong relationship between the availability of the repair-
and-deduct, rent withholding, and rent abatement remedies and rent
levels, the authors advance the following hypotheses:
* * * The most logical explanation, and the one most consistent
with the sketchy empirical information which exists on the sub-
ject, is that repair and deduct and rent withholding remedies are
not being used by tenants to any great extent. If these remedies
are not widely used, no real costs would be imposed on land-
lords, and thus there would be no increased costs to be passed on
to tenants.
If tenant-initiated code enforcement remedies are not widely
used by tenants (or at least were not frequently used by tenants
from 1968 to 1972, the years included in this study), the question
then arises as to the reasons for their lack of use. Housing and
legal services agencies often point to the lack of information and
resources on the part of poor tenants. If costs are indeed passed
on to low-income tenants, as suggested by the experience with
receivership laws, a greater availability of information and re-
sources for indigent tenants may result in higher rents being
charged. Thus, if legal service organizations increase the
probability that tenants will invoke habitability laws, such orga-
nizations may hurt, rather than help, their clients, at least to the
extent of indirectly giving impetus to an increase in rent.
There is another possible explanation for the infrequent use of
such remedies, however. Tenants may indeed know of the avail-
ability of such remedies and in addition perceive the potentially
counterproductive consequences of invoking such remedies.
Thus, the infrequent use of tenant-initiated code enforcement
Laws Upon Rent:. An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63
CAL. L. REv. 1098 (1975).
677. Id. at 1125.
678. Id. at 1130.
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mechanisms may be a reflection of a foresighted perception of
self-interest. This explanation ...may be questioned on the
ground that in the short run the tenant who invokes legal reme-
dies may not be the one who suffers the effects of his actions.
Retaliatory eviction laws may temporarily insulate the initiating
tenant from economic responsibility for his actions. However,
on an aggregate level, all low-income tenants in the immediate
housing market will suffer the counterproductive effects of the
initiating tenant's actions.
Despite the existence of these theoretical flaws, the above ex-
planation has an undeniable intuitive appeal. Low-income ten-
ants are undoubtedly deterred from exercising their rights when
faced with the prosepct of being forced, upon short notice, to
find new accomodations in an extremely tight housing market.
The uncertainty of the law itself may restrain the exercise of ten-
ant rights. In addition, there is probably an unstated recognition
on the part of tenants that the law can provide little protection
against a hostile landlord. Tenants are acutely aware that a
landlord can make a tenant's life extremely unpleasant despite
the formal existence of retaliatory eviction laws. The costs of
resorting to the law to vindicate one's rights as a tenant may
become so burdensome as to make continued occupancy un-
pleasant even if a tenant's right to possession is formally sanc-
tioned by the law.679
There is also some evidence suggesting that the decline in tenant
use of New York's Spiegel Act68° (allowing the state welfare agency
to withhold rental allowances from landlords until housing code vio-
lations are corrected) after 1966, and its almost complete disuse after
1969, "most likely" resulted from "a realization that such a withhold-
ing law worked to the detriment of indigent tenants. 681
In closing, Sternlieb's pioneering empirical studies of the behavior
of slum landlords682 should be mentioned. Sternlieb's major conclu-
679. Id. at 1130-31.
680. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 143-b (McKinney 1966).
681. Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability
Laws Upon Rent. An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63
CAL. L. REv. 1098, 1135-36 n.106 (1975) (quoting Simmons, Passion & Prudence.-
Rent Withholding Under New York's Spiegel Law, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 572, 587 n.72
(1965), and citing I. LOWRY, J. GUERON & K. EISENSTADT, WELFARE HOUSING IN
NEW YORK CITY 25 (1972)). Hirsch et al. also present statistical proof as to the
decline in tenant use of the Spiegel Act. Id. 1135-36 n. 106.
682. G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE TENE-
MENT LANDLORD REVISITED (1973); G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD
(1966).
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sions are as follows:
* "Actual abandonment of blighted neighborhoods by landlords
has reached shockingly high levels." '683
* The classic view of the rapacious slumlord who "milks" his
rental properties is largely a myth.684
* Housing code enforcement is counterproductive.685
* Slum landlords do not believe that repairs to their rental
properties can be justified on the basis of increased rentals or resale
potential.686
As Professor Meyers has pointed out,
Abandonment figures alone do not prove much, but when
combined with the reasons for abandonment, they forcefully
683. G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE TENE-
MENT LANDLORD REVISITED at xiii (1973). The book deals primarily with blighted
areas in Newark, New Jersey, where the authors report a gross abandonment rate of
2% per year of the combined residential, commercial, and industrial building stock.
Id. at 283. Referring to a study sample of 569 residential buildings first studied in
1964, the authors found that by late 1971, 84, or more than 15%, had been abandoned.
Id. 284. In another Newark study sample, composed of 286 buildings, 20% had been
abandoned between 1964 and 1971. Id. at 318. For the city as a whole, during the
1967-71 period, 2535 structures constituting 8% of the housing stock of Newark had
been abandoned. Id. at 278. The authors also cite abandonment rates of 2% for New
York City as a whole, 6% to 10% for Brooklyn (East New York section), 16% for the
worst part of St. Louis, and 20% for Chicago (Woodlawn and Lawndale sections). Id.
at 276. Reporting a study using a different definition of abandonment, the authors
state that 4% of the St. Louis housing stock had been abandoned as of January 1,
1971, and that in North Lawndale, Chicago, 2.6% of the area's housing units were
abandoned in a two-month period between September and November 1970. Id. at
276.
684. Id. at xvi-xvii: "The reality is that the white owner in an urban core area
increasingly is unable to rent his mortgage-free structures to poor blacks and still
derive the necessary income to meet expenses (prime among them are taxes) and turn
the necessary profit to remain solvent. "It . . . does not appear to hold that suc-
ceeding waves of tenement landlords were milking parcels and from this deriving
substantial income." (Emphasis in original.)
685. Id. at xvii, xix:
The pace of urban decay, exemplified by secondary industrial cities, has outrun
all the remedies that have been applied. . . [Assigning blame to maladministra-
tion and corruption tends] to hide rather than typify the underlying reality, pro-
viding a false feeling of assurance that, given a better administration [of housing
codes], or more comprehending funding agencies, or some magic inspiration of
imagination, all could be made well.
* . * Code enforcement,.., when private owners are fleeing the market, be-
comes self-defeating.
686. Id. at 65.
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support the argument that increasing the repair costs of slum
housing or, in the alternative, reducing rental income by al-
lowing tenants to withhold rent, will raise the abandonment
rate. 687
C. Epilogue
As indicated at the beginning of this article,6 s8 the new rule that
the landlord must provide a habitable dwelling for his tenants has
now been adopted in at least thirty-one jurisdictions. In eleven of
these jurisdictions, the new principle was originally established by
judicial decision;689 in the others, by legislation.69" But in several ju-
risdictions the new judge-made implied warranty of habitability has
been superseded by broader warranty of habitability legislation.691
Fifteen states692 have now enacted legislation based on the Model
Code or the URLTA, both of which include a detailed specification
of the landlord's "warranty" obligation and the tenant's remedies for
breach of that obligation. If the trend toward recognition of the resi-
dential tenant's right to a habitable dwelling continues in the future,
it seems probable that it will take the form of further adoptions (and
adaptations) of the URLTA rather than new case law. But it is quite
possible that the impetus for adoption of the new "habitability" prin-
ciples, whether by legislation or by judicial decision, may be slowed
by legislative and judicial doubts as to the likelihood that changing
the law on the books will have much effect on the law of landlord and
tenant in action, and the likelihood that the welfare of tenants will, in
fact, be improved if the new habitability principles should prove to
have substantial effect in the real world. It is interesting to note that
the legislatures of Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Texas recently gave
consideration to enactment of new landlord-tenant legislation includ-
ing a warranty of habitability, and that the proposed legislation failed
of passage in all three states.693
687. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27
STAN. L. REV. 879, 896 (1975).
688. See text accompanying notes 5-28 supra.
689. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
690. See text accompanying notes 6-13 supra.
691. See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
692. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
693. See Krieger & Shurn, Landlord-Tenant Law: Indiana at the Crossroads, 10
IND. L. REV. 591, 641-42 (1977) (URLTA rejected); Sohns & Fuller, Texas Landlord-
Tenant Law and the Sixtj-Ft fh Legislature, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 497, 504-08 (1977) (signifi-
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cant landlord-tenant legislation not passed); Comment, Implied Warranty of Habita-
bility in Pennsylvania, 15 DUQ. L. REv. 459, 469-74 (1977), discussing pending
legislation, and concluding:
[T]he Pennsylvania legislature will probably join the national trend and enact a
warranty provision regardless of how it reconciles the differences between the
versions [in different bills] regarding remedies. A review of recent literature con-
cerning the warranty, however, suggests that the legislature might do well to take
heed and evaluate the reasons why disillusionment with the warranty and its
underlying assumptions has begun to appear.
Id. at 474-75.
Apparently the Pennsylvania legislature did "take heed."
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